

BOOK 1 of 2

**THE
IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL**

United Nations S/RES/2231 (2015)

Security Council

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20 July 2015

**AMERICAN SECURITY
SLIDE**

(SOME LIES OF THE IRAN DEAL EXPOSED)
{imam obama at his best}

**A
REVIEW
BY
A
PROCESS ENGINEER**

28-AUG-2015

BY: kevin I olson

American Security SLIDE

(SOME LIES of the IRAN DEAL EXPOSED) - SUMMARY

1. Keeps IRAN from acquiring a Nuclear Weapon: A LIE !

a. See Item B.8 Page 22 of 124

"UN Security Council Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that on the date **ten years after** the JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, **all the provisions of this resolution shall be terminated**, and none of the previous resolutions described in paragraph 7 (a) shall be applied, the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the item **"Non-proliferation"** will be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized;"

i. JCPOA Adoption Day was 20-Jul-2015.

b. See Item Page 108 of 124

2.1.11. Review and approve in advance, **upon request by Iran**, the design, development, fabrication, acquisition, or use for non-nuclear purposes of **multi-point explosive detonation systems** suitable for a **nuclear explosive device and explosive diagnostic systems** (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, as provided for in paragraphs 82.2 and 82.3 of Annex I;

[SO EVERYTHING IRAN IS NOT SUPPOSE TO HAVE AND DO UNDER THIS SO-CALLED PEACEFUL DEAL IRAN CAN ASK FOR ???]

[IRAN WILL ASK FOR IT OR WILL KEEP IT IN SECRET UNDISCLOSED OPERATION FOR 10 YEARS OR SOONER !!!]

[THEN IRAN WILL UNLEASH HELL ON EARTH IN THE WESTERN WORLD WITH ALL OF IRAN'S SECRET UNDISCLOSED NUCLEAR WEAPONS !!!]

c. See Item 4 Page 120 of 124

"All States **may participate in and permit the activities described below provided** that the Security Council decides in advance **[WHAT HAPPENS AFTER 8 YEARS OR SOONER ???]** on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of **any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;**"

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND IRAN WILL HAVE A NUCLEAR BOMB 8 YEARS OR SOONER !!!]

2. The IRAN Deal is about Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power: A LIE !

a. See Item 19. Under Sanctions Page 34 of 124

"SANCTIONS

19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following areas, as described in Annex II:

xi. **Export of key naval equipment and technology;**"

[WTF – EU IS SUPPOSED TO BE ONE OF OUR ALLIES – WHAT NAVAL TECHNOLOGIES AND SECRETS HAVE WE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SHARED WITH THE EU ???]

[SILENT SECRET SERVICE OF OUR U.S. NAVY SUBMARINE SERVICE ???]

[WILL THIS ALLOW OUR TECHNOLOGIES AND SECRETS TO BE ABLE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO IRAN ???]

[HOW MUCH OF WHAT SNOWDEN STOLE HAS PUT OUR SILENT SECRET SERVICE AT RISK ???]

b. See Item 5 Page 120 of 124 "All States may participate in and permit, provided that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, **of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel;**"

[IF THIS DEAL IS REALLY ABOUT PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR POWER WHAT THE HELL IS THIS DOING IN HERE AS PART OF THIS DEAL????]

3. There will 7/24 Inspections of Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A LIE !

a. 7/24 is not stated anywhere in the document.

b. "continuous monitoring" is a term used but it is not defined.

i. There are some references to cameras and electronic measuring devices.

c. “inspections” is a term used, but not for the benefit of monitoring Iran’s Nuclear facilities, but for protecting Iran vessels and their cargo from inspections:

i. See Items 3.4.3 & 3.4.4 Pages 60 & 61 of 124

3.4.3. Cessation of inspection. [YOU HAVE TO BE SHITTING ME !!!!]

[IF YOU CAN’T INSPECT HOW DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA IF THEY ARE CARRYING ITEMS IRAN IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE CARRYING ????] [GIVES IRAN A WIDE OPEN DOOR FOR VIOLATING THE DEAL !!!!]

seizure and disposal by EU Member States of cargoes to and from Iran in their territories with regard to items which are no longer prohibited; and

3.4.4. Provision of bunkering or ship supply services, or any other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels not carrying prohibited items; and the provision of fuel, engineering and maintenance services to Iranian cargo aircraft not carrying prohibited items.

[IF YOU CAN’T INSPECT HOW DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA IF THEY ARE CARRYING ITEMS IRAN IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE CARRYING ????]

[IF TERRORIST ONCE USED COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT THERE IS A PLAN TO USE CARGO AIRCRAFT !!!!]

[GIVES IRAN A WIDE OPEN DOOR FOR VIOLATING THE DEAL AND BRING HELL ON EARTH TO THE DOORSTEPS OF THE WESTERN NATIONS !!!!]

ii. See Item 7 Page 123 of 124

7. All States are called upon to facilitate full implementation of the JCPOA by inspecting, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains

[NO INSPECTIONS AT-WILL ARE ALLOWED !!!! SEE 3.4.3 PAGE 41/104 AND CONTINUED ON PAGE 42/104 !!!!]

items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement; and are called upon also to cooperate in inspections on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, if there is information that provides reasonable grounds

[NO INSPECTIONS AT-WILL ARE ALLOWED !!!! SEE 3.4.3 PAGE 41/104 AND CONTINUED ON PAGE 42/104 !!!!]

to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement.

China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union note their understanding that, upon adoption of a resolution endorsing the JCPOA, the Security Council would make the practical arrangements to undertake directly

[HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO RESPOND TO THESE REQUIREMENTS ????]

[JUST ALLOWS FOR DELAYS SO IRAN CAN HIDE WHAT THEY ARE REALLY DOING !!!!]

the tasks specified in this statement, including to monitor and take action to support the implementation by Member States of these provisions, review proposals described in paragraph 2 of this statement, answer inquiries from Member States, provide guidance, and examine information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution. Furthermore, these states propose that the Security Council ask the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of these provisions every six months.

The duration of the provisions in this statement may be reviewed by the Joint Commission at the request of any participant at its biannual ministerial-level meetings, at which time the Joint Commission could make recommendations by consensus to the Security Council.

4. The VOTE of the U.S. Congress can keep the Iran Deal from taking place: A LIE !

a. See Item 2 Page 21 of 124

b. 2. Calls upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments [Does a vote by the U.S. Congress that rejects this agreement not violate this clause ???? Why would Secretary Kerry ever agree to this ????] [Has Obama and his Administration decided that his Executive Branch is above the Legislative Branch process of our Federal Government and can do whatever they want ????] [What is Imam Obama’s real goal ????] [Divide and conquer U.S. ????] [This cannot be about Democrats and Republicans – it must be about U.S. – The United States of America. Obama has done nothing but attempt to divide and conquer U.S. !!!! Will this Congress allow him to continue ????] [SUBJUGATION OF THE U.S. CONGRESS OCCURS IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE DOCUMENT !] under the JCPOA;

c. A NO VOTE by CONGRESS and VETO OVERRIDE by the SENATE will PROVIDE for MAXIMUM PROTECTION for the UNITED STATES of AMERICA !!!!

i. NO DEAL IS BETTER FOR THE UNITED STATES than THIS IRAN DEAL !!!!

A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Atomic Age and the Hell that's Raged !!!!



**140 lbs of Uranium 235 – Half a Loaf of Bread
Mushrooms over Hiroshima**

Aftermath 80,000 killed instantly 2X 1-yr later

How many are still suffering?



**14 lbs of Plutonium 239 – A Rubik's Cube
Mushrooms over Nagasaki**

Aftermath 40,000 killed instantly 2x 1-yr later

How many are still suffering?



What would 2 lbs. in a suitcase bomb do in downtown W.D.C., New York, Boston, Miami, Chicago, Des Moines, Omaha, Dallas, Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, L.A., or San Diego?

How well did we hide the Manhattan Project?

What about the Lockheed Martin Skunk Works?

How easy would it be for IRAN to have these programs now for a suitcase bomb?

WHAT ARE WE DOING IN SECRET THAT THE PUBLIC DOESN'T KNOW?

What were we doing with Japan before they bombed Pearl Harbor?

Negotiating !!!!

What were we doing with Russia before they invaded Afghanistan?

Negotiating !!!!

What were we doing before 911?


RADICAL ISLAM SEEKS OUR DEATH !!!!

AND WE'RE NEGOTIATING ????? !!!!

Enriched uranium

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Proportions of uranium-238 (blue) and uranium-235 (red) found naturally versus enriched grades

Enriched uranium is a type of [uranium](#) in which the percent composition of [uranium-235](#) has been increased through the process of [isotope separation](#). [Natural uranium](#) is 99.284% ²³⁸U isotope, with ²³⁵U only constituting about 0.711% of its weight. ²³⁵U is the only [nuclide existing in nature](#) (in any appreciable amount) that is [fissile](#) with [thermal neutrons](#).^[1]


Enriched uranium is a critical component for both civil [nuclear power generation](#) and military [nuclear weapons](#). The [International Atomic Energy Agency](#) **attempts** *[There are no gaurentees – THE IRAN Nuclear Deal does nothing – It is all political fluff - NO DEAL is better]* to monitor and control enriched uranium supplies and processes in its efforts to ensure nuclear power generation safety and curb [nuclear weapons proliferation](#).

During the [Manhattan Project](#) enriched uranium was given the codename **oralloy**, a shortened version of [Oak Ridge alloy](#), after the location of the plants where the uranium was enriched.^[citation needed] The term oralloy is still occasionally used to refer to enriched uranium. There are about 2,000 [tonnes](#) (t, Mg) of highly enriched uranium in the world,^[2] produced mostly for [nuclear weapons](#), [naval propulsion](#), and smaller quantities for [research reactors](#).

The ²³⁸U remaining after enrichment is known as [depleted uranium](#) (DU), and is considerably less [radioactive](#) than even natural uranium, though still very dense and extremely hazardous in granulated form – such granules are a natural by-product of the shearing action that makes it useful for [armor-penetrating weapons](#) and [radiation shielding](#). At present, 95 percent of the world's stocks of depleted uranium remain in secure storage.

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE FACTS ON THE ONLY 2 NUKES USED.

Little Boy



Cross-section drawing of Y-1852 Little Boy showing major mechanical component placement. Drawing is shown to scale. Numbers in () indicate quantity of identical components. Not shown are the APS-13 radar units, clock box with pullout wires, baro switches and tubing, batteries, and electrical wiring. (John Coster-Mullen)

- Z) Armor Plate
- Y) Mark XV electric gun primers (3)
- X) Gun breech with removable inner plug
- W) Cordite powder bags (4)
- V) Gun tube reinforcing sleeve
- U) Projectile steel back
- T) Projectile Tungsten-Carbide disk
- S) U-235 projectile rings (9)
- R) Alignment rod (3)
- Q) Armored tube containing primer wiring (3)
- P) Baro ports (8)
- O) Electrical plugs (3)
- N) 6.5" bore gun tube
- M) Safing/arming plugs (3)
- L) Lift lug
- K) Target case gun tube adapter
- J) Yagi antenna assembly (4)
- I) Four-section 13" diameter Tungsten-Carbide tamper cylinder sleeve
- H) U-235 target rings (6)
- G) Polonium-Beryllium initiators (4)
- F) Tungsten-Carbide tamper plug
- E) Impact absorbing anvil
- D) K-46 steel target liner sleeve
- C) Target case forging
- B) 15" diameter steel nose plug forging
- A) Front nose locknut attached to 1" diameter main steel rod holding target components


"Atom Bombs: The Top Secret Inside Story of Little Boy and Fat Man," 2003, p 112.
John Coster-Mullen drawing used with permission

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(Redirected from [Little boy](#))

Jump to: [navigation](#), [search](#)

For other uses, see [Little boy \(disambiguation\)](#).

Little Boy



A post-war Little Boy model

Type [Nuclear weapon](#)

Place of origin United States of America

Production history

Designer [Los Alamos Laboratory](#)

Produced 1945

Number built 32

Specifications

Weight 9,700 pounds (4,400 kg)

Length 10 feet (3.0 m)

Diameter 28 inches (71 cm)

Filling [Uranium-235](#)

Filling weight 140 lb (64 kg)


Blast yield 15 kilotons of TNT (63 TJ)

Little Boy was the [codename](#) for the type of [atomic bomb](#) dropped on the Japanese city of [Hiroshima](#) on 6 August 1945 by the [Boeing B-29 Superfortress *Enola Gay*](#), piloted by [Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, Jr.](#), commander of the [509th Composite Group](#) of the [United States Army Air Forces](#). It was the first atomic bomb to be used in [warfare](#). The [Hiroshima bombing](#) was the second artificial [nuclear explosion](#) in history, after the [Trinity test](#), and the first [uranium](#)-based detonation. It exploded with an energy of approximately 15 kilotons of TNT (63 TJ). The bomb caused significant destruction to the city of Hiroshima.

Little Boy was developed by [Lieutenant Commander Francis Birch](#)'s group of [Captain William S. Parsons](#)'s Ordnance (O) Division at the [Manhattan Project](#)'s [Los Alamos Laboratory](#) during [World War II](#). Parsons flew on the Hiroshima mission as weaponeer. The Little Boy was a development of the unsuccessful [Thin Man nuclear bomb](#). Like Thin Man, it was a [gun-type fission weapon](#), but derived its explosive power from the [nuclear fission](#) of [uranium-235](#). This was accomplished by shooting a hollow cylinder of uranium over another hollow enriched uranium cylinder by means of a charge of nitrocellulose propellant powder. It contained 64 kg (141 lb) of enriched uranium, of which less than a kilogram underwent nuclear fission. Its components were fabricated at three different plants so that no one would have a copy of the complete design.

After the war ended, it was not expected that the inefficient Little Boy design would ever again be required, and many plans and diagrams were destroyed, but by mid-1946 the [Hanford Site](#) reactors were suffering badly from the [Wigner effect](#), so six Little Boy assemblies were produced at [Sandia Base](#). The Navy [Bureau of Ordnance](#) built another 25 Little Boy assemblies in 1947 for use by the nuclear-capable [Lockheed P2V Neptune aircraft carrier](#) aircraft. All the Little Boy units were withdrawn from service by the end of January 1951.

Fat Man



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This article is about the World War II nuclear weapon. For other uses, see [Fat Man \(disambiguation\)](#).

Fat Man



Replica of the original "Fat Man" bomb

Type [Nuclear weapon](#)

Place of origin United States of America

Production history

Designer [Los Alamos Laboratory](#)

Produced 1945–1949

Number built 120

Specifications

Weight 10,300 pounds (4,670 kg)

Length 128 inches (3.3 m)

Diameter 60 inches (1.5 m)

Filling [Plutonium](#)

Filling weight 6.2 kilograms (14 lb)

Blast yield 21 [kt](#) (88 TJ)

"**Fat Man**" was the codename for the type of [atomic bomb](#) that was [detonated over the Japanese city of Nagasaki](#) by the United States on 9 August 1945. It was the second of the only two nuclear weapons ever used in [warfare](#), the first being [Little Boy](#), and its detonation caused the third man-made nuclear explosion. It was

built by scientists and engineers at [Los Alamos Laboratory](#) using [plutonium](#) from the [Hanford Site](#) and dropped from the [Boeing B-29 Superfortress Bockscar](#). For the Fat Man mission, *Bockscar* was piloted by [Major Charles W. Sweeney](#).

The name Fat Man refers generically to the early design of the bomb, because it had a wide, round shape. It was also known as the Mark III. Fat Man was an [implosion-type nuclear weapon](#) with a [plutonium core](#). The first to be detonated was [the Gadget](#), in the [Trinity nuclear test](#), less than a month earlier on 16 July at the [Alamogordo Bombing and Gunnery Range](#) in New Mexico. This bomb was identical in most respects to the Fat Man used at Nagasaki.

Two more Fat Man bombs were detonated during the [Operation "Crossroads"](#) nuclear tests at [Bikini Atoll](#) in 1946. Some 120 Fat Man units were produced between 1947 and 1949, when it was superseded by the [Mark 4 nuclear bomb](#). The Fat Man was retired in 1950.

Early decisions[\[edit\]](#)

In 1942, prior to the Army taking over wartime atomic research, [Robert Oppenheimer](#) held conferences in Chicago in June and [Berkeley, California](#), in July, at which various engineers and physicists discussed nuclear bomb design issues. A gun-type design was chosen, in which two sub-[critical masses](#) would be brought together by firing a "bullet" into a "target".^[1] The idea of an [implosion-type nuclear weapon](#) was suggested by [Richard Tolman](#) but attracted scant consideration.^[2]

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO REDUCE FURTHER USE?

KEY ITEMS HIGHLIGHTED !!!!

SALT I Treaty[[edit](#)]

SALT.. I is the common name for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement, also known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and was signed on May 26, 1972. SALT I froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels and provided for the addition of new [submarine-launched ballistic missile](#) (SLBM) launchers only after the same number of older [intercontinental ballistic missile](#) (ICBM) and SLBM launchers had been dismantled.^[2] SALT I also limited land-based ICBMs that were in range from the northeastern border of the continental United States to the northwestern border of the continental USSR.^[3] In addition to that, SALT I limited the number of SLBM capable submarines that NATO and the United States could operate to 50 with a maximum of 800 SLBM launchers between them. If the United States or NATO were to increase that number, the USSR could respond with increasing their arsenal by the same amount.

The strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States were changing in character in 1968. The total number of missiles held by the United States had been static since 1967 at 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs but there was an increasing number of missiles with [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle](#) (MIRV) warheads being deployed. MIRVs carried multiple nuclear warheads, often with [dummies](#), to confuse ABM systems, making MIRV defense by ABM systems increasingly difficult and expensive.^[2]

One clause of the treaty required both countries to limit the number of sites protected by an [anti-ballistic missile](#) (ABM) system to two each. The Soviet Union had deployed such a system around [Moscow](#) in 1966 and the United States announced an ABM program to protect twelve ICBM sites in 1967. A modified two-tier Moscow ABM system is still used. The United States built only one [ABM](#) site to protect a [Minuteman](#) base in North Dakota where the "[Safeguard](#)" Program was deployed. Due to the system's expense and limited effectiveness, the Pentagon disbanded "Safeguard" in 1975.

Negotiations lasted from November 17, 1969, until May 1972 in a series of meetings beginning in [Helsinki](#), with the US delegation headed by [Gerard C. Smith](#), director of the [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency](#). Subsequent sessions alternated between [Vienna](#) and Helsinki. After a long deadlock, the first results of SALT I came in May 1971, when an agreement was reached over ABM systems. Further discussion brought the negotiations to an end on May 26, 1972, in [Moscow](#) when [Richard Nixon](#) and [Leonid Brezhnev](#) signed both the [Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty](#) and the *Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*.^[4] A number of agreed statements were also made. This helped improve relations between the United States and the USSR.



[Jimmy Carter](#) and [Leonid Brezhnev](#) signing SALT II treaty, June 18, 1979, in Vienna.

SALT II^[edit]

SALT II was a series of talks between United States and Soviet negotiators from 1972 to 1979 which sought to curtail the manufacture of [strategic nuclear weapons](#). It was a continuation of the SALT I talks and was led by representatives from both countries. SALT II was the first nuclear arms treaty which assumed real reductions in strategic forces to 2,250 of all categories of delivery vehicles on both sides.

SALT II helped the United States to discourage the Soviets from arming their third-generation ICBMs of [SS-17](#), [SS-19](#) and [SS-18](#) types with many more [Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles](#) (MIRVs). In the late 1970s the USSR's missile design bureaus had developed experimental versions of these missiles equipped with anywhere from 10 to 38 warheads each. Additionally, the Soviets secretly agreed to reduce [Tu-22M](#) production to thirty aircraft per year and not to give them an intercontinental range. It was particularly important for the United States to limit Soviet efforts in the [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces](#) (INF) rearmament area.

The SALT II Treaty banned new missile programs (a new missile defined as one with any key parameter 5% better than in currently deployed missiles), so both sides were forced to limit their new strategic missile types development. However, the United States preserved their most essential programs like [Trident](#) and [cruise missiles](#). President [Jimmy Carter](#) wished to use as his main defensive weapon as they were too slow to have first strike capability. In return, the USSR could exclusively retain 308 of its so-called "[heavy ICBM](#)" launchers of the [SS-18](#) type.

An agreement to limit strategic launchers was reached in [Vienna](#) on June 18, 1979, and was signed by [Leonid Brezhnev](#) and Carter.

Six months after the signing, the [Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan](#), and in September of the same year, the United States discovered that a Soviet combat brigade was stationed in Cuba.^[5] (Although President Carter claimed this Soviet brigade had only recently been deployed to Cuba, the unit had been stationed on the island since the [Cuban Missile Crisis](#) of 1962.)^[6] In light of these developments, the treaty was never [ratified](#) by the [United States Senate](#). Its terms were, nonetheless, honored by both sides until it expired.

Subsequent discussions took place under the [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty](#) (START) and the [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty](#).

START I

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This article is about the treaty signed in 1991. For the current treaty, see [New START](#). For the rocket, see [Start-I](#).

START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was a [bilateral treaty](#) between the [United States of America](#) and the [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics](#) (USSR) on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. The treaty was signed on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5 December 1994.^[1] The treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000 [nuclear warheads](#) atop a total of 1,600 inter-continental [ballistic missiles](#) (ICBMs) and bombers. START negotiated the largest and most complex arms control treaty in history, and its final implementation in late 2001 resulted in the removal of about 80 percent of all strategic nuclear weapons then in existence. Proposed by [United States President Ronald Reagan](#), it was renamed **START I** after negotiations began on the second START treaty.

The START I treaty expired 5 December 2009. On 8 April 2010, the replacement [New START](#) treaty was signed in Prague by U.S. President [Obama](#) and Russian President [Medvedev](#). Following ratification by the [U.S. Senate](#) and the [Federal Assembly of Russia](#), it went into force on 26 January 2011.

Proposal[[edit](#)]



Soviet [SS-18](#) intercontinental ballistic missile



American [LGM-118 Peacekeeper](#) intercontinental ballistic missile

The START proposal was first announced by [United States President Ronald Reagan](#) in a commencement address at his alma mater, [Eureka College](#) on 9 May, 1982,^[2] and presented by President [Ronald Reagan](#) in Geneva on 29 June 1982. Reagan proposed a dramatic reduction in strategic forces in two phases, which he referred to as SALT III at the time.^[3] The first phase would reduce overall warhead counts on any missile type to 5,000, with an additional limit of 2,500 on [ICBMs](#). Additionally, a total of 850 ICBMs would be allowed, with a limit of 110 "heavy throw" missiles like the [SS-18](#), with additional limits on the total "throw weight" of the missiles as well. The second phase introduced similar limits on [heavy bombers](#) and their warheads, and other strategic systems as well.

At the time the US had a commanding lead in strategic bombers. The US [B-52](#) force, while aged, was a credible strategic threat but was only equipped with [AGM-86](#) cruise missiles, beginning in 1982, because of Soviet air defense improvements in early 1980s. The US also had begun to introduce new [B-1B Lancer](#) quasi-stealth bomber and was secretly developing the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) project that would eventually result in the [B-2 Spirit](#) stealth bomber. The USSR's force was of little threat to the US, on the other hand, as it was tasked almost entirely with attacking US convoys in the Atlantic and land targets on the Eurasian landmass. Although the USSR had 1,200 medium and heavy bombers, only 150 of them ([Tupolev Tu-95s](#) and [Myasishchev M-4s](#)) could reach North America (the latter only with in-flight refueling). They also faced difficult problems in penetrating admittedly smaller and less heavily defended US airspace. Possessing too few bombers available when compared to US bomber numbers was evened out by the US forces having to penetrate the much larger and heavier defended Soviet airspace. This changed when new [Tu-95MS](#) and [Tu-160](#) bombers appeared in 1984 equipped with the first Soviet [AS-15](#) cruise missiles. By limiting the phase-in as it was proposed, the US would be left with a strategic advantage, for a time.

As [Time](#) magazine put it at the time, "Under Reagan's ceilings, the U.S. would have to make considerably less of an adjustment in its strategic forces than would the Soviet Union. That feature of the proposal will almost certainly prompt the Soviets to charge that it is unfair and one-sided. No doubt some American arms-control advocates will agree, accusing the Administration of making the Kremlin an offer it cannot possibly accept—a deceptively equal-looking, deliberately nonnegotiable proposal that is part of what some suspect is the hardliners' secret agenda of sabotaging disarmament so that the U.S. can get on with the business of rearmament." However, *Time* did point out that, "The Soviets' monstrous ICBMs have given them a nearly 3-to-1 advantage over the U.S. in "throw weight"—the cumulative power to "throw" megatons of death and destruction at the other nation."

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

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The **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty** (CTBT) is a [multilateral treaty](#) by which states agree to **ban all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes**. It was adopted by the [United Nations General Assembly](#) on 10 September 1996^[1] but it has not entered into force due to the non-ratification of eight specific states.

History^[edit]

To date, over 2,000 nuclear tests have been carried out at different locations all over the world.^[2] Arms control advocates had campaigned for the adoption of a treaty banning all nuclear explosions since the early 1950s, when public concern was aroused as a result of radioactive fall-out from atmospheric nuclear tests and the escalating arms race. Over 50 nuclear explosions were registered between 16 July 1945, when the first nuclear explosive test was conducted by the United States at [White Sands Missile Range](#) near [Alamogordo, New Mexico](#), and 31 December 1953. [Prime Minister Nehru](#) of India voiced the heightened international concern in 1954, when he proposed the elimination of all nuclear test explosions worldwide. However, within the context of the [Cold War](#), skepticism about the capability to verify compliance with a **comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty posed a major obstacle to any agreement**. ***[There are no guarantees – THE IRAN Nuclear Deal does nothing – It is all political fluff - NO DEAL is just as good]***

Partial Test Ban Treaty^[edit]

Limited success was achieved with the signing of the [Partial Test Ban Treaty](#) in 1963, which banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in space, **but not underground**. Neither France nor China signed the PTBT. However, the treaty was still ratified by the United States after an 80 to 19 vote in the [United States Senate](#).^[3] While the PTBT reduced atmospheric fallout, underground nuclear testing can also vent radioactivity into the atmosphere, and radioactivity released underground may seep into the ground water. Moreover, the PTBT had no restraining effects on the further development of nuclear warheads.^[4]

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty^[edit]

A major step towards [non-proliferation](#) of nuclear weapons came with the signing of the [Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty](#) (NPT) in 1968. Under the NPT, **non-nuclear weapon states were prohibited from, among other things, possessing, manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**. All signatories, including nuclear weapon states, were committed to the goal of total [nuclear disarmament](#). However, India, Pakistan and Israel have declined to sign the NPT on grounds that such a treaty is **fundamentally discriminatory as it places limitations on states that do not have nuclear weapons while making no efforts to curb weapons development by declared nuclear weapons states**.

Negotiations for the CTBT^[edit]

Given the political situation prevailing in the subsequent decades, little progress was made in nuclear disarmament until the end of the [Cold War](#) in 1991. Parties to the PTBT held an amendment conference that year to discuss a proposal to convert the Treaty into an instrument banning all nuclear-weapon tests; with strong support from the UN General Assembly, negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty began in 1993.

Adoption of the CTBT^[edit]

Intensive efforts were made over the next three years to draft the Treaty text and its two annexes. However, the [Conference on Disarmament](#), in which negotiations were being held, did not succeed in reaching consensus on the adoption of the text. Under the direction of Prime Minister [John Howard](#) and Foreign Minister [Alexander Downer](#), [Australia](#)^[citation needed] then sent the text to the [United Nations General Assembly](#) in [New York](#), where it was submitted as a draft resolution.^[5] On 10 September 1996, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by a large majority, exceeding two-thirds of the General Assembly's Membership.^[1]

Obligations^[edit]

(Article I):^[6]

1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any [nuclear weapon](#) test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

Status^[edit]

Further information: [List of parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty](#)

The Treaty was adopted by the [United Nations General Assembly](#) on 10 September 1996.^[7] It opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996,^[7] when it was signed by 71 States, including five of the eight then [nuclear-capable states](#). As of March 2015, 164 states have [ratified](#) the CTBT and another 19 states have signed but not ratified it.^{[8][9]}

The treaty will enter into force 180 days after the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the treaty have ratified it. These "Annex 2 states" are states that participated in the CTBT's negotiations between 1994 and 1996 and possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at that time.^[10] As of 2015, **eight Annex 2 states have not ratified the treaty: [China](#), [Egypt](#), [Iran](#), [Israel](#) and the [United States](#) have signed but not ratified the Treaty; [India](#), [North Korea](#) and [Pakistan](#) have not signed it.**^[11]

**WHERE IS ALL THE WEAPONS GRADE NUCLEAR
MATERIAL IN THE WORLD?**

DO WE REALLY KNOW?

**ELIMINATING THE GROWTH AND POTENTIAL RISK TO
THE WORLD SHOULD BE THE VISION AND GOAL OF
THE WORLD POWERS.**

DOES THE IRAN DEAL ACCOMPLISH THIS? *NO !!!!*

MY COMMENTS ARE INSERTED IN BLUE AND RED.

Resolution 2231 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7488th meeting, on
20 July 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010),

Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with their obligations, and *recalling* the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes **without discrimination**,

“Without discrimination” what does this mean? Explosion of any kind are not allowed.

[The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons restricts “*non-nuclear weapon states were prohibited from, among other things, possessing, manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices*”] [Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red]

[Enriched Uranium is part of a civil nuclear program. See Enriched Uranium definition TAB xxx]

Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution **guaranteeing** [There are no guarantees – you only see what they want the inspectors to see – you won’t seek the Iran Manhattan or Skunk Works] [See Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Note in red on page] that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, [Is the IRANIAN Leopard all about peaceful purposes today ??? NO !!!!! They are the leading STATE Sponsor of terrorism !!!! Will a Leopard change it’s spots ??? NO !!!!] and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation,

Welcoming diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Iran to reach a comprehensive, long-term and **proper solution** to the Iranian nuclear issue, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded on 14 July 2015, (S/2015/544, as attached as Annex A to this resolution) and the establishment of the Joint Commission,

Welcoming **Iran’s reaffirmation** in the JCPOA that it **will under no circumstances ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons**, [After 1 or 20 suitcase bomb(s) go off in America what will their words mean?] [You will only see what they want you to see – which allows them to say anything] [What has been done with North Korea for their nuclear weapons actions ???]

Noting the statement of 14 July 2015, from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States [Executive Branch only] [Will congress let Obama act as a king over U.S. ???] [Why was America created in the first place ??? Why have so many Americans fought and died to preserve our form of governance ???], and the European Union aimed at promoting transparency and creating an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the JCPOA (S/2015/545, as attached as Annex B to this resolution),

Affirming that conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue, and *expressing* its desire to build a new relationship with

15-12004 (EE)

Iran strengthened by the implementation of the JCPOA and to bring to a satisfactory conclusion its consideration of this matter, **Affirming that full implementation of the JCPOA will contribute to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.** [And if full implementation isn't reached what will be done – lots of complaining and negotiating !!!!] **Strongly supporting** the essential and independent role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying compliance [See Pages 6 & 17 of 124 for issues with verification of compliance] [This is all fluff !!!!] with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of **declared nuclear material** [how much is hidden and not declared ????] to undeclared purposes and the **absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared nuclear activities.** [wishy washy language of no value – if its not declared you will never know about it and Iran can do whatever it wants with what it hasn't declared – The skunks are at work in their SKUNK WORKS] and, in this context, in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, including through the implementation of the **"Framework for Cooperation"** [Where was the cooperation to complete this agreement – how many delays for days to hide what they hadn't declared ????] agreed between Iran and the IAEA on 11 November 2013 and the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues", and *recognizing* the IAEA's important role [See Pages 6 & 17 of 124 for issues with verification of compliance] [Now there are rumors of side deals between IAEA and IRAN to let IRAN inspect itself ????] **[Mom, I din't eat the cookies !!!! There are no crumbs in my room !!!! I promise !!!!]** in supporting full implementation of the JCPOA, **Affirming** that IAEA safeguards [See Pages 6 & 17 of 124 for issues with verification of compliance] are a fundamental component of nuclear non-proliferation, promote greater confidence among States, inter alia [among other things], by providing assurance [See Pages 6 & 17 of 124 for issues with verification of compliance] that States are complying with their obligations under relevant [Where is this term defined ????] safeguards agreements, [if it's not disclosed how do you know ????] contribute to strengthening their collective security and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation, and further *recognizing* that effective and efficient safeguards implementation requires a cooperative effort [if it's not disclosed how do you know ????] between the IAEA and States, that the IAEA Secretariat will continue to engage in open dialogue [how do you have dialogue on undisclosed actions and materials ????] on safeguards matters with States to increase transparency [requires disclosure of what isn't disclosed – WOW REALLY – do we believe this will happen ????] and build confidence and to interact with them on the implementation of safeguards, and in this case, **avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Iran** [In a time of terrorism should we be hampering the economic and technological development of IRAN the chief sponsor of WORLD TERROR ????] or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; respect health, safety, **physical protection** and other **security provisions** [is a secret FIRST STRIKE weapon not allowed for physical and security protection if IRAN fears ISRAEL ???? FEARS U.S. ????] [IRAN has openly called for the destruction of U.S. and ISRAEL !!!!] in force and the rights of individuals; and take every precaution to **protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets** [It's not a secret if it is disclosed – how many SECRETS is IRAN hiding and not disclosing right now ????] as well as other **confidential information coming to its knowledge.** **Encouraging** Member States to cooperate, including through IAEA involvement, with Iran in the framework of the JCPOA in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects, in accordance with Annex III of the JCPOA, [Isn't this exactly what was to be done with North Korea ???? And look at them now !!!!] [I will lay odds that if IRAN has it they will pull the trigger on its uses quicker than North Korea !!!!] **Noting** the termination of provisions of previous resolutions and other measures foreseen in this resolution, and **inviting Member States to give due regard to these changes.** [What provisions have been terminated ???? Does this open up loop holes for hiding stuff or not complying ???? Has compliance with certain provisions not already been referenced ????] **Emphasizing** that the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of **normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran,** and *having regard* to States' rights and obligations relating to international trade, **Underscoring** that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions. [If they have already decided – what good is a vote by the U.S. Congress ????] [Who really rules U.S. – Our Government or the UN ????] [The Obama Executive Branch is trying to rule over U.S. like a King !!!!] [The Legislative Branch needs to stand up and say, "NO !!!! – This is not how it works in the United States of America !!!!] [This cannot be about Democrats and Republicans – it must be about U.S. – The United States of America. Obama has done nothing but attempt to divide and conquer U.S. !!!! Will this Congress allow him to continue ????] 1. **Endorses** the JCPOA, and **urges** its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA; [The UN is attempt to force our obligation and subjugate our compliance !!!!] 2. **Calls upon** all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and **by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments** [Does a vote by the U.S. Congress that rejects this agreement not violate this clause ???? Why would Secretary Kerry ever agree to this ????] [Has Obama and his Administration decided that his Executive Branch is above the Legislative Branch process of our Federal Government and can do whatever they want ????] [What is Imam Obama's real goal ????] [Divide and conquer U.S. ????] [This cannot be about Democrats and Republicans – it must be about U.S. – The United States of America. Obama has done nothing but attempt to divide and conquer U.S. !!!! Will this Congress allow him to continue ????] under the JCPOA;

3. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring [See Pages 6 & 17 of 124 for issues with verification of compliance] [Now there are rumors of side deals between IAEA and IRAN to let IRAN inspect itself ???] of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA [Does this mean that IRAN gets to do whatever it wants when the full duration is over ???] , and *reaffirms* that Iran shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports; [How do you determine full cooperation when they are allowed to keep secrets ???]

4. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to the Security Council on Iran's implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments; [This last statement appears to relate to all parties of the agreement.] [This will allow IRAN to use the agreement against other States for its benefit.] [More problem areas that allow for an agreement never to be fully implemented and IRAN continues to do whatever it wants whenever it wants !!!! There will be no agreement ever fully implements !!!! So why have any agreement now ??? NO DEAL is just as good as THIS DEAL !!!!]

Terminations

5. *Requests* that, as soon as the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this fact to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

6. *Requests* further that, as soon as the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran [What about all the undisclosed material and undisclosed secrets of IRAN ??? Remember this deal allows them to keep secrets !!!!] [See Pages 6 & 17 of 124 for issues with verification of compliance] [Now there are rumors of side deals between IAEA and IRAN to let IRAN inspect itself ???] remains in peaceful activities, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this conclusion to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

7. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, upon receipt by the Security Council of the report from the IAEA described in paragraph 5:

(a) The provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) shall be terminated; [Is this agreement really about the naiveté of, "If we are nice to our enemies – our enemies will be nice to us !!!!"] Remember what CHRIST said, "Even the evil love their own !" IRAN loves ISLAM above all else and will seek any manor to put an end to U.S. and ISRAEL !!!! [IRAN has stated this publically] [Which will you trust more – words on paper or verbal words and actions of IRAN sponsored terror ???]

(b) All States shall comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 and the provisions in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 of Annex B for the duration specified [The duration is for 8 years for nuclear weapons – after that Katy Bar the Door] [The duration on build up of so called conventional weapons and vehicles is 5 years or sooner based on UN Security Council BS] [So in 5 years IRAN can conquer all Islamic States.] [And 3 years later IRAN can take on the WORLD – NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST - DEATH TO US ALL FOR ALLAH AND 70 VIRGINS !!!!] in each paragraph or subparagraph, and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annex B;

8. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that on the date ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, all the provisions of this resolution shall be terminated, and none of the previous resolutions described in paragraph 7 (a) shall be applied, the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the item "Non-proliferation" will be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized; [Do we really only have one ally – ISRAEL ???]

9. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the terminations described in Annex B and paragraph 8 of this resolution shall not occur if the provisions of previous resolutions have been applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

Application of Provisions of Previous Resolutions

10. *Encourages* [NOT REQUIRED] China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union (EU), and Iran (the "JCPOA participants") to resolve any issues arising with respect to implementation of

JCPOA commitments through the procedures specified in the JCPOA, and *expresses* its intention to address possible complaints by JCPOA participants about significant non-performance by another JCPOA participant;

11. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, within 30 days of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an issue that the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a) of this resolution, *decides* further that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member of the Security Council has submitted such a draft resolution for a vote, then the President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and put it to a vote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and *expresses* its intention to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue by the Advisory Board established in the JCPOA; [This is an ambiguous paragraph. Paragraph 7 (a) applies to IRAN and not the other member States to this agreement. What if another member state is in violation of the agreement what happens ???]

12. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph 11 to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), then effective midnight Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of this resolution, and the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

13. *Underscores* that, in the event of a notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, Iran and the other JCPOA participants should strive to resolve the issue giving rise to the notification, *expresses* its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved, *decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that if the notifying JCPOA participant State informs the Security Council that such an issue has been resolved before the end of the 30-day period specified in paragraph 12 above, then the provisions of this resolution, including the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), shall remain in effect notwithstanding paragraph 12 above, and *notes* Iran's statement that if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 in whole or in part, Iran will treat this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA; [IRAN is given an out from the DEAL] [They will play the game to get another State to fail on its obligations so they can run wild with their Nuclear Weapons Program – Oh they are going to do that anyway because they are doing that now in secret undisclosed locations in the mountains of IRAN !!!!]

14. *Affirms* that the application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 do not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions; [Allows IRAN to play the DEAL for maximum benefit and then BREACH the DEAL so they can do whatever they want !!!!] [NO DEAL is as good as THIS DEAL !!!!]

15. *Affirms* that any application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 is not intended to harm individuals and entities that, prior to that application of those provisions, engaged in business with Iran or Iranian individuals and entities that is consistent with the JCPOA and this resolution, *encourages* Member States to consult with each other with regard to such harm, and to take action to mitigate such unintended harm for these individuals and entities,

and *decides* if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 not to impose measures with retroactive effect on individuals and entities for business activities with Iran that were consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions prior to the application of these provisions; [Protects States and Parties and Allows IRAN to play the DEAL for maximum benefit and then BREACH the DEAL so they can do whatever they want !!!!] [NO DEAL is as good as THIS DEAL !!!!]

JCPOA Implementation

16. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to review recommendations of the Joint Commission regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B, and that such recommendations shall be deemed to be approved unless the Security Council adopts a resolution to reject a Joint Commission recommendation within five working days of receiving it; [5 Working Days – REALLY – Can any multi-State organization accomplish anything in 5 days ???] [IRAN will bury the Security Council in proposals – and slip in a wild card that gets overlooked !!!!]

[What good is a deal that in all reality can't be managed and controlled ???]

[Why not put all control and operation of nuclear power generation under the control of the IAEA and eliminate all nuclear weapons from the WORLD ???]

[In this 21ST Century why do we need States to Conquer states ??? Isn't it time we live in peace and work together ???]

[If death is coming from IRAN nuclear weapons what good does it do to superficially delay that for 8 years ??? Superficially meaning they are developing stuff in secret that has not been disclosed and will go developing it. This deal just gives them the cash flow to accelerate the SECRET STUFF !!!!]

[NO DEAL IS JUST AS GOOD AS THIS DEAL !!!!]

17. *Requests* [Doesn't require this – so States can make deals without approval as long as they comply with the JCPOA or until they are caught doing something they are not suppose to ???] [Current Status and NO DEAL is BETTER than THIS DEAL !!!!] Member States seeking to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B to submit proposals to the Security Council, *expresses* its intention to share such proposals with the Joint Commission established in the JCPOA for its review, *invites* any Member of the Security Council to provide relevant information and opinions about these proposals, *encourages* the Joint Commission to give due consideration to any such information and opinions, and *requests* the Joint Commission to provide its recommendations on these proposals to the Security Council within twenty working days (or, if extended, within thirty working days); [Those wanting this to work will submit the proposals. Those want to support IRAN in the DEATH and DESTRUCTION of the U.S. and ISRAEL will not !!!!] [If a DEAL can't be managed and controlled – The current status and NO DEAL is better than THIS DEAL !!!!]

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in order to support JCPOA implementation, to take the necessary administrative measures to facilitate communications with Member States and between the Security Council and the Joint Commission through agreed practical arrangements; [So there will be all kinds of side deals to allow IRAN to obtain whatever it wants.]

[Do most of the STATES of the UNITED NATIONS see U.S. as a great evil and believe the WORLD would be better off without U.S. ???]

[The Federal Legislative Branch needs to give serious consideration to how the majority of the STATES of the WORLD really view U.S. !!!!]

[The U.S. needs to LEAD the WORLD in elimination of all nuclear weapons – and not support agreements that only delay Terrorist States in acquiring nuclear weapons !!!!]

19. *Requests* the IAEA and the Joint Commission to consult and exchange information, where appropriate, [Who decides this ??? If it is a secret that's not appropriate to share it won't be shared !!!!]

[IF YOU CAN'T MANAGE AND CONTROL AN AGREEMENT YOU REALLY DON'T HAVE AN AGREEMENT !!!!]

as specified in the JCPOA, and *requests* further that the exporting states cooperate with the Joint Commission in accordance with Annex IV of the JCPOA;

20. *Requests* the Joint Commission to review proposals for transfers and activities described in paragraph 2 of Annex B with a view to recommending approval where consistent with this resolution and the provisions and objectives of the JCPOA so as to provide for the transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for Iran's nuclear activities under the JCPOA, and *encourages* the Joint Commission to establish procedures to ensure detailed and thorough review of all such proposals;

Exemptions

21. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) **shall not apply** to the supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and the provision of any related technical assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, by JCPOA participant States or Member States acting in coordination with them, that is directly related to: (a) the modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production; (b) the export of Iran's enriched uranium in excess of 300 kilograms [661 LBS] [REMEMBER IT ONLY TOOK 140 LBS TO BLOWUP HIROSHIMA !!!!] in return for natural uranium; [so IRAN can make a deal with Russia or China for this exchange and Russia or China can stockpile nuclear weapons for IRAN for a period of 10 years and then release them to IRAN so IRAN can raise HELL on U.S. and ISRAEL !!!!] and (c) the

modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design and, subsequently, on the agreed final design of such reactor;

22. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that Member States engaging in the activities permitted in paragraph 21 shall ensure that: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; (b) they notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and, when constituted, the Joint Commission ten days in advance of such activities; (c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the relevant INFCIRC referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, have been met; (d) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and (e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the INFCIRCS referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfers; [This provides for a document trail, but does nothing for side agreements as to the disposition or payment after 10 years.]

[HOW MUCH STUF GETS LOST ALREADY ????

[WHAT ARE THE WEIGHTS AND MEASSURES ????

[IT TOOK ONLY 14 LBS TO BLOWUP HIROSHIMA !!!!]

[IF YOU CAN'T MANAGE AND CONTROL AN AGREEMENT YOU REALLY DON'T HAVE AN AGREEMENT !!!!]

23. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, also that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall not apply to the extent necessary to carry out transfers and activities, as approved on a case-by-case basis in advance by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), that are: (a) directly related to implementation of the nuclear-related actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA; (b) required for preparation for the implementation of the JCPOA; or, (c) determined by the Committee to be consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

[Russia can claim they are helping IRAN deplete their stockpiles of enriched uranium in accord with the JCPOA all the while looking forward to the destruction of the U.S. and ISRAEL !!!!!]

[Russia is already probing our defenses with bomber and fighter flights.]

[What were we doing with Japan before they bombed Pearl Harbor ??? NEGOTIATING !!!!]

24. *Notes* that the provisions of paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 27 continue in effect if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

[So our enemies can continue to build a war machine against U.S. and ISRAEL with nuclear weapons grade uranium material supplied by IRAN !!!!!]

[IF YOU CAN'T MANAGE AND CONTROL AN AGREEMENT YOU REALLY DON'T HAVE AN AGREEMENT !!!!]

Other Matters

25. *Decides* to make the necessary practical arrangements to undertake directly tasks related to the implementation of this resolution, including those tasks specified in Annex B and the release of guidance;

[States can do what they want as long as they claim it is in accordance with the resolution.]

[Someone somehow has to catch them in violation !!!!!]

[The security counsel is going to be so tied up in proposals they aren't going to do it !!!!!]

[The IAEA is going to let IRAN do self checking so IRAN isn't going to BLOW THE WHISTLE on ITSELF !!!!!]

26. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Security Council in its exercise of the tasks related to this resolution, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures in this resolution; [Suspect violation are covered in another sections – but how long before a suspected violation becomes an actual violation – and then nothing is done about it ????

27. *Decides* that all provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices; [THIS PARAGRAPH REALLY MEANS NOTHING !!!!!] [WHAT ABOUT ALL THE OTHER STATES THAT ARE NOT PARTICIPANTS TO IT ????] [IF YOU NEGOTIATE WITH ONE – YOU OPEN IT UP FOR ALL !!!!!]

28. *Recalls* that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided

that the conditions specified in paragraph 15 of that resolution are met, and *underscores*, that if the provisions of previous resolutions are reapplied pursuant to paragraph 12 of this resolution, then this provision will apply;

[WHAT ARMY OF INSPECTORS, REVIEWERS, AND LAWYERS IS GOING TO MANAGE AND CONTROL THIS DEAL ???]

[WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING FOR THIS ARMY ???]

29. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the application of the provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) and this resolution;

[WHAT DOES THIS PARAGRAPH MEAN RELATIVE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW – “ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the government of Iran, or any person or entity in Iran”]

30. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until the termination of the provisions of this resolution in accordance with paragraph 8.

[WHAT DOES THIS PARAGRAPH MEAN RELATIVE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW – “remain seized of this matter”]

Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, 14 July 2015

PREFACE

The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the **Islamic Republic of Iran** [Their NAME should say it all – IT'S Islamic or IT'S NOT AT ALL !!!!] welcome this historic [Only Time will tell if it is historically good or BAD !!!!] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which **will ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful**, [Only for a maximum period of 10 years] and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. [They are agreeing only to the timelines within the agreement.] [There are no restrictions once the 10 years or sooner timeline is over !!!!]

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms. [But they can contract and ally themselves with anyone they want that will support IRAN'S desire to destroy the U.S. and ISRAEL !!!!]

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran's nuclear programme, including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3's concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification. [[Except for SECRET UNDISCLOSED operations and R&D !!!!]

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy. [Give them everything in writing, and hoping IRAN and its friends will comply: knowing all well that it will be impossible to guarantee IRAN'S compliance !!!!]

[NO AGREEMENT – NO DEAL is better than THIS DEAL !!!!] [Sanctions are working – that's what brought them to the table – once they seen the WEAKNESS of OBAMA and his EXECUTIVE Branch based on past no response to redlines being crossed they took full advantage of the negotiations.]

[Is OBAMA and his EXECUTIVE Branch that naïve or is it INTENTIONAL ????]

PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

i. **The Islamic Republic of Iran** [Their NAME should say it all – IT’S Islamic or IT’S NOT AT ALL !!!!] and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

[NOT TO BE ENDORSED BY THE U.S. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH ????] [DOES THE CONGRESS’ VOTE EVEN MATER ????]

- ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure [There is nothing ensured !!!!] [Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red] the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
- iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. [Nothing in this agreement applies once the 10 or less years is up.]
- iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy **its right** [Is there a UN Bill of Rights for Member States ????] [What does this Bill of Rights allow for defense from enemies PERCEIVED or REAL ????] to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT. [IF IRAN has nuclear weapons already in SECRET – they can claim they were a nuclear nation before the agreement !!!!] [How is a nation determined to be a non-nuclear-weapon state ????]
- v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. [If you can’t prove they are violating the agreement because of their SECRET UNDISCLOSED R&D IRAN will get everything that is causing them problems now !!!!] [They are currently sponsoring State Terrorism around the WORLD !!!!] [They will be able to sponsor more Terrorism faster and more effectively around the WORLD !!!!]
- vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.

[Is Russia not committed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter ????] [Is that stopping them from doing what they want to do other countries like Chechnya ????]

[IRAN and RUSSIA allies in the Destruction of the U.S.]

[NO DEAL is better than THIS DEAL !!!!]

- vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone [IRAN has not ratified the NPT !!!!] [We have not ratified it either !!!!] [There must be lots of issues with it ????] [There are !!!!] [Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red] of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith [Fluffy Hopeful language that doesn’t really mean anything in todays WORLD !!!!] and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent [Fluffy Hopeful language that doesn’t really mean anything in todays WORLD !!!!] of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. [It’s only good for 10 years. They will passively comply with what is known !!!!] [They will aggressively continue in SECRET with what’s UNDISCLOSED !!!!] [And in 10 years all HELL will be unleashed !!!!] The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013. **[where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed !!!!]**

[IRAN will receive everything and give up nothing for their allies can keep IRAN’S stuff for them !!!!]

- ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.
- x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested **[“Request” not “Required” ????]** to monitor and verify the voluntary **[“voluntary” not “mandatory” ????]** nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested **[“Request” not “Required” ????]** to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information **[Secret – not public !!!!]** **[Don’t want to piss off the American Public – need to protect the U.S. Government over AMERICA and the NATION it STANDS FOR !!!!]** will be fully observed by all parties involved.

xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and practices.

xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the annexes to this document.

xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in Annex III, including through IAEA involvement. **[What can the IAEA really do to verify what IRAN is really doing ???] [Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red]**

xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after the Adoption Day.

[It all ends in 10 years and IRAN can do whatever it wants !!!!!]

xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.

xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus.

[5 Meetings until hell is unleashed !!!!!] [Just as Japan was doing before they bombed Pearl Harbor !!!!!]

[The U.S. CONGRESS needs to take immediate action to bolster our defenses and military to preempt the actions of IRAN in 10 years !!!!!]

Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes

NUCLEAR

A. ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES

1. Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities **for the first 8 years**, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary **["voluntary" not "mandatory" ???]** commitments, as expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan **[A SECRET PLAN TO BE SHARED WITH LIMITED MEMBERS]** to be submitted as part of the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran's Safeguards Agreement. **[What about their SECRET UNDISCLOSED R&D ???]**
2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. **[The JCPOA ends in 10 years – they won't have to comply because the JCPOA is over. !!!!] [SEE xiii on page 10/104 above]** During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I. **[Stored until the 10 years are up and then IRAN can go full bore on whatever it wants to do !!!!] [SEE xiii on page 10/104 above]**
3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and **Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies** for enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.

[Remember it only took 14 lbs of Plutonium to blowup Nagasaki !!!!]

4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace failed centrifuges **[So what they broke in their R&D they are able to replace !!!!]** with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will **manufacture advanced centrifuge machines** only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA. **[And in 10 years they can use these advanced centrifuge machines to do whatever they want !!!!]** From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan. **[What about IRAN'S SECRET UNDISCLOSED R&D PLANS ???]**
5. Based on its own long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded **[What does "safeguarded" here mean ??? SECRET and UNDISCLOSED ???]** R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, **for stable isotope production**. The

other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.

7. During the 15 year period, **[What is the 15 period when it ends in 10 years per the JCPOA ???]** and as Iran gradually moves to meet international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural uranium level. **Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted against the above stated 300 kg UF₆ stockpile**, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. **All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).** **[So how much enriched uranium can IRAN really have ???]** Any additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at international market prices.

B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING

8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production **[What radioisotopes ???]** for medical and industrial purposes. **[What are these medical and industrial purposes.]** **[Just more ways to spit up the nuclear material increasing the difficulties in controlling and monitoring where it goes and how it is actually used.]** The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium. **[Can what it produces lead to production of weapons grade plutonium at another facility – SECRET FACILITY ???]** **[SEE PAGE 36/104]** **[14 lbs. of weapons grade plutonium annihilated Nagasaki !!!!]** **[2 lbs. (14.3%) in a suitcase bomb will annihilate how much ???]** Except for the first core load, all of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. **[Why does Iran need to produce the fuel assemblies – aren't there enough countries that do this already and can supply IRAN with their needed fuel supply ???]** All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. **[What is the lifetime of the reactor ???]** **[Will they shut it down in 10 years and bring all their material back to make bombs ???]**

[IF YOU CAN'T MANAGE AND CONTROL AN AGREEMENT YOU REALLY DON'T HAVE AN AGREEMENT !!!!]

This international partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined. **Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager**

[IRAN will receive everything they want and they will be ALLOWED TO MANAGE AND CONTROL EVERYTHING !!!!]

and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document **[This means the deal isn't even fully detailed and documented !!!!]**

[IF YOU CAN'T MANAGE AND CONTROL AN AGREEMENT YOU REALLY DON'T HAVE AN AGREEMENT !!!!]

which would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants. **[What about the responsibilities required by IRAN ???]**

9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance **[Why is IRAN given assurances but not are required of IRAN ???]** of supply of necessary fuel.

10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. **[How is this supposed to be managed and controled the UN washes it hands of everything after 10 years – SEE Paragraph xiv page 10/104]** All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market.

11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.

[And if contracts can be concluded between IRAN and the other parties, IRAN can do whatever they want !!!!]

[Why on EARTH is all of the negotiating power being given to IRAN ???]

[Because everything else is being given to IRAN by all the other parities !!!!]

12. For 15 years **[How is this supposed to be managed and controled the UN washes it hands of everything after 10 years – SEE Paragraph xiv page 10/104]** Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel

reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from irradiated enriched uranium targets.

C. TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

[Are these all the SECRET AGREEMENTS being talked about in the media today ???]

14. Iran will fully implement the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues” agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.

[What can the IAEA really do to verify what IRAN is really doing ???] [Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red] [It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]

15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures **[So if the IAEA tries to monitor something no voluntarily agreed to by IRAN – IRAN can say NO !!!!] [WOW – Oh IRAN will never say no !!!! Oh IRAN will never cause delays for the IAEA to move and hide stuff in IRAN’S Nuclear Weapons Shell Game !!!! Oh IRAN will never keep and SECRETS from the IAEA !!!!]** for their respective durations **[10 years]**, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all **uranium ore concentrate plants** for 25 years; **[And IRAN can move un-concentrated material to another facility, one of the SECRET and UNDISCLOSED ONES, of a different type to concentrate the uranium or plutonium !!!!]** containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.

[How are all these extra years beyond 10 going to be enforced (oh that’s right it is voluntary by IRAN) managed and controled when the UN washes it hands of everything after 10 years – SEE Paragraph xiv page 10/104]

16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.

[And if this is disguised as SECRET and UNDISCLOSED Scientific Study who will know ???]

17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.

[Oh – IRAN will be a tuff negotiator and maximize IRAN’S SECRET and UNDISCLOSED operations !!!!]

[IRAN after 10 years will run wild and become absolutely impossible to deal with relative to all requirements past the 10 year mark as noted in the above paragraphs.]

SANCTIONS

18. The **UN Security Council** resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue - 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) – simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish specific restrictions, as specified in Annex V.¹

**[The UN Security Council will pass an approve all things before them to prove that their resolution with IRAN is working !!!!]
[Maybe the UN Security Council wants to be awarded an Nobel Peace Prize ????] [Obama received on without really doing anything !!!!]**

19. The **EU** will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following areas, as described in Annex II:

- i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;
- ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States;
- iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance;
- iv. Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
- v. Financial support for trade with Iran (**export credit**, guarantees or insurance);
- vi. Commitments for **grants**, financial assistance and **concessional loans** to the Government of Iran;
- vii. Transactions in public or **public-guaranteed bonds**;

[IRAN IS WEALTHY IT IS BEING HELD IN SANCTIONS.] [IRAN IS GOING TO BE ABLE TO USE THIS WEALTH ONCE RELEASED TO DO WHATEVER THEY WANT !!!!]

[WHY DO THEY NEED CREDIT, GRANTS, CONCESSIONAL LOANS, AND/OR PUBLIC-GUARANTEED BONDS ????]

[THIS APPEARS TO BE STRUCTURED FOR ISLAMIC LAW VERSUS GENERAL INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STANDARDS AND LAW !!!!]

[IRAN CAN DUMP ON ALL THE PUBLIC-GUARANTEED BONDS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND CAUSE AN ECONOMIC CRASH AS PREEMPTIVE ACTION TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS STRIKES AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

- viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical products;
- ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
- x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
- xi. **Export of key naval equipment and technology;**

[WTF – EU is supposed to be one of our ALLIES – what NAVAL Technologies and SECRETS have we the UNITED STATES of AMERICA shared with the EU ????]

[SECRET SERVICE OF OUR U.S. NAVY SUBMARINE SERVICE ????]

[WILL THIS ALLOW OUR TECHNOLOGIES AND SECRETS TO BE ABLE TO BE TRANSFERED TO IRAN ????]

- xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
- xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services;
- xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;

[A CARGO FLIGHT CARRYING A NUCLEAR WEAPON !!!!] [THE SAME WAY ISRAEL BOMB THE EGYPTIAN RUNWAYS BACK IN THEIR WARS !!!!]

- xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
- xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;

¹ The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.

- xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminium and steel, and export or software for integrating industrial processes;
- xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II; and
- xix. Associated services for each of the categories above.

20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.

[THE EU WILL GIVE IRAN EVERYTHING AND RECEIVE NOTHING REAL !!!] [What can the IAEA really do to verify what IRAN is really doing ???] [Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red] [It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]

21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the following areas as described in Annex II:
- i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and letters of credit);
 - ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial;
 - iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;
 - iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on their transfer;
 - v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds;
 - vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
 - vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
 - viii. Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales;
 - ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
 - x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;
 - xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran;
 - xii. Transactions with Iran's energy sector;
 - xiii. Transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;

- xiv. Trade in gold and other precious metals;
- xv. Trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
- xvi. Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector;
- xvii. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above;
- xviii. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List; and
- xix. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections 5 – 7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.

[THE UNITED STATES WILL GIVE IRAN ALMOST EVERYTHING AND RECEIVE NOTHING REAL !!!] [What can the IAEA really do to verify what IRAN is really doing ???] [Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red] [It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]

22. The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V, allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran;

[AND WHAT WAS USED AGAINST US THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON 911 ??? COMMERICAL PASSENGER AIRCRAFT !!!!]

[AND IF ONE IS LOADED WITH A DIRTY OR CLEAN NUCLEAR WEAPON – 100 TIMES THE SIZE OF “LITTLE BOY” OR “FAT MAN” WHAT WILL BE LEFT OF THE CITY IT IS LANDING IN ???]

license non-U.S. persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA; and license the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.

23. Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.

[THEY ARE FORCING OUR LEGISLATIVE BRANCH TO TAKE ACTIONS TO TERMINATE SANCTIONS – AND IF WE DON'T WE'RE VIOLATING ITEM 2. PAGE 2/104 – SEE NOTE IN BLUE !!!!]

24. The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete **[IF ONE IS FORGOTTEN THEN IRAN CAN BACK-OUT OF THE DEAL AFTER THEY HAVE EVERYTHING !!!!]** list of all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures and will lift them in accordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting of sanctions beginning on “Implementation Day”. If at any time following the Implementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur that lifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOA participant in question will take appropriate action. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the Joint Commission.

[IRAN WILL PLAY THIS TO THE MAXIMUM SO THAT IRAN CAN DELAY THE IAEA OR SLOW DOWN ALL OF THEIR VOLUNTARY ACTIONS TO MAXIMIZE IRAN'S CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF EVERYTHING !!!!]

25. If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United States will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities, with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will actively encourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.

[THIS IS NOT U.S. POLICY !!!!]

[IT IS THE POLICY OF THE MUSLIM IMAM OBAMA IN THE WHITE HOUSE !!!!] [OBAMA IS SEEKING TO END THE U.S. !!!!] [ALL OF HIS ACTIONS ARE REVEALING THIS IF YOU WILL OPEN YOUR EYES AND LOOK !!!!]

[SO THIS DEAL MADE BY THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH WILL FORCE THE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE BRANCH TO FORCE THE STATES TO COMPLY WITH WHAT OUR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SAYS ???]

[THIS IS NOT HOW IT WORKS IN THESE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!!]

26. The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. [WOW – YOU CAN UNDER VERY SPECIAL PREJUDICE GO BACK TO THE OLD SANCTIONS – BUT YOU CAN IMPLEMENT ANY NEW ONES !!!!] The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. [WOW – YOU CAN UNDER VERY SPECIAL PREJUDICE GO BACK TO THE OLD SANCTIONS – BUT YOU CAN IMPLEMENT ANY NEW ONES !!!!] Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

[FORCE ALL PARTIES EXCEPT IRAN TO HAVE EXTREME PREJUDICE TO RE-INSTATE SANCTIONS]

[HOWEVER, GIVE IRAN AN EASY OUT FOR GROUND TO CEASE IRAN'S PERFORMANCE !!!!]

27. The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis and whenever appropriate.

[LET IRAN KNOW WHAT EVERYONE IS DOING SO THAT THEY CAN PREEMPTIVELY ACT TO CEASE IRAN'S PERFORMANCE OF IRAN'S COMMITMENTS UNDER THIS JCPOA !!!!]

28. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements.² [SEE NOTE 2 AT BOTTOM – CONGRESS NOT INCLUDED !!!!] [OBAMA AND HIS ADMINISTRATION SUBJUGATING CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE !!!!] The E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.

29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, [THIS MAYBE THE OUT FOR US THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THAT WHAT THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION IS TRYING TO FORCE UPON CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN STATES AND LOCALITIES IS IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON HOW OUR GOVERNMENT WORKS !!!!] will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.

[CONGRESS HASN'T VOTED SO WE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAVE NOT COMMITTED TO ANYTHING]

[ONLY THE EXECUTIVE IMAM OBAMA HAS MADE COMMITMENTS THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REPRESENTATIVES !!!!]

30. The E3/EU+3 will not apply sanctions or restrictive measures to persons or entities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions provided for in this JCPOA, provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with E3/EU+3 laws and regulations in effect. Following the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA as specified in Annex II, ongoing investigations on possible infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance with applicable national laws.

[WE CAN KEEP INVESTIGATING ON POSSIBLE IMGRINGMENTS, BUT IRAN ONLY NEEDS TO WORK WITH THE IAEA.]

[AND AFTER 10 YEARS FORGET EVERYTHING – IRAN IS FREE TO DO WHATEVER THEY WANT, WHENEVER THEY WANT, WHEREVER THEY WANT !!!!]

[Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red] [It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]

² 'Government officials' for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration.

31. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States will terminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated entities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks and financial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, **the United States** will remove designation of certain entities and individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals listed on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto.

[GIVE IRAN EVERYTHING AND HOPE THEY COMPLY]

[HOW DO YOU KNOW IF THEY ARE COMPLYING BECAUSE IRAN WILL KEEP IRAN'S SECRET AND UNDISCLOSED OPERATIONS SECRET !!!!]

[Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red] [It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]

32. EU and E3+3 countries **and international participants** **[UNITED STATES WITHOUT SPECIFICITY ????** will engage in joint projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel fabrication, **[HOW EASY IS IT TO SWITCH FORM URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION TO PLUTONIUM FABRICATION] [PLUTONIUM MAKES A MUCH BETTER BOMB BASED ON A RATE OF 1/10 REQUIRED AS COMPARED TO URANIUM !!!!] [A PLUTONIUM SUITCASE BOMB IS MUCH BETTER FOR ANNIHILATION THAN A URANIUM SUITCASE BOMB !!!!]**

[HOW MUCH WEAPONS GRADE NUCLEAR MATERIAL HAS ALREADY CROSSED THE MEXICAN BORDER ????

[HOW MUCH WEAPONS GRADE NUCLEAR MATERIAL HAS ALREADY CROSSED THE CANADIAN BORDER ????

agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion, establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, **[THIS WILL HELP IRAN DO A BETTER JOB OF HIDING IRAN'S SECRET AND UNDISCLOSED OPERATIONS !!!!]** as detailed in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the implementation of these projects.

33. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to **ensure Iran's access** in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. **[IRAN RECEIVES ALL THE ASSURANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES RECEIVES NOT ASSURANCE !!!!]**

[Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red] [It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]

The EU will further explore possible areas for cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Iran, and in this context consider the use of available instruments such as **export credits** to facilitate trade, **project financing** and **investment** in Iran.

[IRAN IS WEALTHY IT IS BEING HELD IN SANCTIONS.] [IRAN IS GOING TO BE ABLE TO USE THIS WEALTH ONCE RELEASED TO DO WHATEVER THEY WANT !!!!]

[WHY DO THEY NEED CREDIT, GRANTS, CONCESSIONAL LOANS, AND/OR PUBLIC-GUARANTEED BONDS ????

[THIS APPEARS TO BE STRUCTURED FOR ISLAMIC LAW VERSUS GENERAL INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STANDARDS AND LAW !!!!]

[IRAN CAN DUMP ON ALL THE PUBLIC-GUARANTEED BONDS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND CAUSE AN ECONOMIC CRASH AS PREEMPTIVE ACTION TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS STRIKES AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:

i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.

[OBAMA AND HIS EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL ARE ATTEMPTING TO SUBJUGATE THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS FROM THIS DEAL !!!!] [THEY ARE FORCING OUR LEGISLATIVE BRANCH TO TAKE ACTIONS TO TERMINATE SANCTIONS – AND IF WE DON'T WE VIOLATING ITEM 2. PAGE 2/102 – SEE NOTE IN BLUE !!!!]

ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, **[WILL OBAMA AND HIS EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL ATTEMPTING TO FURTHER SUBJUGATE THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS FROM THIS DEAL !!!!]** at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.

iii. Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, **[THEY ARE FORCING OUR LEGISLATIVE BRANCH TO TAKE ACTIONS TO TERMINATE SANCTIONS – AND IF WE DON'T WE'RE VIOLATING ITEM 2. PAGE 2/104 – SEE NOTE IN BLUE !!!!]** the actions described in Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.

iv. Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion **[IF IT IS CLOSE THE UN IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA WILL CALL IT GOOD – “DON'T SWEAT THE DETAILS” – JUST REMEMBER THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS - WHO IS THE REAL DEVIL (SATAN) – U.S. OR IRAN ???]** that all nuclear material **[WHAT IRAN HAS DISCLOSED – BUT NOT WHAT IRAN HAS KEPT SECRET AND UNDISCLOSED !!!!]** in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.

[IRAN IS ALLOWED TO HAVE FULL POLITICAL CONTROL !!!!]

[HOWEVER, WE THE PEOPLE AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES IS BEING SUBJUGATED BY THE DEAL – IMAM OBAMA AND HIS MINIONS STRIKE AGAIN AT OUR FREEDOMS !!!!]

v. UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.

35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days **[WHAT CAN ANY POLITICAL BODY ACCOMPLISH IN 15 DAYS ???]** to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, **[THIS JUST ALLOWS FOR DELAYS ALL THE WHILE IRAN CAN CONTINUE TO DO WHAT IT WANTS !!!!]** if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved.

Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level - either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, **[THIS JUST ALLOWS FOR DELAYS ALL THE WHILE IRAN CAN CONTINUE TO DO WHAT IT WANTS !!!!]** which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant **[IRAN]**, and if the complaining participant **[IRAN]** deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant **[IRAN]** could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.

37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, **[IRAN]** as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. **[THE WAY THIS IS WRITTEN IS THAT IRAN IS GOING TO COMPLY BUT ONE OF THE OTHER PARTIES IS NOT GOING TO !!!!] [IS THIS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO SUBJUGATE THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS ????]** If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise **[AGAIN THIS SUBJUGATES THE UNITED STATES AND ALL OTHER PARTIES !!!!]**. In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, **[MORE MASSIVE PROTECTION FOR IRAN AND ALL THE PARTIES IRAN DOESN'T HAVE ISSUES WITH OR WHO HAVE ISSUES WITH IRAN !!!!]** provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. **[EVERYTHING IS BEING DONE TO PROTECT IRAN !!!!]** Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA **[IRAN CAN CLAIM REINSTATEMENT AS A WAY OUT !!!!] [EVERYTHING HAS BEEN GIVEN TO IRAN AND TAKEN AWAY FROM THE OTHER PARTIES !!!!] [IT APPEARS THAT MOST OF THE TAKING AWAY OF ACTIONS BY A STATE OTHER THAN IRAN IS DIRECTED AT THE UNITED STATES !!!!]** in whole or in part.

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

A. GENERAL

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.

B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR

2. Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotopes production **[WILL THEY BE ALLOWED TO DO WORK WITH PLUTONIUM CLAIMING IT IS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH AND NOT WEAPONS ????** **[REMEMBER IT ONLY TOOK 14 LBS OF PLUTONIUM TO ANNIHILATE NAGASAKI !!!!]** for **medical and industrial** purposes. Iran will redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, including testing of fuel pins **[OF WHAT FUEL SOURCE ????** **REMEMBER IT TOOK ONLY 14 LBS OF PLUTONIUM TO ANNIHILATE NAGASAKI !!!!]** and **not to produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation.** **[WHAT ARE NORMAL OPERATIONS ????** **[IRAN CAN IN R&D ACCIDENTALLY UPSET THE NORMAL OPERATION AND PRODUCE WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM – THEY ONLY NEED 14 LBS TO RAISE HELL ON EARTH !!!!]** **[THEY CAN DO THIS WHEN NOT BEING INSPECT AND HIDE ALL OF THESE ACTIONS AND MOVE THE WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM TO ONE OF IRAN'S SECRET UNDISCLOSED OPERATIONS !!!!]** **[Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red]** **[It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]** The power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that the **parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary adjustments in developing the final design** **[ALLOWING IRAN TO PLAY WITH IT ALLOWS THEM TO PRODUCE WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM !!!!]** **[Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red]** **[It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]** while fully preserving the above-mentioned purposes and principles of modernisation.

3. **Iran** will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in **Iran**. The calandria will be made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application. In redesigning and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research reactor. **[DO THEY HAVE MORE THAN ONE OF THESE FUEL HOLDING STRUCTURES ????** **[IN 10 YEARS THEY CAN INSTALL A NEW ONE AND CAN GO INTO FULL PRODUCTION !!!!]**

4. **Iran** will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have responsibility for overall implementation **ALLOWING IRAN TO PLAY WITH IT ALLOWS THEM TO PRODUCE WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM !!!!]** **[Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red]** **[It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]** of the Arak modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities regarding the modernisation of the Arak reactor as described in this Annex. A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak modernisation project. The Working Group could be enlarged to include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, and subsequently contracts would be concluded.

[WHAT ABOUT IRAN'S RESPONSIBILITIES NOT TO PLAY WITH THE REACTOR WHERE OPERATING PAREMETERS ENTER THE REGIONS WHERE WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM CAN BE PRODUCED ????

[AGAIN AND AGAIN EVERYTHING IS GIVEN TO IRAN AND TAKEN AWAY FROM THE OTHER PARTIES !!!!]

The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, **consistent with their respective national laws,** **[AS LONG AS THOSE LAWS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JCPOA !!!!]** **[THEY ARE FORCING OUR LEGISLATIVE BRANCH TO TAKE ACTIONS TO TERMINATE SANCTIONS – AND IF WE DON'T WE'RE VIOLATING ITEM 2. PAGE 2/104 – SEE NOTE IN BLUE !!!!]** in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.

5. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried

out by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, **such that the reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and operation. [IRAN WILL LICENSE IT TO OPERATE WHERE IT CAN PRODUCE WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM !!!!] [IRAN WILL PUT IT IN FULL PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION AFTER 10 YEARS !!!!]** The final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories will be submitted to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will aim to complete its review and endorsement **within three months** after the submission of the final design. **[THREE MONTHS IS NOT VERY MUCH TIME TO REVIEW A DETAILED NUCLEAR REACTOR CONSTRUCTION MODIFICATION AND UPGRADE PLAN !!!!]** If the Joint Commission does not complete its review and endorsement within three months, **Iran could raise the issue through the dispute resolution mechanism envisaged** by this JCPOA.

****** [NOTHING TO THIS POINT HAS DISCUSSED THE OPERATING PARAMETERS OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND LIMITING THESE PARAMETERS TO AVOID PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL !!!!]**

6. The IAEA will monitor the construction and report to the Working Group for confirmation that the construction of the modernised reactor is consistent with the approved final design.

7. **As the project manager, Iran** will take responsibility for the construction efforts. E3/EU+3 parties will, consistent with their national laws, take appropriate administrative, legal, technical, and regulatory measures to support co-operation.

[DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION OR FUTURE ADMINISTRATIONS CAN TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST STATES, LOCALITIES OR INDIVIDUALS OF THE UNITED STATES THAT WORK TO DELAY OR STOP THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JCPOA ????]

E3/EU+3 parties will support the purchase by **Iran**, the transfer and supply of necessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems and technologies required for the construction of the redesigned reactor, through the mechanism established by this JCPOA, **as well as through exploration of relevant funding contributions.**

[IRAN IS RICH AND THEY WILL BE RICHER AFTER THIS. IRAN HAS ALL KINDS OF OIL AND IRAN WILL WORK WITH ISIS TO EXPORT ISIS OIL AND INDIRECTLY SUPPORT ISIS AND IRAN'S WORLD SUPPORT OF TERROR !!!!]

8. E3/EU+3 parties will also support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the modernized Arak reactor and its subsidiary laboratories, **upon request by Iran**, through IAEA technical cooperation if appropriate, including but not limited to technical and **financial assistance**, supply of required materials and equipment, **state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems** and equipment and support for licensing and authorization.

[SO WE THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES – YES THE GOVERNMENT BELONGS TO US – ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE IRAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND GIVE IRAN OUR BEST OF THE BEST STATE-OF-ART OPERATION ????]

[ISLAM IS OUR ENEMY AND THEY NOW RESIDE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. NOW WE ARE SUPPORTING THE IRAN KING PIN OF WORLD TERRORISM TO BRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS HELL TO AMERICA !!!!]

[14 LBS. OF PLUTONIUM ANNIHILATED NAGASAKI !!!!] [THIS IS EQUAL TO A BLOCK ALMOST 3"X3"X3" – IT COULD EASILY FIT INTO A SUITCASE !!!!]

[140 BLS OF URANIUM 235 ANNIHILATED HIROSHIMA !!!!] [THIS IS EQUAL TO A BLOCK ALMOST 6"X6"X6" – IT COULD EASILY FIT INTO A SUITCASE !!!!]

[WE KNOW HOW MUCH DAMAGE THESE BOMBS DID !!!!] [100 SMALLER 1/10TH SUITCASE BOMBS COULD DO 10 TIMES AS MUCH !!!!]

9. The redesigned reactor will use up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium in the form of UO₂ with a mass of approximately 350 kg **[771.4 LBS.]** of UO₂ in a full core load, with a fuel design to be reviewed and approved by the Joint Commission. The international partnership with the participation of Iran will fabricate the initial fuel core load for the reactor outside Iran. **The international partnership will cooperate with Iran, including through technical assistance, to fabricate, test and license fuel fabrication capabilities in Iran for subsequent fuel core reloads for future use with this reactor. [TEACH THEM HOW TO DO IT BETTER SO IRAN CAN BLOWUP MORE WITH LESS !!!!]** Destructive and non-destructive testing of this fuel including Post-Irradiation-Examination (PIE) will take place in one of the participating countries outside of Iran and that **country will work with Iran to license the subsequent fuel fabricated in Iran for the use in the redesigned reactor under IAEA monitoring.**

10. Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies, which are specifically designed for the support of the originally designed Arak reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40. Iran will store under IAEA continuous monitoring all existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies until the modernised Arak reactor becomes operational, at which point these natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies will be converted to UNH, or exchanged with an equivalent quantity of natural uranium. Iran will make the necessary technical modifications **[WILL THIS BE CHECKED AND APPROVED BY OTHERS ????]** to the natural

uranium fuel production process line that was intended to supply fuel for the IR-40 reactor design, such that it can be used for the fabrication of the fuel reloads for the modernised Arak reactor.

11. All spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of the reactor, will be shipped out of Iran to a mutually determined location in E3/EU+3 countries or third countries, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded, consistent with national laws, with the recipient party, **within one year from the unloading** from the reactor **or whenever deemed to be safe** for transfer by the recipient country. **[ONE YEAR ALLOWS A LONG TIME FOR THE RECORDS TO BE MODIFIED AND THE AMOUNTS CHANGED SO THAT IRAN CAN USE SOME OF THE MATERIAL FOR OTHER USES !!!!]**

[Note the issues on actual verification see Pages 6 & 17 of 124 Notes in red] [It will remain a Scottish dub until the first IRANIAN Nukes go off in SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, and/or AMERICA.]

12. Iran will submit the DIQ **[WHAT IS THIS – THIS IS THE ONLY PLACE THAT IT APPEARS ????** of the redesigned reactor to the IAEA which will include information on the planned radio-isotope production and reactor operation programme. The reactor will be operated under IAEA monitoring. **[WHAT MONITORING ???? CONTINUOUS 7/24 OR AS SCHEDULE WITH A 24 DAY NOTICE PRIOR TO INSPECTION ????**

13. Iran will operate the Fuel Manufacturing Plant only to produce fuel assemblies for light water reactors and reloads for the modernized Arak reactor. **[HOW WILL MONITORING BE DONE ???? CONTINUOUS 7/24 OR AS SCHEDULE WITH A 24 DAY NOTICE PRIOR TO INSPECTION ????**

C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT

14. All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the modernised Arak research reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quantities needed for medical research and production of deuterate solutions and chemical compounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer for 15 years. **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????** Iran's needs, consistent with the parameters above, are estimated to be 130 metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water or its equivalent in different enrichments prior to commissioning of the modernised Arak research reactor, and 90 metric tonnes after the commissioning, including the amount contained in the reactor.

15. Iran will inform the IAEA about the inventory and the production of the HWPP and will allow the IAEA to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced, including through IAEA visits, as requested, to the HWPP. **[WHAT MONITORING ???? CONTINUOUS 7/24 OR AS SCHEDULE WITH A 24 DAY NOTICE PRIOR TO INSPECTION ????**

D. OTHER REACTORS

16. Consistent with its plan, Iran will keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying only on light water for its future nuclear power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation including assurances of supply of necessary fuel.

17. Iran intends **["INTENDS" BUT NOT "REQUIRED"]** to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power and research reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded consistent with national laws with the recipient party.

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

18. For 15 years **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????** Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or spent fuel reprocessing R&D activities. For the purpose of this annex, spent fuel includes all types of irradiated fuel. **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????**

ten **ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????**] Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, reprocess spent fuel except for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.

20. For **15 years** **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????**] Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, develop, acquire or build facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptunium from spent fuel or from fertile targets, other than for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.

21. For **15 years**, **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????**] Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters **[THAT'S 61,000+ CUBIC INCHES – MORE THAN ENOUGH FOR 140 LBS OF WEAPONS GRADE URANIUM !!!! – OR ONE HIROSHIMA BOMB !!!!]** in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????**] Iran will develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission. **[THIS LAST SENTENCE APPEARS TO CONTRADICT THE PREVIOUS SENTENCE – “ONLY LESS THAN 6 CUBIC METERS” IN PERVIOUS SENTENCE AND THEN IN THIS SENTENCE “BEYOND 6 CUBIC METERS” ????**]

22. The E3/EU+3 are ready to facilitate all of the destructive and non-destructive examinations on fuel elements and/or fuel assembly prototypes including PIE for all fuel fabricated in or outside Iran and irradiated in Iran, using their existing facilities outside Iran. Except for the Arak research reactor complex, Iran will not develop, build, acquire or operate hot cells capable of performing PIE or seek to acquire equipment to build/develop such a capability, **for 15 years**. **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????**]

23. For **15 years**, **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????**] in addition to continuing current fuel testing activities at the TRR, Iran will undertake non-destructive post irradiation examination (PIE) of fuel pins, fuel assembly prototypes and structural materials. These examinations will be exclusively at the Arak research reactor complex. However, the E3/EU+3 will make available their facilities to conduct destructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed. The hot cells at the Arak research reactor in which non-destructive PIE are performed will not be physically interconnected to cells that process or handle materials for the production of medical or industrial radioisotopes.

24. For **15 years**, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.

25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years.

26. If Iran seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed quantities after 10 years and before 15 years, Iran will present its plan to, and seek approval by, the Joint Commission.

[IN ALL OF THE PARAGRAPHS WHERE IRAN IS ALLOWED TO SHIP TO OTHER COUNTRIES – MOST OF WHICH ARE WESTERN COUNTRIES – WHAT WILL KEEP THEM FROM INITIATING A DIRTY NUCLEAR BOMB SHIPMENT AND RAISING HELL ON EARTH IN THE WESTERN NATIONS ????]

[HAS THE WORLD LOST ALL ITS COMMON SENSE AND BELIEVES IRAN IS GOING TO PLAY BY THE RULES ????]

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!!]

F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY

27. Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in no more than 30 cascades in their current configurations in currently operating units at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) for 10 years.

28. Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67 percent for 15 years. [THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????]

29. Iran will remove the following excess centrifuges and infrastructure not associated with 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in FEP, which will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring: [WHAT DOES IAEA CONTINUOUS MONITORING MEAN ????] [WHERE ARE THESE TERMS DEFINED ????] [ARE THEY IN THE SECRET SIDE AGREEMENTS ????]

29.1. All excess centrifuge machines, including IR-2m centrifuges. Excess IR-1 centrifuges will be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges of the same type on a one-for-one basis. [THAT ARE DAMAGED IN PUSHING THE PARAMETERS OF R&D TO PRODUCE PLUTONIUM ????]

29.2. UF6 pipework including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters, and UF6 withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal stations, which is currently not in service, including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps. [THIS PARAGRAPH SEEMS TO BE DISCONNECT FORM THE REST OF THE DOCUMENT ????] [IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO RELATE TO THIS SECTION EITHER !!!!]

30. For the purpose of this Annex, the IAEA will confirm through the established practice the failed or damaged status of centrifuge machines before removal. [WHAT IS THE ESTABLISHED PRACTICE – IRAN NOTIFIES AND THEN THE IAEA HAS TO GIVE A 24 DAY NOTICE BEFORE INSPECTIONS ????]

31. For 15 years, [THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????] Iran will install gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-related infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium enrichment, research and development, or stable isotope enrichment, exclusively at the locations and for the activities specified under this JCPOA.

G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

32. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. For 10 years and consistent with its enrichment R&D plan, [A SECRET PLAN TO BE SHARED WITH LIMITED MEMBERS] Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges. Mechanical testing on up to two single centrifuges for each type will be carried out only on the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7 and IR-8. Iran will build or test, with or without uranium, only those gas centrifuges specified in this JCPOA.

33. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-2m cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.

34. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-4 cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring [WHAT DOES IAEA CONTINUOUS MONITORING MEAN ????] [WHERE ARE THESE TERMS DEFINED ????] [ARE THEY IN THE SECRET SIDE AGREEMENTS ????] at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.

35. Iran will continue the testing of a single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10 centrifuge machines for 10 years.

36. Iran will test a single IR-5 centrifuge machine for 10 years.

37. Iran will continue testing of the IR-6 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuge machines and small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence. **[LETTING IRAN BEGIN TO BUILD UP BEFORE THE END OF 10 YEARS !!!!] [IRAN WILL POSITION ITSELF TO MAXIMIZE ITS LEVERAGE AND USE OF THE JCPOA TO RAISE HELL ON EARTH AS SOON AS IRAN POSSIBLY CAN !!!!]**

38. Iran will commence, upon start of implementation of the JCPOA, testing of the IR-8 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence the testing of up to 30 centrifuges machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuges to small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence. **[LETTING IRAN BEGIN TO BUILD UP BEFORE THE END OF 10 YEARS !!!!] [IRAN WILL POSITION ITSELF TO MAXIMIZE ITS LEVERAGE AND USE OF THE JCPOA TO RAISE HELL ON EARTH AS SOON AS IRAN POSSIBLY CAN !!!!]**

39. For 10 years, Iran, consistent with the established practice, will recombine the enriched and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the use of welded pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of enriched and depleted uranium materials and verified by the IAEA. **[VERIFIED WHEN AND HOW ???]**

40. For 15 years, **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ???]** Iran will conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only at the PFEP. Iran will conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only at the PFEP and the Tehran Research Centre.

41. For the purpose of adapting PFEP to the R&D activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, **[A SECRET PLAN TO BE SHARED WITH LIMITED MEMBERS]** Iran will remove all centrifuges except those needed for testing as described in the relevant paragraphs above, except for the IR-1 cascade (No. 1) as described below. For the full IR-1 cascade (No. 6), Iran will modify associated infrastructure by removing UF6 pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters. The IR-1 cascade (No. 1) centrifuges will be kept but made inoperable, as verified by the IAEA **[VERIFIED WHEN AND HOW ???]**, through the removal of centrifuge rotors and the injection of epoxy resin into the sub headers, feeding, product, and tails pipework, and the removal of controls and electrical systems for vacuum, power and cooling. Excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. **[WHAT DOES IAEA CONTINUOUS MONITORING MEAN ???] [WHERE ARE THESE TERMS DEFINED ???] [ARE THEY IN THE SECRET SIDE AGREEMENTS ???]** The R&D space in line No. 6 will be left empty until Iran needs to use it for its R&D programme. **[SO IRAN CAN DECIDE THE SOONER THE BETTER WITHOUT ANY TIMELINE ???]**

42. Consistent with the activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, **[WHERE IS THIS PLAN ???] [A SECRET PLAN TO BE SHARED WITH LIMITED MEMBERS]** Iran will maintain the cascade infrastructure for testing of single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascades in two R&D lines (No. 2 and No. 3) and will adapt two other lines (No. 4 and No. 5) with infrastructure similar to that for lines No. 2 and No. 3 in order to enable future R&D activities as specified in this JCPOA. Adaptation will include modification of all UF6 pipework (including removal of all sub headers except as agreed as needed for the R&D programme) and associated instrumentation to be compatible with single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascade testing instead of full scale testing.

[REMEMBER IT ONLY TAKES A SMALL AMOUNT TO MAKE THE NUCLEAR BOMBS THAT ANNIHILATED HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI !!!!]

43. Consistent with its plan and internationally established practices, Iran intends to continue R&D on new types of centrifuges through computer modelling and simulations, including at universities.

[WILL IRAN BE REQUIRED TO SHARE IRAN'S STATE-OF-ART DEVELOPMENTS OR WILL THEY BE ABLE TO KEEP THAT SECRET ???]

[AS MENTIONED BEFORE THE OTHER PARTIES ARE REQUIRED TO SHARE THEIR STATE-OF-ART DEVELOPMENTS !!!!]

[THIS JUST SEEMS TO BE MORE OF THE "GIVE IRAN EVERYTHING" BUT DON'T REQUIRE ANY ACTUAL BENEFICIAL AND VERIFIABLE RETURNS !!!!]

For any such project to proceed to a

prototype stage for mechanical testing within 10 years, a full presentation to, and approval by, the Joint Commission is needed. **[REALLY – IRAN WILL WORK ON IT AND KEEP IT SECRET AND UNDISCLOSED FOR 10 YEARS AND THEN RAMP IT UP TO DELIVER HELL ON EARTH IN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES FIRST !!!!]**

H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT

44. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology centre and international collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research.

["agreed areas of research" – IRAN will work on what is agreed on before – during – short time after the advanced scheduled inspections !!!]

[OUTSIDE OF THE SCHEDULED INSPECTIONS IRAN WILL WORK ON SECRET UNDISCLOSED NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLUTONIUM !!!!] [REMEMBER IT TAKES 1/10 THE AMOUNT OF PLUTONIUM (14 LBS) TO DO THE EQUIVALENT DESTRUCTION OF HEROSHIMA !!!!]

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL] [THIS DEAL REMOVES ALL OF THE CONTROLS (SANCTIONS) THE WORLD IS USING TO CORRAL IRAN THE WORLD EXPORTER OF TERRORISM AND UNLEASHING THEM TO RAISE ABSOLUTE HELL IN 10 YEARS]

The Joint Commission will be informed in advance of the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow. **[AND THE IAEA WILL GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF 24 DAYS TO INSPECT THESE SPECIFIC PROJECTS !!!!] [SEE NOTES ABOVE UNDER THIS SAME ITEM !!!!]**

45. Iran will not conduct any uranium enrichment or any uranium enrichment related R&D and will have no nuclear material at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) for 15 years. **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????]**

[SEE B.8 PAGE 3/104] [DOES ANYBODY REALLY KNOW WHAT THE REAL SCHEDULE IS AND HOW MUCH SOONER IT CAN OCCUR THAN 10 YEARS ????] { PAGE 19/104 34.ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement [20-JUL-2015] of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, }

46. For 15 years, **[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????]** Iran will maintain no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines at one wing of the FFEP of which:

46.1. Two cascades that have not experienced UF6 before will be modified for the production of stable isotopes. **[DEFINE THE STABLE ISOTOPES – IS PLUTONIUM A STABLE ISOTOPE OR A DIFFERENT ELEMENT – DEFINITIONS NEED TO BE CONSIDERED, UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED TO SO THAT THERE IS NO WIDE INTERPRETATIONS FOR R&D ACTIVITIES !!!!] [WHERE WAS OBAMA'S MIT NUCLEAR EXPERT ????] [DID HE EVEN READ THE AGREEMENT ????] The transition to stable isotope production of these cascades at FFEP will be conducted in joint partnership between the Russian Federation**

[AND WE TRUST THE RUSSIAN NOW – AFTER ALL OF OBAMA'S ACTIONS TO PISS THEM OFF ????]

[HOW MUCH WILL RUSSIA DO TO HOLD, ENRICH, AND MODIFY IRAN'S NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO WEAPONS GRADE URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM TO USE AS ALLIES AFTER THE 10 OR LESS YEARS OF THIS AGREEMENT ????]

and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. To prepare these two cascades for installation of a new cascade architecture appropriate for stable isotope production by the joint partnership, Iran will remove the connection to the UF6 feed main header, and move cascade UF6 pipework (except for the dump line in order to maintain vacuum) to storage in Fordow under IAEA continuous monitoring. The Joint Commission will be informed about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at FFEP. 46.2. For four cascades with all associated infrastructure remaining except for pipework that enables crossover tandem connections, two will be placed in an idle state, not spinning. The other two cascades will continue to spin until the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous subparagraph has been completed. **[WILL UNSTABLE ISOTOPES AND PLUTONIUM BE GENERATED DURING THE RANSITION PERIOD ????] [WHAT WILL BE DONE WITH ALL THE RANSITION MATERIALS ????] Upon completion of the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous subparagraph, these two spinning cascades will be placed in an idle state, not spinning.**

47. Iran will:

47.1. remove the other 2 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges from this wing, by removing all centrifuges and cascade UF6 pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters.

47.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets and vacuum pumps. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. **[NOTE CONTINUOUS MONITORING BY IAEA IS NOT DEFINED ANYWHERE IN THIS DOCUMENT !!!!] [TO BE PUT BACK IN OPERATION WITH 10 YEARS !!!!]**

48. Iran will:

48.1. remove all excess centrifuges and uranium enrichment related infrastructure from the other wing of the FFEP. This will include removal

of all centrifuges and UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure gauges and transducers, and frequency inverters and converters, and UF6 feed and withdrawal stations.

48.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets, vacuum pumps and centrifuge mounting blocks. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. **[NOTE CONTINUOUS MONITORING BY IAEA IS NOT DEFINED ANYWHERE IN THIS DOCUMENT !!!!]**
[TO BE PUT BACK IN OPERATION WITH 10 YEARS !!!!]

49. Centrifuges from the four idle cascades may be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges in stable isotope production at Fordow.

50. Iran will limit its stable isotope production activities with gas centrifuges to the FFEP for 15 years and will use no more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for these activities at the FFEP. The associated R&D activities in Iran will occur at the FFEP and at Iran's declared and monitored centrifuge manufacturing facilities for testing, modification and balancing these IR-1 centrifuges.

51. The IAEA will establish a baseline for the amount of uranium legacy from past enrichment operations that will remain in Fordow. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, **[WHAT IS "REGULAR ACCESS" ???]** including daily as requested **[AND WHAT ARE THE NUMBER OF DAYS REQUIRED FROM REQUEST AND ACCEPTANCE ???]** **[WHAT CAN IRAN CLAIM TO DELAY THE REGULAR ACCESS ???]** by the IAEA, access to the FFEP in order to monitor Iran's production of stable isotopes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the FFEP for 15 years.

[THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA] [WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ???]

[SEE B.8 PAGE 3/104] [DOES ANYBODY REALLY KNOW WHAT THE REAL SCHEDULE IS AND HOW MUCH SOONER IT CAN OCCUR THAN 10 YEARS ???] { PAGE 19/104 34.ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement [20-JUL-2015] of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, }

28/104

I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT

52. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments **[IF THE COMMITMENTS BY IRAN ARE VOLUNTARY THEN THERE IS NO ENFORCEMENT IF THEY DON'T COMPLY !!!!]** as expressed in its own long term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan **[A SECRET PLAN TO BE SHARED WITH LIMITED MEMBERS]** to be submitted as part of the initial declaration described in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol.¹ The IAEA will confirm on an annual basis, **[ONCE A YEAR – SO FOR THE OTHER 11 MONTHS IRAN CAN DO WHATEVER IT WANTS WITH THE AID AND SUPPORT OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION !!!!]** for the duration of the plan that the nature and scope and scale of Iran's enrichment and enrichment R&D activities are in line with this plan.

53. Iran will start to install necessary infrastructure for the IR-8 at Natanz in Hall B of FEP **after year 10.**

[LET THEM AND THEY WILL BUILD THE IRANIAN BOMB AS SOON AS THEY CAN !!!!]

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!]

54. An agreed template for describing different centrifuge types (IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, IR-8) and the associated definitions need to be accomplished by implementation day.

[SO THEY ARE GOING TO WORK AND ARGUE ABOUT DEFINITIONS AFTER THE FACT THAT THIS AFTER THE ADOPTION DAY AND 2. Calls upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and **by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments**

[Does a vote by the U.S. Congress that rejects this agreement not violate this clause ???? Why would Secretary Kerry ever agree to this ????) **[Has Obama and his Administration decided that his Executive Branch is above the Legislative Branch process of our Federal Government and can do whatever they want ????** **[What is Imam Obama's real goal ????** **[Divide and conquer U.S. ????** **[This cannot be about Democrats and Republicans – it must be about U.S. – The United States of America. Obama has done nothing but attempt to divide and conquer U.S. !!!! Will this Congress allow him to continue ????** under the JCPOA;

2/104] [WTF ????

[ALL THESE POLITICOS WILL WHINE AND CRY “WE WORKED SO HARD ON THIS WE CAN'T LET IT FAIL NOW !” “DUMB ASSES – YOU'RE TO WORK OUT ALL THE DETAILS BEFORE YOU MAKE AN AGREEMENT NOT AFTER !!!!]

[OH – IF YOU HAD THE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE NEVER BEEN REACHED !!!!]

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!]

55. An agreed procedure for measuring IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge performance data needs to be accomplished by implementation day. **[SEE COMMENTS UNDER ITEM 54.]**

J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS

56. Iran will maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride **[Uranium hexafluoride, referred to as "hex" in the nuclear industry, is a compound used in the uranium enrichment process that produces fuel for nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. It forms solid grey crystals at standard temperature and pressure, is highly toxic, reacts violently with water and is corrosive to most metals. It reacts mildly with aluminum, forming a thin surface layer of AlF₃ that resists further reaction.]** (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) for **15 years. [THIS 15 YEAR TERM FALLS OUT SIDE THE 10 YEAR END OF THE JCPOA]** **[WHERE IS THE ENFORCEMENT IN IRAN DOES NOT COMPLY AFTER THE 10 YEARS ????**

57. All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF₆ (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be **sold [TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO HOLD AND COVERT TO PLUTONIUM]** on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. Iran will enter into a commercial contract with an entity **[RUSSIAN FEDERATION]** outside Iran for the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kg UF₆ in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, where applicable, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. Iran may choose to seek to sell excess enriched uranium to the IAEA fuel bank in Kazakhstan when the fuel bank becomes operational.

58. All uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran **[RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RF)]** or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. Scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran **[RF]** or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. In case of future supply of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U₃O₈) for TRR fuel plates fabrication, all scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates, containing uranium enriched to between 5% and 20%, will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran **[RF]** or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less within 6 months of its production. Scrap plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside Iran **[RF]**. The commercial transactions should be structured to return an equivalent amount of natural uranium to Iran. For **15 years**, Iran will not build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back to UF₆. **[15 YEARS DOES NOT FIT WITH 10 YEARS OR SOONER - A FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THIS DEAL !!!!]**

¹ Iran will permit the IAEA to share the content of the **enrichment and enrichment R&D plan**, as submitted as part of the initial declaration, with the Joint Commission participants. **[A SECRET PLAN TO BE SHARED WITH LIMITED MEMBERS]**

59. Russian **[ALLIED WITH IRAN AGAINST WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!!] [WILL CONGRESS ALLOW THIS DEAL TO RING OUR DEATH BELL ????** designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran **do not count against the 300 kg UF6** stockpile limit. **[SO THERE ARE NO REAL LIMITS TO WHAT CAN BE OPERATED IN IRAN ????** Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from other sources outside of Iran for use in Iran's nuclear research and power reactors, including those which will be fabricated outside of Iran for the initial fuel load of the modernised Arak research reactor, which are certified by the fuel supplier and the appropriate Iranian authority to meet international standards, **will not count against the 300 kg UF6 [SO THERE ARE NO REAL LIMITS TO WHAT CAN BE OPERATED IN IRAN ????** stockpile limit. **[GIVE EVERYTHING TO IRAN AND REQUIRE NO REAL VERIFIABLE OBSERVATION OR DOCUMENTATION OF WHAT THEY ARE ACTUALLY DOING !!!!] [IF YOU GIVE A GAMBLER TO MANY OUTS THEY WILL BET AGAINST YOU EVERY TIME !!!!] [THIS DEAL WITH BRING AN ACCELERATED END TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA – IT BORDERS ON BIBLICAL REVELATIONS !!!!]** The Joint Commission **will establish** a Technical Working Group **with the goal** of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or the equivalent in different chemical forms). This Technical Working Group will also, **within one year, work to develop objective technical criteria for** assessing whether fabricated fuel and its intermediate products can be readily converted to UF6. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, **will not count against the 300 kg UF6 [NO REAL LIMITS !!!!]** stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6. This could for instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical criteria **[WHERE IS THIS DOCUMENT ????** will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products **comport [AGREE]** with the fuel fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group. The Joint Commission will also support assistance to Iran including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran.

60. Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities outside Iran **[RUSSIAN FEDERATION]** for the purchase of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets. **The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, as needed, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. [CAN'T DO ANYTHING THAT LIMITS IRAN'S RUNAWAY PATH TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION WITH IN 10 YEARS !!!]** In the case of lack of conclusion of a contract with a fuel supplier, **E3/EU+3 will supply a quantity of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) and deliver to Iran, [IF THEY CAN'T AGREE TO A CONTRACT THEY WILL RECEIVE EVERYTHING THEY NEED !!!!] [WHY AGREE TO ANY CONTRACT ????** **[KEEP EVERYTHING SECRET AND UNDISCLOSED WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION !!!!] [OBAMA HAS MADE PUTIN AN ENEMY – THIS NEEDS TO BE CORRECTED OR WWII IS A DECADE OR LESS AWAY – AND WILL RESULT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GOING AWAY !!!!] [THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IS ALREADY TESTING OUR DEFENSES WITH MILITARY FLIGHTS NEAR AND INTO OUR AIR SPACE AND OUR ALLIES !!!!]** exclusively for the purpose of fabrication in Iran of **fuel** for the TRR and **enriched uranium targets** for the lifetime of the reactor. This 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) will be supplied in increments no greater than approximately 5 kg **[11 LBS] [IF CONVERTED TO PLUTONIUM 78% OF THE NAGASAKI BOMB !!!!]** and each new increment will be provided only when the previous increment of this material has been verified by the IAEA to have been mixed with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or **fabricated into enriched uranium targets**. Iran will notify the E3/EU+3 **within 2 year before the contingency of TRR fuel will be exhausted** in order to have the uranium oxide available 6 months before the end of the 2 year period.

[THIS DEAL IS A MASSIVE SHELL GAME OF THIS – THAT – ANOTHER THING UNDER A DOZEN OR MORE COCONUT HALVES !!!!]

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!]

K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING

61. Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, **[A SECRET PLAN TO BE SHARED WITH LIMITED MEMBERS]** Iran will only engage in production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rotors suitable for

isotope separation or any other centrifuge components, to meet the enrichment and enrichment R&D requirements of this Annex.

62. Consistent with **its plan, Iran will** use the stock of IR-1 centrifuge machines in storage, which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in Natanz and the IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow, for the replacement of failed or damaged machines. **Whenever during the 10 year period** from the start of the implementation of the JCPOA, the level of stock of IR-1 machines falls to 500 or below, Iran may maintain this level of stock by resuming production of IR-1 machines at a rate up to the average monthly crash rate without exceeding the stock of 500.

[IRAN IS ALLOWED TO PROTECT IRAN'S SPARE EQUIPMENT – THIS ALLOWS THEM TO R&D TO THE MAXIMUM PARAMETERS TO RUN ON AND OVER THE EDGE OF PRODUCING PLUTONIUM !!!!] [IF THE IAEA IS NOT STANDING SIDE BY SIDE WITH THEM EVERY DAY – THERE IS NO WAY TO CONTROL AND MONITOR IRAN'S PLAY IN AN EVIL WAY !!!!]

63. **Consistent with its plan**, at the **end of year 8**, **[SOONER THAN LATER – 10 YEARS]** Iran will commence manufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors **through year 10** at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type. **After year 10**, Iran will produce complete centrifuges with the same rate to meet its enrichment and enrichment R&D needs. Iran will store them at Natanz in an above ground location, under IAEA continuous monitoring, **["CONTINUOUS MONITORING" IS NOT DEFINED ANY WHERE IN THIS DOCUMENT !!!!] [HOW DOES ANY NATION OTHER THAN IRAN AGREE TO SOMETHING THAT IS NOT DEFINED ????] [IRAN CAN BECAUSE IT IS ALL FOR IRAN'S BENEFIT !!!!]** until they are needed for final assembly according to the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan. **[A SECRET PLAN TO BE SHARED WITH LIMITED MEMBERS]**

L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1

64. **Iran will notify the IAEA** of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force, **consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament)**.

[SO IRAN'S GOVERNMENT IS ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE. BUT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S CONGRESS IS SUBJUGATED !!!!]

[IMAM OBAMA IS RULING LIKE HE IS KING OF THE U.S. AND NOT ACCOUNTABLE TO THE WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!!]

[WASHINGTON BETTER WAKE UP TO WHAT THE HELL THEY ARE DOING OR A NEW REVOLUTION WILL ARISE AS WE THE PEOPLE FO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RETAKE OUR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT !!!!]

65. Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force.

[WHERE ARE ALL THESE MODIFIED CODES AND SUBSIDIARY AGREEMENTS ????]

[HOW CAN YOU KNOW WHAT YOU'RE AGREEING TO WHEN YOU AREN'T ALLOWED TO SEE EVERYTHING YOU'RE AGREEING TO ????]

M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN

66. Iran will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues", **[WHERE IS THIS ROADMAP ????]**

[HOW CAN YOU KNOW WHAT YOU'RE AGREEING TO WHEN YOU AREN'T ALLOWED TO SEE EVERYTHING YOU'RE AGREEING TO ????]

as verified **[HOW ????]** by the IAEA in its regular updates by the Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this Roadmap.

N. MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA

67. For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, **for 15 years or longer**, **[15 YEARS DOES NOT FIT WITH 10 YEARS OR SOONER - A FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THIS DEAL !!!!]** for the specified verification measures:

67.1. Iran will permit the IAEA the use of **on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals** which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally accepted IAEA practice. **Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working space in individual nuclear sites. [AND WHO WILL INSPECT AND VERIFY CALIBRATION OF THESE DEVICES ????] [WHAT HAPPENS WHEN ONE IS FOUND TO BE OUT OF LIMITS ????] [ABSOLUTE FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THE DEAL THAT ALLOWS IRAN TO RUN WILD !!!!]**

67.2. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence, including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear sites and, with best efforts, at locations near

nuclear sites in Iran for the designated IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment.

67.3. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran, consistent with its laws and regulations. **[THIS WILL LEAVE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OUTSIDE AND IN THE DARK !!!!]**

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!!]

O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)

68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, **[WHAT CAN AND WILL THE IAEA DO AFTER THE UN HAS WASHED ITS HANDS OF IT AFTER 10 YEARS ????**] that all uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period. **[AND IF THEY BUILD OUTSIDE THIS PERIOD THEY CAN DO WHATEVER THEY WANT !!!]**

69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years. **[WHAT CAN AND WILL THE IAEA DO AFTER THE UN HAS WASHED ITS HANDS OF IT AFTER 10 YEARS ????**

P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT

70. For 15 years, **[8 – 10 – 15 – 25 ????**] **[ABSOLUTE FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THE DEAL THAT ALLOWS IRAN TO RUN WILD !!!!!]** Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, **[NOT DEFINED ANYWHERE IN THIS DEAL !!!!!]** **[ABSOLUTE FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THE DEAL THAT ALLOWS IRAN TO RUN WILD !!!!!]** including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges, as specified in this Annex.

71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access **[AND WHAT ARE THE NUMBER OF DAYS REQUIRED FROM REQUEST AND ACCEPTANCE ????**] **[WHAT CAN IRAN CLAIM TO DELAY THE REGULAR ACCESS ????**] as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the FEP and PFEP, for 15 years.

72. For 15 years, **[15 YEARS DOES NOT FIT WITH 10 YEARS OR SOONER - A FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THIS DEAL !!!!!]** the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D.

73. Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology. For 15 years, **[15 YEARS DOES NOT FIT WITH 10 YEARS OR SOONER - A FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THIS DEAL !!!!!]** Iran will only engage, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment or enrichment related activities, including related research and development activities, following approval by the Joint Commission. **[ABSOLUTE FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THE DEAL THAT ALLOWS IRAN TO RUN WILD !!!!!]**

Q. ACCESS

74. Requests for access pursuant to provisions of this JCPOA will be made in good faith, with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the minimum necessary to effectively implement the verification responsibilities under this JCPOA. In line with normal international safeguards practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities, **[NUCLEAR WEAPONS R&D AND PRODUCTION]** but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran's other non-proliferation and

[IRAN WILL LET IAEA INSPECT WHEN IRAN WANTS THEM TO INSPECT SO THAT IRAN CAN MAXIMIZE ITS MILITARY AND OTHER NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES !!!!!] **[IRAN CAN CLAIM THAT THEY ARE DOING CONFIDENTIAL "SECRET UNDISCLOSED" R&D AND DELAY ACCESS !!!!!]**

[THE WOLVES HAVE SURROUNDED THE SHEEP PEN AND THE HAWKS WINGS HAVE BEEN CLIPPED BY IMAM OBAMA AND THE UN TO KEEP CONGRESS FROM DOING ANYTHING !!!!!]

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!!]

safeguards obligations. The following procedures are for the purpose of JCPOA implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and are **without prejudice** to the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto. In implementing this procedure as well as other transparency measures, the **IAEA will be requested to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge.**

[IRAN IS ALLOWED TO KEEP EVERYTHING SECRET WITH THE IAEA !!!!]

[HOW MUCH WILL IRAN HIDE AND IS HIDING FROM THE IAEA AND THE WORLD ALREADY ????]

[YET THIS DEAL REQUIRES THAT ALL STATE-OF-ART DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE OF IRAN DEVELOPED BY THE OTHER PARTICIPATING PARTIES BE SHARED !!!!]

[THIS DEAL GIVES IT ALL TO IRAN WITHOUT REQUIRING IRAN TO GIVE ANYTHING REAL IN RETURN !!!!]

75. In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, **if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared** **[IF THEY ARE SECRET AND UNDECLARED HOW WILL THE IAEA EVER KNOW ABOUT THEM ????] [THE IAEA IS NOT BEING GIVEN FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN !!!!] [THE IAEA WILL NEVER KNOW AND THUS THE WORLD WILL NEVER KNOW UNTIL IRAN STARTS RAISING HELL ON EARTH !!!!]** under the comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.

[SO THE IAEA IS ALLOWED TO NEGOTIATE AND WORK WITH IRAN OUTSIDE OF COMMUNICATING CONCERNS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OR PARTICIPATING PARTIES !!!!]

[NOTE THE ISSUES ON ACTUAL VERIFICATION SEE PAGES 6 & 17 OF 124 NOTES IN RED]

76. If Iran's explanations do not resolve the IAEA's concerns, the Agency may request access to such locations **[IF THEY ARE SECRET AND UNDECLARED HOW WILL THE IAEA EVER KNOW ABOUT THEM ????] [THE IAEA IS NOT BEING GIVEN FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN !!!!] [THE IAEA WILL NEVER KNOW AND THUS THE WORLD WILL NEVER KNOW UNTIL IRAN STARTS RAISING HELL ON EARTH !!!!]** for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.

[NO DETAILS ON TIME REQUIREMENTS – IRAN CAN PARTICIPATE AND RUN AND HIDE EVERYTHING SO THAT THE IAEA FINDS NOTHING !!!!]

[WITHOUT FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN THERE WILL BE NO REAL MONITORING AND VERIFICATION !!!!]

77. **Iran may propose** to the IAEA **alternative means of resolving** the IAEA's concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration. **[JUST ALLOWS IRAN A WAY TO LOCK OUT ACCESS AND HAVE MORE TIME TO RUN AND HIDE THE NUCLEAR ACTIVITY THEY WANT TO KEEP SECRET AND UNDISCLOSED !!!!]**

78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations **within 14 days of the IAEA's original request for access**, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA's concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. **The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days**, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

[JUST ALLOWS IRAN A WAY TO LOCK OUT ACCESS AND HAVE MORE TIME TO RUN AND HIDE THE NUCLEAR ACTIVITY THEY WANT TO KEEP SECRET AND UNDISCLOSED !!!!]

R. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY

79. Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows **for 20 years**. **[NOW ANOTHER TIME PERIOD !!!!] [8 – 10 – 15 – 20 – 25 ????] [ABSOLUTE FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THE DEAL THAT ALLOWS IRAN TO RUN WILD !!!!]**

80. In this context:

80.1. **Iran will provide** **[IRAN HAS ABSOLUTE CONTROL !!!!]** the IAEA with an initial inventory of all existing centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and subsequent reports on changes in such inventory and will permit the IAEA to verify the inventory by item counting and numbering, and through containment and surveillance, of all rotor tubes and bellows, including in all existing and newly produced centrifuges. **[WITHOUT FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN THERE WILL BE NO REAL MONITORING AND VERIFICATION !!!!]**

80.2. **Iran will declare** [EXCEPT WHAT IRAN WANTS TO KEEP SECRET AND UNDISCLOSED !!!!] [WITHOUT FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN THERE WILL BE NO REAL MONITORING AND VERIFICATION !!!!] all locations and equipment, namely flow-forming machines, filament-winding machines and mandrels that are used for production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows, and will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance on this equipment, to verify that this equipment is being used to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in this JCPOA.

S. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES

81. For **10 years**, [8 – 10 – 15 – **20** – 25 ???] [ABSOLUTE FULLNESS OF AMBIGUITY IN THE DEAL THAT ALLOWS IRAN TO RUN WILD !!!!] Iran's uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production activities will be exclusively based on gaseous centrifuge technology.² Iran will permit IAEA access [HOWEVER, IRAN IS ALLOWED TO CONTROL SCHEDULING AND TIME !!!!] [WITHOUT FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN THERE WILL BE NO REAL MONITORING AND VERIFICATION !!!!] to verify that uranium isotope separation production and R&D activities are consistent with this Annex.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. **Iran will not engage** in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

[WITHOUT FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN THERE WILL BE NO REAL MONITORING AND VERIFICATION !!!!]

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, **unless approved by the Joint Commission** for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

[WITHOUT FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN THERE WILL BE NO REAL MONITORING AND VERIFICATION !!!!]

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, **unless approved by the Joint Commission** for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

[WITHOUT FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN THERE WILL BE NO REAL MONITORING AND VERIFICATION !!!!]

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

[WITHOUT FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN THERE WILL BE NO REAL MONITORING AND VERIFICATION !!!!]

[IF THEY ARE SECRET AND UNDECLARED HOW WILL THE IAEA EVER KNOW ABOUT THEM ???] [THE IAEA IS NOT BEING GIVEN FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN !!!!] [THE IAEA WILL NEVER KNOW AND THUS THE WORLD WILL NEVER KNOW UNTIL IRAN STARTS RAISING HELL ON EARTH !!!!]

²For the purpose of this Annex, non-gaseous centrifuge uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production will include laser isotope separation systems, electromagnetic isotope separation systems, chemical exchange systems, gaseous diffusion systems, vortex and aerodynamic systems, and other such processes that separate uranium isotopes.

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!]

Attachment: Arak conceptual design

Fundamental Principles:

- Maximize use of the current infrastructure of original design of Arak research reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40, according to their respective ratings.
- Modernizing of the original design in order to be a **multi-purpose research reactor** comprising radio-isotope production, **[PLUTONIUM ???]** structural materials and fuel (pins and assembly prototypes) testing and able to conduct other **neutronic experiments** which demand **high neutron fluxes** (more than 10^{14}).

[AND IF AN IRAN CONTROLLED AND UNSUPERVISED R&D EXPERIMENT RUNS OUT OF CONTROL WHAT IS FORMED ???] [82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.]

[IF THEY ARE SECRET AND UNDECLARED HOW WILL THE IAEA EVER KNOW ABOUT THEM ???] [THE IAEA IS NOT BEING GIVEN FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN !!!!] [THE IAEA WILL NEVER KNOW AND THUS THE WORLD WILL NEVER KNOW UNTIL IRAN STARTS RAISING HELL ON EARTH !!!!]

- Using heavy water as coolant, moderator and reflector. Light water would be utilized as an annular ring around the compact new core for safety reasons **if necessary**.

[HUGE UNANSWERED QUESTION IN THE DEAL TO BE AGREED TO BEFORE THE DEAL IS FULLY DEFINED !!!!]

- Around 78 fuel assemblies in a tight hexagonal grid spacing with the following preliminary characteristics will be loaded.
- Up to 3.67 percent enriched UO_2 , in the improved assembly design, will be used as fuel.
- Power will not exceed to 20 MWth.
- Adding different types of beam tubes to the existing beam tubes which being extended to the edge of the new compact core.
- Having one central channel in the center of the new core with passive cooling system for the purpose of structural materials and fuel pins and assembly prototypes testing with neutron flux beyond $2 \cdot 10^{14}$, **[THE 14 SHOULD BE 10^{14}] [THE FIRST CONTROL LIMIT INDICATED IN THE DEAL FOR ARAK ONLY]** twelve in-core irradiation channels (IIC) inside the core and twelve lateral irradiation channels (LIC) just next to the outer ring of fuel assemblies.
- The location of the in-core and lateral irradiation channels should be designed and fixed to meet the best anticipated performances.

[BEST ANTICIPATED PERFORMANCES FOR WHAT – NUCLEAR ENERGY OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS BYPRODUCT DEVELOPMENT ???] [DON'T THEY GO HAND IN HAND ???]

- Consistent with relevant section of Annex 1, subsidiary laboratories are part of the modernization project of the Arak Research Reactor. In Addition, Annex III reinforce design and construction of subsidiary laboratories.
- The highest tolerable pressure for the first and second loop is 0.33 Mpa (at the interance of the reactor pit).
- The highest possible flow rate for coolant is 610 kg/s at the pressure of 0.33 MPa in the main piping system and 42 Kg/sec for Moderator with the same conditions.

[DO THESE CONTROL LIMITS KEEP IRAN FROM DOING UNSUPERVISED R&D THAT WILL PRODUCE WEAPONS GRADE URANIUM OR PLUTONIUM ???]

[IF THEY ARE SECRET AND UNDECLARED HOW WILL THE IAEA EVER KNOW ABOUT THEM ???] [THE IAEA IS NOT BEING GIVEN FULL AND UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO SEARCH AND ROOT OUT EVERY LOCATION AND OPERATION WITHIN IRAN !!!!] [THE IAEA WILL NEVER KNOW AND THUS THE WORLD WILL NEVER KNOW UNTIL IRAN STARTS RAISING HELL ON EARTH !!!!]

Preliminary Characteristics:	Values
Core Parameters	
Power (MW)	20
Number of fuel assemblies	~ 78
Active length (cm)	~ 110
Lattice configuration	Hexagonal
Fuel pellets Material	UO ₂
Fuel enrichment level	Up to 3.67 %
Clad material	Zr Alloys
Burnable poison	Yes, if necessary
Lattice pitch (cm)	~ 11
Coolant medium	D ₂ O
Moderator medium	D ₂ O
Reflector medium	D ₂ O
Reflector thickness (cm)	~ 50
Purity of D ₂ O	~ 99.8%
Mass of D ₂ O (mtons)	~ 60-70
Yearly makeup	Yes
K _{eff}	< 1.25
Core Excess reactivity (pcm)	< 20000
Cycle length (days) <small>approximatly</small>	~ 250
²³⁹ Pu at EoC (g)	~ 850 [1.87 LBS OR 13.4% OF THE NAGASAKI BOMB !!!!]
[NO DOCUMENTATION ON HOW TO MANAGE AND CONTROL THE PLUTONIUM. WILL IT BE ENRICHED IN IRAN OR IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ???]	
²³⁹ Pu purity at EoC	~ 78%
²³⁵ U consumption	~ 60%
Maximum Thermal Flux, E<0.625ev	~ 3•10 ¹⁴
Maximum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev	~ 1•10 ¹⁴
Minimum Thermal Flux, E<0.625ev	~ 1•10 ¹⁴
Minimum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev	~ 1•10 ¹⁴
Fluid velocity in channels (m/s)	~ 3.8
Channel mass flow rate (kg/s)	~ 2.4
Working pressure (MPa)	0.33
Fluid inlet temperature (oC)	~ 47
Fluid outlet temperature (oC)	~ 78
Core material	Mainly S.S. 304
Core wall Thichness (mm)	~ 30
Fuel Pellet Diameter (cm)	~ 0.65
Inner Clad Diameter (cm)	~ 0.67
Outer Clad Diameter (cm)	~ 0.8
Number of pins per assembly	12
Mass of UO ₂ in full core load (Kg)	~ 350 [771.4 LBS.]
Core diameter (cm)	~ 240

JCPOA Annex II – Sanctions-related commitments

The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V (Implementation Plan) to this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

A. European Union¹

1. The EU and EU Member States **commit to terminate** all provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (as subsequently amended) implementing all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, to **terminate all provisions** of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP (as subsequently amended), as specified in Sections **1.1-1.10 below**, and to **terminate or amend** national implementing legislation as required, in accordance with Annex V:

1.1. Financial, banking and insurance measures²

1.1.1 Prohibition and authorisation regimes on financial transfers to and from Iran (Article 10 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 30, 30a, 30b and 31 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);

1.1.2. Sanctions on banking activities (Article 11 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 33 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);

1.1.3. Sanctions on insurance (Article 12 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 35 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);

1.1.4. Sanctions on financial messaging services (Article 20(12) of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);

1.1.5. Sanctions on financial support for trade with Iran (Article 8 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);

1.1.6. Sanctions on **grants, financial assistance and concessional loans** (Article 9 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);

1.1.7. Sanctions on Government of Iran **public-guaranteed bonds** (Article 13 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 34 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

1.1.8. Sanctions on associated services³ for each of the categories above (see the references above).

¹ For the purposes of EU legislation, “Iranian person, entity or body” means:

(i) the State of Iran or any public authority thereof;

(ii) any natural person in, or resident in, Iran;

(iii) any legal person, entity or body having its registered office in Iran;

(iv) any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside Iran, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by one or more of the above mentioned persons or bodies.

² The headings and subheadings in this Annex are for descriptive purposes only.

³ For the purposes of this Annex, the term “associated services” means any service – including technical assistance, training, insurance, re-insurance, brokering, transportation or financial service – necessary and ordinarily incident to the underlying activity for which sanctions have been lifted pursuant to this JCPOA.

1.2. Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors

1.2.1. Sanctions on the import of oil and gas from Iran (Articles 3a, 3c and 3e of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 11, 12 and 14a, and Annexes IV and IVA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);

[MAKE IRAN RICHER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

1.2.2. Sanctions on the import of Iranian petrochemical products (Articles 3b and 3d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 13 and 14, and Annex V of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);

[MAKE IRAN RICHER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

1.2.3. Sanctions on the export of key equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles 4, 4a and 4b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 8, 9 and 10, and Annexes VI and VIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

1.2.4. Sanctions on investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles 6, 6a and 7 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 17(1), 17(2)(b) and (c), 17(3), 17(4), 17(5), 20 and 21 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

[MAKE IRAN RICHER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

[AS LONG AS SOME BECOME RICHER WITH THEM THEY DON'T CARE ABOUT THE REST OF THE WORLD !!!!]

1.2.5. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).

1.3. Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors

1.3.1. Sanctions related to shipping and shipbuilding (Articles 4g, 4h, 8a, 18a and 18b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10a, 10b, 10c, 37a, and 37b, and Annex VIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);

[HELPS IRAN MOVE IRAN'S EXPORT OF TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD UNCHECKED !!!!]

1.3.2. Sanctions related to the transport sector (Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

1.3.3. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).

1.4. Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage

1.4.1. Sanctions on gold, precious metals and diamonds, banknotes and coinage (Articles 4c and 4d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15 and 16, and Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

1.4.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).

1.5. Nuclear proliferation-related measures

1.5.1. Sanctions related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities (goods and technology, investment and specialised training) (Articles 1(1) (a), (b), (d), (e), (2), (3) and (4), 2, 3, 5, 14 and 21 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17(1) and (2)(a), 18, 19 and 22, and Annexes I, II and III of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

[LETS IRAN RUN WILD WITH IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR R&D FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE IRAN WANTS !!!!]

1.5.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).

1.6. Metals

1.6.1. Sanctions on metals (Articles 4e and 4f of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15a, 15b and 15c, and Annex VIIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and **[OPEN THE GATES SO THAT IRAN CAN BE FLOODED WITH GOODS AND CONTRACTING PARTIES CAN BECOME RICH QUICK !!!!] [THIS GIVES IRAN ACCESS TO WHAT THEY NEED TO KEEP BUILDING AND DEVELOPING IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM !!!!]**

1.6.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).

1.7. Software

1.7.1. Sanctions on software (Articles 4i and 4j of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10d, 10e and 10f, and Annex VIIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

[HELPS IRAN DEVELOP R&D FASTER SO THAT THEY CAN OUTPERFORM THE TIMELINE AND BE DONE IN 5 YEARS !!!!]

1.7.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).

1.8. Arms

1.8.1. Sanctions on arms (Articles 1(1)(c), (3) and (4), and 3 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 5(1)(a) and (c), 17(1) and (2)(a), and 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

[IF THIS DEAL IS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WHAT LIFT ARMS SANCTIONS ???]

[THE ONLY REASON FOR THIS IS TO MAKE ARMS DEALERS RICHER AND TO HELL WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD !!!!]

1.8.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).

1.9. Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban)

[LETS IRANIANS TRAVEL THE WORLD TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

1.9.1. Asset freeze and visa ban measures applicable to:

1.9.1.1. listed Iranian banks and financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran;

1.9.1.2. listed persons, entities and bodies related to the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;

1.9.1.3. listed persons, entities and bodies related to shipping, shipbuilding and transport;

1.9.1.4. other listed persons, entities and bodies not related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile-related activities;

1.9.1.5. listed persons, entities and bodies related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile-related activities; and

1.9.1.6. entities and individuals listed by the UN Security Council, as set out in Attachment 1, part I to this Annex for categories

1.9.1.1-1.9.1.4, Attachment 2, part I to this Annex for category 1.9.1.5, and Parts II of Attachments 1 and 2 to this Annex for category

1.9.1.6 (Articles 19 and 20, and Annexes I and II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 28a, 28b and

29, and Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).

1.10. Other provisions

1.10.1. The commitment in Section 1 covers all remaining provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 not specified above.

1.10.1.1. Definitions (Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and

1.10.1.2. General and final provisions (Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 26a, 27 and 28 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 43a, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and Annex X of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).

2. The EU represents that the provisions listed in Section 1 above constitute the full and complete list of all EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures.

[IF THE EU FORGETS ONE IT GIVES IRAN THE EASY OUT OPTION NOT TO COMPLY AND KEEPS ALL CONTRACTS IN PLACE PRIOR TO THE POINT OF DISCOVERY !!!!]

[THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WILL BE GOING GANG BUSTERS TO IMPLEMENT ALL THE CONTRACTS THEY CAN BEFORE ANYONE ELSE !!!!]

These sanctions or restrictive measures will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.

3. Effects of the lifting of EU economic and financial sanctions

3.1. As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 1 above, the following activities, including associated services, will be allowed, beginning on implementation day, in accordance with this JCPOA and provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with EU and EU Member States' laws and regulations in effect:⁴

3.2. Financial, banking and insurance measures (See Sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.8)

3.2.1. Transfers of funds between EU persons, entities or bodies, including EU financial and credit institutions, and Iranian persons, entities or bodies, including Iranian financial and credit institutions, without the requirement for authorisation or notification;

[BACKDOOR DEALS WITHOUT REQUIREMENTS OF MONITORING AND CONTROL !!!!]

[LETS IRAN AND ITS ALLIES RUN WILD !!!!] [ONCE HELL BLOWS UP ON EARTH IT WILL BE TO LATE !!!!]

3.2.2. Opening of new branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States;

[WHAT CAN IRAN BRING INTO THERE BANKS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND SUITCASES THEN COULD RAISE HELL ON EARTH IN EU COUNTRIES ????] [IRAN HATES ALL OF THE WEST !!!!] [ATTACK NATO ON MANY FRONTS AND IN THE U.S. AND IRAN AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WILL BRING AN END TO THE GREAT SATAN !!!!] and the establishment of new joint ventures, or the taking of an ownership interest or the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships by Iranian banks with EU banks; and opening by EU persons, including EU financial and credit institutions, of representative offices, subsidiaries, joint ventures or bank accounts in Iran;

3.2.3. Provision of insurance or reinsurance to Iran or the Government of Iran, an Iranian legal person, entity or body, or a natural person or a legal person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction;

3.2.4. Supply of specialised financial messaging services **[WHAT IS THIS ????] [WILL IT JUST GIVE IRAN QUICKER ACCESS TO EXCHANGE AND EXPEDITE FINANCIAL TRANSFERS TO IRAN CAN EXPORT IRAN'S TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD ???]** to any Iranian natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, including those listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex;

3.2.5. Entering into commitments by EU Member States to provide financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits,

⁴ Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons still subject to restrictive measures and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those referred to in Section 1. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on EU sanctions.

guarantees or insurance; and into commitments for **grants, financial assistance** and **concessional loans** to the Government of Iran; and

[IRAN IS WEALTHY IT IS BEING HELD IN SANCTIONS.] [IRAN IS GOING TO BE ABLE TO USE THIS WEALTH ONCE RELEASED TO DO WHATEVER THEY WANT !!!!]

[WHY DO THEY NEED CREDIT, GRANTS, CONCESSIONAL LOANS, AND/OR PUBLIC-GUARANTEED BONDS ????]

[THIS APPEARS TO BE STRUCTURED FOR ISLAMIC LAW VERSUS GENERAL INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STANDARDS AND LAW !!!!]

3.2.6. **Sale or purchase of public or public-guaranteed bonds** to and from Iran, the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, or Iranian banks and financial institutions or persons acting on their behalf.

[IRAN CAN DUMP ON ALL THE PUBLIC-GUARANTEED BONDS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND CAUSE AN ECONOMIC CRASH AS PREEMPTIVE ACTION TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS STRIKES AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

3.3. Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.5)

3.3.1. Import, purchase, **swap** **[ON A ONE FOR ONE BASIS OR ON SOME NEGOTIATED BASIS ????]**

[THIS JUST ADDS ANOTHER LEVEL OF ACCOUNTING TO KEEP TRACK OF AMOUNTS !!!!]

[IT IS SPECIFICALLY NOTED AND WILL THIS BE APPLIED TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL EXCHANGE ALSO ????]

[ITS NOT DEFINED IN THIS DOCUMENT AND IS TO BE DEFINED IN OTHER CONTRACTS !!!!]

or transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products, natural gas or petrochemical products and related financing;

3.3.2. Sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment or technology, technical assistance, including training, used in the sectors of the oil, gas and petrochemical industries in Iran covering exploration, production and refining of oil and natural gas, including liquefaction of natural gas, to any Iranian person, in or outside Iran, or for use in Iran; and

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

[NOTE: IRAN IS NOT REQUIRED TO TRANSFER IRAN'S DISCOVERIES AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT BACK TO THE OTHER PARTIES !!!!]

3.3.3. Granting of any financial loan or credit to, the acquisition or extension of a participation in, and the creation of any joint venture with, any Iranian person that is engaged in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors in Iran or outside Iran.

[KICK STARTS FINANCING FOR IRAN SO THAT IRAN CAN START ROLLING WITH THEIR NUCLEAR BUILDUP AND EXPORTING TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

3.4. Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors (See Sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.3)

3.4.1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of **naval equipment and technology for ship building, maintenance or refit,**

[NAVAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ????]

[THE EU IS AN ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!!]

[WHAT HAS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SUPPLIED TO OUR ALLIES RELATED TO NAVAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ????]

[IF THIS DEAL IS TO BE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WHY IS THIS REQUIRED ????]

to Iran or to any Iranian persons engaged in this sector; the design, construction or the participation in the design or construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers for Iran or for Iranian persons; the provision of vessels designed or used for the transport or storage of oil and petrochemical products to Iranian persons, entities or bodies; and the provision of flagging and classification services, including those pertaining to technical specification, registration and identification numbers of any kind, to Iranian oil tankers and cargo vessels;

[IF COMMERCIAL PLANES WERE USED TO ATTACK US WHY NOT PLAN AN ATTACK WITH COMMERCIAL CARGO VESSELS AND OIL TANKERS FILLED WITH CHEMICALS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS ????]

3.4.2. **Access to the airports** under the jurisdiction of EU Member States **of all cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or originating from Iran;**

[AN ORCHESTRATED WORLD WIDE ATTACK ON THE WEST BY IRAN OR IRAN AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION COULD RENDER A DEVASTATING BLOW ON THE WEST !!!!]

[ASK ISRAEL – THEY USED THIS ON EGYPT IN ONE OF THEIR WARS WITH THE MULSIM STATES !!!!]

3.4.3. **Cessation of inspection,** **[YOU HAVE TO BE SHITTING ME !!!!]**

[IF YOU CAN'T INSPECT HOW DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA IF THEY ARE CARRYING ITEMS IRAN IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE CARRYING ????] [GIVES IRAN A WIDE OPEN DOOR FOR VIOLATING THE DEAL !!!!]

seizure and disposal by EU Member States of cargoes to and from Iran in their territories with regard to items which are no longer prohibited; and

3.4.4. Provision of bunkering or ship supply services, or any other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels not carrying prohibited items; and the provision of fuel, engineering and maintenance services to Iranian cargo aircraft not carrying prohibited items.

[IF YOU CAN'T INSPECT HOW DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA IF THEY ARE CARRYING ITEMS IRAN IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE CARRYING ???]

[IF TERRORIST ONCE USED COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT THERE IS A PLAN TO USE CARGO AIRCRAFT !!!]

[GIVES IRAN A WIDE OPEN DOOR FOR VIOLATING THE DEAL AND BRING HELL ON EARTH TO THE DOORSTEPS OF THE WESTERN NATIONS !!!]

3.5. Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage (See Sections 1.4.1 to 1.4.2)

3.5.1. Sale, supply, purchase, export, transfer or transport of gold and precious metals as well as diamonds, and provision of related brokering, financing and security services, to, from or for the Government of Iran, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, or the Central Bank of Iran; and

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!]

3.5.2. Delivery of newly printed or minted or unissued Iranian denominated banknotes and coinage to, or for the benefit of the Central Bank of Iran.

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!]

[ALSO SEE PREVIOUS NOTES IN SECTION 1.2 – 1.4 PAGE 38/104 !!!] [WHY SO MUCH DUPLICATED LANGUAGE ???]

[JUST OPENS MORE HOLES FOR DISCREPANCIES FOR DISPUTE GENERATION AND DELAYS TO PROTECT IRAN !!!]

41/104 (CONTINUED)

3.6. Metals (See Sections 1.6.1 to 1.6.2)

3.6.1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals, such as aluminum and steel to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.

[OPEN THE GATES SO THAT IRAN CAN BE FLOODED WITH GOODS AND CONTRACTING PARTIES CAN BECOME RICH QUICK !!!!!] [THIS GIVES IRAN ACCESS TO WHAT THEY NEED TO KEEP BUILDING AND DEVELOPING IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM !!!!!]

3.7. Software (See Sections 1.7.1 to 1.7.2)

3.7.1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of software for integrating industrial processes, including updates, to any Iranian person, entity or body, or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA,

[HELPS IRAN DEVELOP R&D FASTER SO THAT THEY CAN OUTPERFORM THE TIMELINE AND BE DONE IN 5 YEARS !!!!!]

3.8. Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) (See Section 1.9.1)

3.8.1. As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, releasing of all funds and economic resources which belong to, and making available funds or economic resources to, the persons, entities and bodies, including Iranian banks and financial institutions, the Central Bank of Iran, listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex; and

3.8.2. As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, **entry into, or transit through the territories of EU Member States** of individuals listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex.

[IRAN IS ALREADY DEVELOPING IS LIST OF TERRORISTIC LEADERS THAT WILL PLAN, DETAIL AND IMPLEMENT THE HELL ON EARTH ATTACK ON THE WEST !!!!!] [HOW MANY OF THESE WILL BE ON THIS NEW REVOLUTIONARY GUARD LIST ????]

[SEE PREVIOUS NOTES IN SECTION 1.6 – 1.9 PAGE 39/104 !!!!!] [WHY SO MUCH DUPLICATED LANGUAGE ????]

[JUST OPENS MORE HOLES FOR DISCREPANCIES FOR DISPUTE GENERATION AND DELAYS TO PROTECT IRAN !!!!!]

B. United States⁵ [MAKE SURE YOU READ THE FOOTNOTES !!!!]

4. The United States commits to cease the application of, and to seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, all nuclear-related sanctions⁶ [MAKE SURE YOU READ THE FOOTNOTES !!!!] as specified in Sections 4.1-4.9 below, and to terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622 and 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628, in accordance with Annex V.⁷

[OPENS THE DOORS FOR IRAN WITHOUT ANY REAL CONTROL OR MONITORING !!!!]

4.1. Financial and banking measures

4.1.1. Sanctions on transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including: the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other specified Iranian financial institutions; the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),⁸ Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and other specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control; and certain designated individuals and entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii)(I); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1245(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

⁵For the purposes of U.S. legislation, “Iranian person” means (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; and (B) an entity organised under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.

⁶The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply, and subsequently terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, pursuant to its commitment under Section 4 are those directed towards non-U.S. persons. For the purposes of Sections 4 and 6-7 of this JCPOA, the term “non-U.S. person” means any individual or entity, excluding (i) any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organised under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States, and (ii) any entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person. For the purposes of (ii) of the preceding sentence, an entity is “owned or controlled” by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 percent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity. U.S. persons and U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities will continue to be generally prohibited from conducting transactions of the type permitted pursuant to this JCPOA, unless authorised to do so by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

⁷All citations to statutes and Executive orders included in this JCPOA refer to the statute or Executive order as amended as of the conclusion date of this JCPOA, including: the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), as amended by Section 102 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and Sections 201-207 and 311 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA); CISADA, as amended by Sections 214-216, 222, 224, 311-312, 402-403 and 605 of TRA and Section 1249 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA); the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), as amended by Sections 503-504 of TRA and Section 1250 of IFCA; Executive Order (E.O.) 13622, as amended by Section 15 of E.O. 13628 and Section 16 of E.O. 13645. The citations listed in Section 4 include authorities under which secondary sanctions will no longer apply as a result of actions described in Section 4.8.1.

⁸Removal of NIOC from the SDN List, as provided for in Section 4.8.1, will include resolution of related designations and determinations.

4.1.2. Sanctions on the Iranian Rial (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 1(a), 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

4.1.3. Sanctions on the provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

4.1.4. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues held abroad, including limitations on their transfer (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

4.1.5. Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) Section 213(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

4.1.6. Sanctions on financial messaging services to the CBI and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 220; IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

[WHAT IS THIS ????] [WILL IT JUST GIVE IRAN QUICKER ACCESS TO EXCHANGE AND EXPEDITE FINANCIAL TRANSFERS TO IRAN CAN EXPORT IRAN'S TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD ???]

4.1.7. Sanctions on associated services⁹ for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.2. Insurance measures

4.2.1. Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex (Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) Section 5(a)(7); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645).

[IRAN CAN SET UP A MANMADE DISASTER WITH OR WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND BREAK AN INSURANCE COMPANY(S) !!!!] [THIS ON TOP OF OTHER IRANIAN AND IRANIAN ALLY ACTIONS IN THE WAR ON THE WEST WILL HAVE WHAT IMPACT ???]

[ATTACK COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH COMMERCIAL CIVIL AND CARGO PLANES; TRANSPORTATION WITH COMMERCIAL CIVIL AND CARGO PLANES AND CARGO SHIPS; AND WIDESPREAD COMMUNITY ATTACKS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONIZED SUITCASE BOMBS !!!!]

4.3. Energy and petrochemical sectors

4.3.1. Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales, including limitations on the quantities of Iranian crude oil sold and the nations that can purchase Iranian crude oil (ISA Section 5(a)(7); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

[MAKE IRAN RICHER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

4.3.2. Sanctions on investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors (ISA Sections 5(a)(1)-(2) and

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

[NOTE: IRAN IS NOT REQUIRED TO TRANSFER IRAN'S DISCOVERIES AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT BACK TO THE OTHER PARTIES !!!!]

⁹ See footnote 3 for the meaning of "associated services".

(4)-(8); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Section 1 of E.O. 13590, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i)-(iii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

4.3.3. Sanctions on the purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation, or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

[MAKE IRAN RICHER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

4.3.4. Sanctions on the export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran (ISA Section 5(a)(3); NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

[MAKE IRAN RICHER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

4.3.5. Sanctions on transactions with Iran's energy sector including with NIOC, NICO and NITC (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); TRA Section 212(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

[NOTE: IRAN IS NOT REQUIRED TO TRANSFER IRAN'S DISCOVERIES AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT BACK TO THE OTHER PARTIES !!!!]

4.3.6. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.4. Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors

4.4.1. Sanctions on transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators including IRISL, South Shipping Line, and NITC, and the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas¹⁰ (TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d); 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.4.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

[HELPS IRAN MOVE IRAN'S EXPORT OF TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD UNCHECKED !!!!]

[IF COMMERCIAL PLANES WERE USED TO ATTACK US WHY NOT PLAN AN ATTACK WITH COMMERCIAL CARGO VESSELS AND OIL TANKERS FILLED WITH CHEMICALS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS ????]

4.5. Gold and other precious metals

4.5.1. Sanctions on Iran's trade in gold and other precious metals (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(A) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.5.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

[HELPS IRAN BECOME RICHER FASTER TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

4.6. Software and metals

4.6.1. Sanctions on trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes,

[OPEN THE GATES SO THAT IRAN CAN BE FLOODED WITH GOODS AND CONTRACTING PARTIES CAN BECOME RICH QUICK !!!!] [THIS GIVES IRAN ACCESS TO WHAT THEY NEED TO KEEP BUILDING AND DEVELOPING IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM !!!!]

[SOFTWARE HELPS IRAN DEVELOP R&D FASTER SO THAT THEY CAN OUTPERFORM THE TIMELINE AND BE DONE IN 5 YEARS !!!!]

¹⁰ This commitment in Section 4.4.1 is based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.

in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B)-(C) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

4.6.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.7. Automotive sector

4.7.1. Sanctions on the sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i), 3(a)(i)-(ii), 5 and 6 of E.O. 13645); and

4.7.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

[GIVING EVERYTHING TO IRAN MAKES THEM A NATION WITH MORE FREEDOMS THAN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!!]

[THEY WILL USE ALL THESE FREEDOMS TO MAXIMIZE IRAN'S MONEY MACHINE TO EXPORT MORE TERRORISM AROUND THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!] [THEN LOOK OUT EASTERN WORLD !!!!]

4.8. Designations and other sanctions listings

4.8.1. **Removal of individuals and entities set out in Attachments 3 and 4** **[CHECK THE LIST CLOSELY !!!!]** to this Annex from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List (Removal of designations and/or sanctions imposed under ISA Section 5(a), IFCA Section 1244(d)(1) and TRA Section 212; and removals pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of certain persons listed pursuant to E.O. 13382, E.O. 13608, E.O. 13622, and E.O. 13645).

[IRAN IS ALREADY DEVELOPING IS LIST OF TERRORISTIC LEADERS THAT WILL PLAN, DETAIL AND IMPLEMENT THE HELL ON EARTH ATTACK ON THE WEST !!!!] [HOW MANY OF THESE WILL BE ON THIS NEW REVOLUTIONARY GUARD LIST ????]

4.9. Nuclear proliferation-related measures

4.9.1. Sanctions under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT;

[LETS IRAN RUN WILD WITH IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR R&D FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE IRAN WANTS !!!!]

4.9.2. Sanctions on joint ventures relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium (ISA Section 5(b)(2)); and

[LETS IRAN RUN WILD WITH IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR R&D FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE IRAN WANTS !!!!]

4.9.3. Exclusion of Iranian citizens from higher education coursework related to careers in nuclear science, nuclear engineering or the energy sector (TRA Section 501).

[LETS IRAN RUN WILD WITH IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR R&D FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE IRAN WANTS !!!!]

5. Other trade measures

5.1. The United States commits to:¹¹

5.1.1. **Allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft** **[AND WHAT WERE WE ATTACKED WITH ON 911 ????]** and related parts and services to Iran by licensing the (i) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft for exclusively civil aviation end-use, **[IT WAS COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT THEY ATTACKED US WITH !!!!]**

¹¹ To give effect to the measures described in this Section 5.1, the United States will license activities that do not involve any person on the SDN List and are otherwise consistent with applicable U.S. laws and regulations, including but not limited to the Export Administration Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.

(ii) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of spare parts and components for commercial passenger aircraft, and (iii) provision of associated serviced, **including warranty, maintenance, and repair services and safety-related inspections**, for all the foregoing, provided that licensed items and services are used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation;¹²

[SUPPORT IRAN WITH WHATEVER THEY NEED TO KEEP IRAN'S COMMERCIAL ATTACK AIRCRAFT ON THE LEADING EDGE OF OPERATION AND TECHNOLOGY !!!!]

[IRAN WILL USE EVERYTHING IRAN CAN AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ISRAEL !!!!]

5.1.2. License non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person¹³ to engage in activities with Iran that are consistent with this JCPOA; and

[SUPPORT IRAN WITH WHATEVER THEY NEED TO KEEP IRAN AT THE TOP OF IRAN'S GAME OF EXPORTING TERRORISM AROUND THE WORLD !!!!]

5.1.3. License the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar.

6. The United States represents that the provisions listed in Section 4 above **constitute the full and complete list of all U.S. nuclear-related sanctions**. These sanctions will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.

[IF THE U.S. FORGETS ONE IT GIVES IRAN THE EASY OUT OPTION NOT TO COMPLY AND KEEPS ALL CONTRACTS IN PLACE PRIOR TO THE POINT OF DISCOVERY !!!!]

[THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WILL BE GOING GANG BUSTERS TO IMPLEMENT ALL THE CONTRACTS THEY CAN BEFORE ANYONE ELSE !!!!]

7. Effects of the lifting of U.S. economic and financial sanctions:

[WHY SO MUCH DUPLICATED LANGUAGE ?????]

[JUST OPENS MORE HOLES FOR DISCREPANCIES FOR DISPUTE GENERATION AND DELAYS TO PROTECT IRAN !!!!]

7.1. As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 4 above, beginning on implementation day such sanctions, including associated services, would not apply to non-U.S. persons who carry out the following or that:¹⁴

7.2. Financial and banking measures¹⁵ (See Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7) [AND COMMENTS IN RED]

Engage in activities, including financial and banking transactions, with the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, Iranian financial institutions and other Iranian persons specified in Attachment 3 **[CHECK THE LIST CLOSELY !!!!]** to this Annex, including the provision of loans, transfers, accounts (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions), investments, securities, guarantees, foreign exchange (including Rial related transactions), letters of credit and commodity futures or options, the provision of specialised financial messaging services and facilitation of direct or indirect access thereto, the purchase or acquisition by

12 Licenses issued in furtherance of Section 5.1.1 will include appropriate conditions to ensure that licensed activities do not involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods, or services are re-sold or re-transferred to, any person on the SDN list. Should the United States determine that licensed aircraft, goods, or services have been used for purposes other than exclusively civil aviation end-use, or have been re-sold or re-transferred to persons on the SDN List, the United States would view this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under Section 5.1.1 in whole or in part.

13 For the purposes of Section 5.1.2 of this JCPOA, a non-U.S. entity is owned or controlled by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 per cent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.

14 Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons on the SDN List and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those cited in Section 4. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on U.S. sanctions.

15 For the purposes of the cessation of application of the provisions set out in Sections 4.1.1-4.1.7, the effects described for non-U.S. financial institutions extend to the activities outside of U.S. jurisdiction of international financial institutions.

the Government of Iran of U.S. bank notes, and the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt.¹⁶

7.3. Insurance measures (See Section 4.2.1) [AND COMMENTS IN RED]

Provide underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities in the energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), or for vessels that transport crude oil, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical products to or from Iran.

7.4. Energy and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.6) [AND COMMENTS IN RED]

Are part of the energy sector of Iran; purchase, acquire, sell, transport or market petroleum, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; provide to Iran support, investment (including through joint ventures), goods, services (including financial services) and technology that can be used in connection with Iran's energy sector, the development of its petroleum resources, its domestic production of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products; or engage in activities with Iran's energy sector, including NIOC, NITC, and NICO).

7.5. Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors (See Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.2) [AND COMMENTS IN RED]

Are part of the shipping or shipbuilding sectors of Iran; own, operate, control or insure a vessel used to transport crude oil, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; operate a port in Iran, engage in activities with, or provide financial services and other goods and services used in connection with, the shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran (including the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas¹⁷), including port services, such as bunkering and inspection, classification, and financing, and the sale, leasing, and provision of vessels to Iran, including to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), NITC, and South Shipping Line Iran or their affiliates.

7.6. Gold and other precious metals (See Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.2) [AND COMMENTS IN RED]

Sell, supply, export or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, gold and other precious metals, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or

¹⁶ Non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions with Iranian financial institutions (including the Central Bank of Iran) not appearing on the SDN List will not be exposed to sanctions as a result of those Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions or banking relationships involving Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List, provided that the non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institution does not conduct or facilitate, and is not otherwise involved in, those specific transactions or banking relationships with the Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List.

¹⁷ The effects described in Section 7.5 with respect to the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas are based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.

provide services for the foregoing including security, insurance and transportation.

7.7. Software and metals (See Sections 4.6.1 to 4.6.2) [AND COMMENTS IN RED]

Sell, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, to or from Iran in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, and the sale, supply, or transfer of such materials to the energy, petrochemical, shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, and Iranian ports, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing, including insurance and transportation.

7.8. Automotive sector (See Sections 4.7.1 to 4.7.2) [AND COMMENTS IN RED]

Conduct or facilitate financial or other transactions for the sale, supply or transfer to Iran of goods and services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran.

7.9. Designations and other sanctions listings (See Section 4.8.1) [AND COMMENTS IN RED]

The removal of designations and/or sanctions as described in Section 4.8.1, ceasing the application of secondary sanctions for transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex; and unblocking of property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction for individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex.

[SEE ALL THE NOTES UNDER THE EU SECTION FOR THEY ALSO APPLY TO THE UNITED STATES SECTIONS !!!!]

ATTACHMENT 1 - PART I

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX II TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP AND ANNEX IX TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012

ACENA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ADVANCE NOVEL
AGHAJARI OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
AGHAZADEH, Reza
AHMADIAN, Mohammad
AKHAVAN-FARD, Massoud
ALPHA EFFORT LTD
ALPHA KARA NAVIGATION LIMITED
ALPHA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
ARIAN BANK
ARVANDAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
ASHTREAD SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
ASPASIS MARINE CORPORATION
ASSA CORPORATION
ASSA CORPORATION LTD
ATLANTIC INTERMODAL
AVRASYA CONTAINER SHIPPING LINES
AZARAB INDUSTRIES
AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY ALIAS AZORES SHIPPING FZE LLC
BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO CA
BANK KARGOSHA
BANK MELLAT
BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
BANK MELLI IRAN ZAO
BANK MELLI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY
BANK MELLI,
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE
BANK REFAH KARGARAN
BANK TEJARAT
BATENI, Naser
BEST PRECISE LTD
BETA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
BIIS MARITIME LIMITED
BIS MARITIME LIMITED
BONAB RESEARCH CENTER
BRAIT HOLDING SA
BRIGHT JYOTI SHIPPING
BRIGHT SHIP FZC
BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
CEMENT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN
CHAPLET SHIPPING LIMITED
COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD

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CONCEPT GIANT LTD
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT BANK
CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE
DAJMAR, Mohammad Hossein
DAMALIS MARINE CORPORATION
DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
DARYA DELALAN SEFID KHAZAR SHIPPING COMPANY
DELTA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
DELTA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
DIAMOND SHIPPING SERVICES
DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
EAST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
ELBRUS LTD
ELCHO HOLDING LTD
ELEGANT TARGET DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
EMKA COMPANY
EPSILON NARI NAVIGATION LTD
E-SAIL A.K.A.E-SAIL SHIPPING COMPANY
ETA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
ETERNAL EXPERT LTD.
EUROPÄISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK
EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN
FAIRWAY SHIPPING
FAQIHIAN, Dr Hoseyn
FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
FASIRUS MARINE CORPORATION
FATSA
FIFTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK
FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST PERSIAN EQUITY FUND
FOURTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FUTURE BANK BSC
GACHSARAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
GALLIOT MARITIME INCORPORATION
GAMMA KARA NAVIGATION LTD

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GIANT KING LIMITED
GOLDEN CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
GOLDEN SUMMIT INVESTMENTS LTD.
GOLDEN WAGON DEVELOPMENT LTD.
GOLPARVAR, Gholam Hossein
GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
GOOD LUCK SHIPPING COMPANY LLC
GRAND TRINITY LTD.
GREAT EQUITY INVESTMENTS LTD.
GREAT METHOD LTD
GREAT PROSPECT INTERNATIONAL LTD.
HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING LINES
HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST & SHIPPING GMBH
HARVEST SUPREME LTD.
HARZARU SHIPPING
HELIOTROPE SHIPPING LIMITED
HELIX SHIPPING LIMITED
HK INTERTRADE COMPANY LTD
HONG TU LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED
HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
IFOLD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
INDUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT & RENOVATION ORGANIZATION
INSIGHT WORLD LTD
INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL
IOTA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
IRAN ALUMINIUM COMPANY
IRAN FUEL CONSERVATION ORGANIZATION
IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY
IRAN LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS CO.
IRANIAN OFFSHORE ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY LIMITED
IRANIAN OIL PIPELINES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY (IOPTC)
IRANIAN OIL TERMINALS COMPANY
IRANO MISR SHIPPING COMPANY
IRINVESTSHIP LTD
IRISL (MALTA) LTD
IRISL EUROPE GMBH
IRISL MARINE SERVICES AND ENGINEERING COMPANY
IRISL MARITIME TRAINING INSTITUTE
IRITAL SHIPPING SRL
ISI MARITIME LIMITED
ISIM AMIN LIMITED
ISIM ATR LIMITED
ISIM OLIVE LIMITED
ISIM SAT LIMITED
ISIM SEA CHARIOT LTD
ISIM SEA CRESCENT LTD
ISIM SININ LIMITED

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ISIM TAJ MAHAL LTD
 ISIM TOUR COMPANY LIMITED
 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
 JACKMAN SHIPPING COMPANY
 KALA NAFT
 KALAN KISH SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
 KAPPA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
 KARA SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH
 KAROON OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
 KAVERI MARITIME INCORPORATION
 KAVERI SHIPPING LLC
 KEY CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
 KHALILPOUR, Said Esmail
 KHANCHI, Ali Reza
 KHAZAR EXPL & PROD CO
 KHAZAR SHIPPING LINES
 KHEIBAR COMPANY
 KING PROSPER INVESTMENTS LTD.
 KINGDOM NEW LTD
 KINGSWOOD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 KISH SHIPPING LINE MANNING COMPANY
 LAMBDA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
 LANCING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 LOGISTIC SMART LTD
 LOWESWATER LTD
 MACHINE SAZI ARAK
 MAGNA CARTA LIMITED
 MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY
 MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED
 MAROUN OIL & GAS COMPANY
 MASJED-SOLEYMAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
 MASTER SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
 MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY
 MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
 MELLAT BANK SB CJSC
 MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY PJS
 MELLI BANK PLC
 MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING INTERNATIONAL
 MELODIOUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
 METRO SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
 MIDHURST SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (MALTA)
 MILL DENE LTD
 MINISTRY OF ENERGY
 MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM
 MODALITY LTD
 MODERN ELEGANT DEVELOPMENT LTD.
 MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INCORPORATION
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY SRL
 NAMJOO, Majid

NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG
 NARMADA SHIPPING
 NATIONAL IRANIAN DRILLING COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN GAS COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY NEDERLAND (A.K.A.: NIOC NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATION OFFICE)
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LIMITED
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (NIOEC)
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTS DISTRIBUTION COMPANY (NIOPDC)
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL REFINING AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
 NEUMAN LTD
 NEW DESIRE LTD
 NEW SYNERGY
 NEWHAVEN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 NOOR AFZA GOSTAR
 NORTH DRILLING COMPANY
 NUCLEAR FUEL PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT COMPANY
 OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 OCEAN EXPRESS AGENCIES PRIVATE LIMITED
 ONERBANK ZAO
 OXTED SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 PACIFIC SHIPPING
 PARS SPECIAL ECONOMIC ENERGY ZONE
 PARTNER CENTURY LTD
 PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD
 PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA
 PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
 PETRO SUISSE
 PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD
 PETROLEUM ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
 PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE
 PETROPARS IRAN COMPANY
 PETROPARS LTD.
 PETROPARS OILFIELD SERVICES COMPANY
 PETROPARS OPERATION & MANAGEMENT COMPANY
 PETROPARS RESOURCES ENGINEERING LTD
 PETROPARS UK LIMITED
 PETWORTH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 POST BANK OF IRAN
 POWER PLANTS' EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING COMPANY (SAAKHTE TAJHIZATE NIROOGAHI)
 PROSPER METRO INVESTMENTS LTD.
 RASTKHAH, Engineer Naser
 REIGATE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

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RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

REZVANIANZADEH, Mohammad Reza

RISHI MARITIME INCORPORATION

SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LTD

SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY

SALEHI, Ali Akbar

SANFORD GROUP

SANTEXLINES

SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH

SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG

SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED

SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH

SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG

SHALLON LTD

SHEMAL CEMENT COMPANY

SHINE STAR LIMITED

SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY

SILVER UNIVERSE INTERNATIONAL LTD.

SINA BANK

SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS

SINOSE MARITIME

SISCO SHIPPING COMPANY LTD

SIXTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH

SIXTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG

SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH

SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG

SMART DAY HOLDINGS LTD

SOLTANI, Behzad

SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT)

SOROUSH SARAMIN ASATIR

SOUTH WAY SHIPPING AGENCY CO. LTD

SOUTH ZAGROS OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY

SPARKLE BRILLIANT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED

STATIRA MARITIME INCORPORATION

SUREH (NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY)

SYSTEM WISE LTD

TAMALARIS CONSOLIDATED LTD

TENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH

TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG

TEU FEEDER LIMITED

THETA NARI NAVIGATION

THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH

THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG

THIRTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH

THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG

TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED

TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED

TRADE CAPITAL BANK

TRADE TREASURE

TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LTD
TULIP SHIPPING INC
TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
UNIVERSAL TRANSPORTATION LIMITATION UTL
VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE
WEST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
WESTERN SURGE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
WISE LING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ZANJANI, Babak
ZETA NERI NAVIGATION

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ATTACHMENT 1 - PART II

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX I TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP AND ANNEX VIII TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012

AGHA-JANI, Dawood
ALAI, Amir Moayyed
ASGARPOUR, Behman
ASHIANI, Mohammad Fedai
ASHTIANI, Abbas Rezaee
ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANISATION OF IRAN (AEOI)
BAKHTIAR, Haleh
BEHZAD, Morteza
ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTRE (NFRPC) AND ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE (ENTC)
FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.:
HOSSEINI, Seyyed Hussein
IRANO HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
IRISL BENELUX NV
JABBER IBN HAYAN
KARAJ NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE
KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
MOHAJERANI, Hamid-Reza
MOHAMMADI, Jafar
MONAJEMI, Ehsan
NOBARI, Houshang
NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
PARS TRASH COMPANY
PISHGAM (PIONEER) ENERGY INDUSTRIES
QANNADI, Mohammad
RAHIMI, Amir
RAHIQI, Javad
RASHIDI, Abbas
SABET, M. Javad Karimi
SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
SOLEYMANI, Ghasem
SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (SSL)
TAMAS COMPANY

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ATTACHMENT 2 - PART I

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX II TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP AND ANNEX IX TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012

AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION, AIO

AL YASIN, Javad

ALUMINAT

ANSAR BANK

ARAN MODERN DEVICES

ARAS FARAYANDE

ARFA PAINT COMPANY

ARFEH COMPANY

ARIA NIKAN,

ARMED FORCES GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANISATION

ASHTIAN TABLO

BABAEI, Davoud

BALS ALMAN

BANK SADERAT IRAN

BANK SADERAT PLC

BARGH AZARAKSH

BEHNAM SAHRIYARI TRADING COMPANY

BONYAD TAAVON SEPAH

BORBORUDI, Sayed Shamsuddin

DANESHJOO, Kamran

DARVISH-VAND, IRGC Brigadier-General Javad

ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS INDUSTRIES

ESNICO (EQUIPMENT SUPPLIER FOR NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES CORPORATION)

ETEMAD AMIN INVEST CO MOBIN

EYVAZ TECHNIC

FADAVI, Rear Admiral Ali

FAJR AVIATION COMPOSITE INDUSTRIES

FARAH, IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi

FARASEPEHR ENGINEERING COMPANY

FATAH, Parviz

GHANI SAZI URANIUM COMPANY

HAERI, Engineer Mojtaba

HIRBOD CO

HOSEYNITASH, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali

HOSSEINI NEJAD TRADING CO.

INSTITUTE OF APPLIED PHYSICS

IRAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES

IRAN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY

IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY

IRAN COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES

IRAN COMPOSITES INSTITUTE

IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES

IRAN MARINE INDUSTRIAL COMPANY

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IRAN POOYA
IRAN SAFFRON COMPANY OR IRANSAFFRON CO.
IRANIAN AVIATION INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION
IRGC AIR FORCE
IRGC QODS FORCE
IRGC-AIR FORCE AL-GHADIR MISSILE COMMAND
ISFAHAN OPTICS
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
JAFARI, Milad
JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS
JELVESAZAN COMPANY
KARANIR
KARIMIAN, Ali
KHALA AFARIN PARS
KHANSARI, Majid
MAAA SYNERGY
MACPAR MAKINA SAN VE TIC
MAHMUDZADEH, Ebrahim
MARINE INDUSTRIES
MAROU SANAT
MATSA (MOHANDESI TOSEH SOKHT ATOMI COMPANY)
MECHANIC INDUSTRIES GROUP
MEHR BANK
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS
MOBIN SANJESH
MODERN TECHNOLOGIES FZC
MOHAMMADI, Mohammad
MOHAMMADLU, Brigadier-General Beik
MOVASAGHNIA, Mohammad Reza
MULTIMAT LC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI
NACCACHE, Anis
NADERI, Brigadier-General Mohammad
NAJJAR, IRGC Brigadier-General Mostafa Mohammad
NAQDI, BrigGen Mohammad Reza
NASERI, Mohammad Sadegh
NASERIN VAHID
NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP
NEKA NOVIN
NOAVARAN POOYAMOJ
NOURI, Ali Ashraf
OIL INDUSTRY PENSION FUND INVESTMENT COMPANY
ORGANISATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH
PAKPUR, BrigGen Mohammad
PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
PARTO SANAT CO
PASSIVE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
PAYA PARTO
QASEMI, Rostam (a.k.a. Rostam GHASEMI)
RAAD IRAN
RAKA

RESEARCH CENTRE FOR EXPLOSION AND IMPACT
 ROSMACHIN
 SAIDI, Hojatoleslam Ali
 SALAMI, BrigGen Hossein
 SAMAN NASB ZAYENDEH ROOD; SAMAN NASBZAINDE ROOD
 SAMAN TOSE'E ASIA
 SAMEN INDUSTRIES
 SCHILLER NOVIN
 SEPANIR OIL AND GAS ENERGY ENGINEERING COMPANY
 SHAFI'I RUDSARI, Rear Admiral Mohammad
 SHAHID AHMAD KAZEMI INDUSTRIAL GROUP
 SHAHID BEHESHTI UNIVERSITY
 SHAKHESE BEHBUD SANAT
 SHAMS, Abolghassem Mozaffari
 SHAMSHIRI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali
 SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
 SHETAB G.
 SHETAB GAMAN
 SHETAB TRADING
 SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES
 SIMATEC DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
 SOLAT SANA, Abdollah
 SOLTANI, Hamid
 STATE PURCHASING ORGANISATION
 STEP STANDART TEKNIK PARCA SAN VE TIC A.S.
 SUN MIDDLE EAST FZ COMPANY
 SURENA (A.K.A. SAKHD VA RAH-AN- DA-ZI)
 TABA (IRAN CUTTING TOOLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY - TABA TOWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN)
 TAGHTIRAN
 TAJHIZ SANAT SHAYAN
 TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION OFFICE OF THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
 TEST TAFSIR
 TIDEWATER
 TOSSE SILOOHA
 TURBINE ENGINEERING MANUFACTURING
 VAHIDI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ahmad
 WEST SUN TRADE GMBH
 Y.A.S. CO. LTD
 YARSANAT
 YASA PART
 ZADEH, Amir Ali Haji

ATTACHMENT 2 - PART II

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX I TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP AND ANNEXES VIII TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012
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ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun
ABZAR BORESH KAVEH CO.
AGHAJANI, Azim
AHMADIAN, Ali Akbar
AMIN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
AMMUNITION AND METALLURGY INDUSTRIES GROUP
ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES GROUP
BAHMANYAR, Bahmanyar Morteza
BANK SEPAH
BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL
BARZAGANI TEJARAT TAVANMAD SACCAL COMPANIES
BEHINEH TRADING CO.
CRUISE MISSILE INDUSTRY GROUP
DASTJERDI, Ahmad Vahid
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION (DIO)
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE RESEARCH CENTER
DERAKHSHANDEH, Ahmad
DOOSTAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY
ELECTRO SANAM COMPANY
ESLAMI, Mohammad
ESMAELI, Reza-Gholi
ETTEHAD TECHNICAL GROUP
FAJR INDUSTRIAL GROUP
FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen
FARASAKHT INDUSTRIES
FARAYAND TECHNIQUE
FATER (OR FAATER) INSTITUTE
GHARAGAHE SAZANDEGI GHAEM
GHORB KARBALA
GHORB NOOH
HARA COMPANY
HEJAZI, Mohammad
HOJATI, Mohsen
IMENSAZAN CONSULTANT ENGINEERS INSTITUTE
INDUSTRIAL FACTORIES OF PRECISION (IFP) MACHINERY
JOZA INDUSTRIAL CO.
KALA-ELECTRIC
KAVEH CUTTING TOOLS COMPANY
KETABACHI, Mehrdada Akhlaghi
KHATAM AL-ANBIYA CONSTRUCTION HEADQUARTERS
KHORASAN METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
M. BABAIE INDUSTRIES
MAKIN

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MALEK ASHTAR UNIVERSITY
MALEKI, Naser
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXPORT
MIZAN MACHINERY MANUFACTURING A.K.A.: 3MG
NAQDI, Mohammad Reza
NEJAD NOURI, Mohammad Mehdi
NIRU BATTERY MANUFACTURING COMPANY
OMRAN SAHEL
ORIENTAL OIL KISH
PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
PARS AVIATION SERVICES COMPANY
PEJMAN INDUSTRIAL SERVICES CORPORATION
QODS AERONAUTICS INDUSTRIES
RAH SAHEL
RAHAB ENGINEERING INSTITUTE
REZAIE, Morteza
SABALAN COMPANY
SAD IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY
SAFARI, Morteza
SAFAVI, Yahya Rahim
SAFETY EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT (SEP)
SAHAND ALUMINUM PARTS INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
SAHEL CONSULTANT ENGINEERS
SALIMI, Hosein
SANAM INDUSTRIAL GROUP
SEPANIR
SEPASAD ENGINEERING COMPANY
SHAHID BAGHERI INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SBIG)
SHAHID HEMMAT INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SHIG)
SHAHID KARRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SATARRI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SAYYADE SHIRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHO'A' AVIATION.
SOLEIMANI, Qasem
SPECIAL INDUSTRIES GROUP
TABATABAEI, Ali Akbar
TIZ PARS
YA MAHDI INDUSTRIES GROUP
YAS AIR
YAZD METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
ZAHEDI, Mohammad Reza
ZOLQADR, General

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ATTACHMENT 3

IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL AND ENTITIES IDENTIFIED AS GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (GOI) ON THE SDN LIST; DESIGNATED ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS ON THE SDN LIST AND ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS LISTED ON THE FSE LIST; INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES SANCTIONED UNDER ISA; BLOCKED PROPERTY OF THE FOREGOING

AA ENERGY FZCO*
ABAN AIR
ADVANCE NOVEL LIMITED
AFZALI, Ali
AGHA-JANI, Dawood
AL AQILI GROUP LLC
AL AQILI, Mohamed Saeed
AL FIDA INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING
AL HILAL EXCHANGE
ALPHA EFFORT LIMITED
AMERI, Teymour
AMIN INVESTMENT BANK*
ANTARES SHIPPING COMPANY NV
ARASH SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED*
ARIAN BANK
ARTA SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED*
ASAN SHIPPING ENTERPRISE LIMITED*
ASCOTEC HOLDING GMBH*
ASCOTEC JAPAN K.K.*
ASCOTEC MINERAL & MACHINERY GMBH*
ASCOTEC SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY GMBH*
ASCOTEC STEEL TRADING GMBH*
ASHTREAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ASIA BANK
ASIA ENERGY GENERAL TRADING (LLC)*
ASIA MARINE NETWORK PTE. LTD.
ASSA CO. LTD.
ASSA CORP.
ATLANTIC INTERMODAL
ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN
AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY LL FZE
BAHADORI, Masoud*
BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO, C.A.
BANDAR IMAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
BANK KARGOSHAEE
BANK KESHAVARZI IRAN*

* Denotes Iranian financial institutions and individuals and entities identified as GOI by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). U.S. persons and foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person will continue to be prohibited from transactions with these individuals and entities, pursuant to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.

BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN*
 BANK MASKAN*
 BANK MELLAT*
 BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
 BANK MELLI IRAN*
 BANK MELLI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING CO.
 BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE (OF IRAN)*
 BANK REFAH KARGARAN*
 BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL PLC
 BANK SEPAH*
 BANK TEJARAT*
 BANK TORGVOY KAPITAL ZAO*
 BANK-E SHAHR*
 BATENI, Naser
 BAZARGAN, Farzad*
 BEHSAZ KASHANE TEHRAN CONSTRUCTION CO.*
 BEHZAD, Morteza Ahmadali
 BELFAST GENERAL TRADING LLC
 BEST PRECISE LIMITED
 BIIS MARITIME LIMITED
 BIMEH IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED*
 BLUE TANKER SHIPPING SA*
 BMIIC INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING LTD
 BOU ALI SINA PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 BREYELLER STAHL TECHNOLOGY GMBH & CO. KG*
 BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 CAMBIS, Dimitris*
 CASPIAN MARITIME LIMITED*
 CAUCASUS ENERGY
 CEMENT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
 CENTRAL INSURANCE OF IRAN
 CISCO SHIPPING COMPANY CO. LTD.
 COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 COMMERCIAL PARS OIL CO.*
 CONCEPT GIANT LIMITED
 CREDIT INSTITUTION FOR DEVELOPMENT*
 CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE
 CYLINDER SYSTEM L.T.D.*
 DAJMAR, Mohhammad Hossein
 DANESH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 DAVAR SHIPPING CO LTD*
 DENA TANKERS FZE*
 DERAKHSHANDEH, AHMAD
 DETTIN SPA
 DEY BANK*
 DFS WORLDWIDE
 DIVANDARI, Ali
 DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
 EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
 EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 EGHTEHAD NOVIN BANK*
 EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTER
 ESLAMI, Mansour
 EUROPAISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG*
 EUROPEAN OIL TRADERS
 EVEREX
 EXECUTION OF IMAM KHOMEINI'S ORDER*
 EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN*
 EZATI, Ali
 FAIRWAY SHIPPING LTD
 FAL OIL COMPANY LIMITED
 FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 FARSOUDEH, Houshang
 FAYLACA PETROLEUM
 FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED
 FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.
 FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK LTD.
 FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIRST PERSIA EQUITY FUND
 FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FUTURE BANK B.S.C.*
 GALLIOT MARITIME INC
 GARBIN NAVIGATION LTD*
 GEORGIAN BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
 GHADIR INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 GHAEED BASSIR PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS COMPANY*
 GHALEBANI, Ahmad*
 GHARZOLHASANEH RESALAT BANK*
 GHAVAMIN BANK*
 GHEZEL AYAGH, Alireza
 GOLDEN RESOURCES TRADING COMPANY L.L.C.*
 GOLDENTEX FZE
 GOLPARVAR, Gholamhossein
 GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 GOOD LUCK SHIPPING L.L.C.
 GRACE BAY SHIPPING INC*
 GREAT BUSINESS DEALS

GREAT METHOD LIMITED
 HADI SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO
 HARAZ SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HATEF SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HEKMAT IRANIAN BANK*
 HERCULES INTERNATIONAL SHIP*
 HERMIS SHIPPING SA*
 HIRMAND SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HODA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HOMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HONAR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 HONG KONG INTERTRADE COMPANY*
 HORMOZ OIL REFINING COMPANY*
 HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 HOSSEINPOUR, Houshang
 HTTS HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST AND SHIPPING, GMBH
 IDEAL SUCCESS INVESTMENTS LIMITED
 IFIC HOLDING AG*
 IHAG TRADING GMBH*
 IMPIRE SHIPPING COMPANY*
 INDUS MARITIME INC
 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ORGANIZATION OF IRAN*
 INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL
 INTRA CHEM TRADING GMBH*
 IRAN & SHARGH COMPANY*
 IRAN & SHARGH LEASING COMPANY*
 IRAN AIR
 IRAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY*
 IRAN O HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
 IRAN O MISR SHIPPING COMPANY
 IRAN PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY*
 IRAN ZAMIN BANK*
 IRANAIR TOURS
 IRANIAN MINES AND MINING INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ORGANIZATION*
 IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED*
 IRANIAN-VENEZUELAN BI-NATIONAL BANK / JOINT IRAN-VENEZUELA BANK*
 IRASCO S.R.L.*
 IRINVESTSHIP LTD.
 IRISL (MALTA) LIMITED
 IRISL (UK) LTD.
 IRISL CHINA SHIPPING CO., LTD.
 IRISL EUROPE GMBH
 IRISL MARINE SERVICES & ENGINEERING COMPANY
 IRISL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CO.
 IRITAL SHIPPING SRL COMPANY

ISI MARITIME LIMITED
 ISIM AMIN LIMITED
 ISIM ATR LIMITED
 ISIM OLIVE LIMITED
 ISIM SAT LIMITED
 ISIM SEA CHARIOT LIMITED
 ISIM SEA CRESCENT LIMITED
 ISIM SININ LIMITED
 ISIM TAJ MAHAL LIMITED
 ISIM TOUR LIMITED
 ISLAMIC REGIONAL COOPERATION BANK*
 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
 JABBER IBN HAYAN
 JAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY
 JASHNSAZ, Seifollah*
 JUPITER SEAWAYS SHIPPING*
 KADDOURI, Abdelhak
 KAFOLATBANK*
 KALA LIMITED*
 KALA PENSION TRUST LIMITED*
 KARAFARIN BANK*
 KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC*
 KAVERI MARITIME INC
 KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
 KERMAN SHIPPING CO LTD
 KHALILI, Jamshid
 KHAVARMIANEH BANK*
 KHAZAR SEA SHIPPING LINES
 KISH INTERNATIONAL BANK*
 KISH PROTECTION & INDEMNITY
 KONING MARINE CORP*
 KONT INVESTMENT BANK
 KONT KOSMETIK
 KSN FOUNDATION
 KUO OIL PTE. LTD
 LANCELIN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 LEADING MARITIME PTE. LTD.
 LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
 LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
 LOGISTIC SMART LIMITED
 LOWESWATER LIMITED
 MACHINE SAZI ARAK CO. LTD.*
 MAHAB GHODSS CONSULTING ENGINEERING COMPANY*
 MAHDAVI, Ali
 MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY LTD.
 MARANER HOLDINGS LIMITED
 MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED
 MARJAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY
 MAZANDARAN TEXTILE COMPANY

MCS ENGINEERING*
 MCS INTERNATIONAL GMBH*
 MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
 MEHR IRAN CREDIT UNION BANK*
 MEHRAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 MELLAT BANK SB CJSC
 MELLAT INSURANCE COMPANY*
 MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY, P.J.S.
 MELLI BANK PLC
 MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING INTERNATIONAL
 MELODIOUS MARITIME INC
 MERSAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
 METAL & MINERAL TRADE S.A.R.L.*
 MID OIL ASIA PTE LTD
 MILL DENE LIMITED
 MINAB SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 MINES AND METALS ENGINEERING GMBH*
 MIR BUSINESS BANK ZAO
 MOALLEM INSURANCE COMPANY
 MOBIN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 MODABER*
 MODALITY LIMITED
 MOGHADDAMI FARD, Mohammad
 MOHADDES, Seyed Mahmoud*
 MOINIE, Mohammad*
 MONSOON SHIPPING LTD*
 MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INC
 MSP KALA NAFT CO. TEHRAN*
 N.I.T.C. REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE*
 NABIPOUR, Ghasem
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) LIMITED*
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) SARL*
 NAFTIRAN TRADING SERVICES CO. (NTS) LIMITED*
 NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG
 NASIRBEIK, Anahita
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD*
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY*
 NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY LLC*
 NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY*
 NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 NAYEBI, Pourya
 NEFERTITI SHIPPING COMPANY
 NEUMAN LIMITED
 NEW DESIRE LIMITED
 NEW YORK GENERAL TRADING
 NEW YORK MONEY EXCHANGE
 NICO ENGINEERING LIMITED*
 NIKOUSOKHAN, Mahmoud*
 NIKSIMA FOOD AND BEVERAGE JLT

NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 NIOC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (LONDON) LIMITED*
 NIZAMI, Anwar Kamal
 NOOR AFZAR GOSTAR COMPANY
 NOOR ENERGY (MALAYSIA) LTD.*
 NOURI PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
 NPC INTERNATIONAL LIMITED*
 NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
 NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
 OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 OIL INDUSTRY INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 OMID REY CIVIL & CONSTRUCTION COMPANY*
 ONE CLASS PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD.*
 ONE VISION INVESTMENTS 5 (PTY) LTD.*
 ONERBANK ZAO*
 ORCHIDEA GULF TRADING
 P.C.C. (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED*
 PACIFIC SHIPPING DMCEST
 PAJAND, Mohammad Hadi
 PARDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 PARS MCS*
 PARS OIL AND GAS COMPANY*
 PARS OIL CO.*
 PARS PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 PARS PETROCHEMICAL SHIPPING COMPANY*
 PARS TRASH COMPANY
 PARSAEI, Reza*
 PARSIAN BANK*
 PARTNER CENTURY LIMITED
 PARVARESH, Farhad Ali
 PASARGAD BANK*
 PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD.
 PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA
 PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
 PERSIA OIL & GAS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CO.*
 PETRO ENERGY INTERTRADE COMPANY*
 PETRO ROYAL FZE*
 PETRO SUISSE INTERTRADE COMPANY SA*
 PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED*
 PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY FZE*
 PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY INTERNATIONAL*
 PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (PEDCO) LIMITED*
 PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA S.A. (PDVSA)
 PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE*
 PETROPARS LTD.*
 PETROPARS UK LIMITED*
 PIONEER ENERGY INDUSTRIES COMPANY
 POLAT, Muzaffer

POLINEX GENERAL TRADING LLC*
 POLYNAR COMPANY*
 POST BANK OF IRAN*
 POURANSARI, Hashem*
 PROTON PETROCHEMICALS SHIPPING LIMITED*
 PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA
 QANNADI, Mohammad
 QULANDARY, Azizullah Asadullah
 RAHIQI, Javad
 RASOOL, Seyed Alaeddin Sadat
 REY INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 REY NIRU ENGINEERING COMPANY*
 REYCO GMBH.*
 REZVANIANZADEH, Mohammed Reza
 RISHI MARITIME INC
 RISHMAK PRODUCTIVE & EXPORTS COMPANY*
 ROYAL ARYA CO.*
 ROYAL OYSTER GROUP
 ROYAL-MED SHIPPING AGENCY LTD
 SABET, Javad Karimi
 SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LIMITED
 SADAF PETROCHEMICAL ASSALUYEH COMPANY*
 SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
 SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY
 SAMAN BANK*
 SAMAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 SAMBOUK SHIPPING FZC*
 SANDFORD GROUP LIMITED
 SANTEX LINES LIMITED
 SARKANDI, Ahmad
 SARMA YEH BANK*
 SARV SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SEIBOW LIMITED
 SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED
 SEIFI, Asadollah
 SEPID SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SEYYEDI, Seyed Nasser Mohammad*
 SEYYEDI, Seyedeh Hanieh Seyed Nasser Mohammad
 SHAHID TONDGOOYAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 SHALLON LIMITED
 SHAZAND PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 SHERE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY
 SHOMAL CEMENT COMPANY
 SIMA GENERAL TRADING CO FZE*
 SIMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*

SINA BANK*
 SINA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 SINGA TANKERS PTE. LTD.
 SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS LIMITED
 SINOSE MARITIME PTE. LTD.
 SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP.
 SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SMART DAY HOLDINGS GROUP LIMITED
 SOKOLENKO, Vitaly
 SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT) BANKERS
 SOROSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP MANAGEMENT COMPANY
 SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN
 SPEEDY SHIP FZC
 SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED
 STARRY SHINE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
 SWISS MANAGEMENT SERVICES SARL*
 SYNERGY GENERAL TRADING FZE*
 SYSTEM WISE LIMITED
 TABATABAEI, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Khatibi*
 TABRIZ PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY*
 TADBIR BROKERAGE COMPANY*
 TADBIR CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY*
 TADBIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GROUP*
 TADBIR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT GROUP CO.*
 TADBIR INVESTMENT COMPANY*
 TAFAZOLI, Ahmad
 TALAI, Mohamad
 TAMAS COMPANY
 TAT BANK*
 TC SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED*
 TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 THE EXPLORATION AND NUCLEAR RAW MATERIALS PRODUCTION COMPANY
 THE NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY
 THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 TONGHAM SHIPPING CO LTD
 TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED
 TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED
 TOSEE EQTESAD AYANDEHSAZAN COMPANY*
 TOSEE TAAVON BANK*
 TOURISM BANK*
 TRADE TREASURE LIMITED
 TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LIMITED
 TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 UPPERCOURT SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE CO SSK

VOBSTER SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
WEST SUN TRADE GMBH*
WIPPERMANN, Ulrich
WOKING SHIPPING INVESTMENTS LIMITED
YASINI, Seyed Kamal
YAZDI, Bahareh Mirza Hossein
ZADEH, Hassan Jalil
ZANJANI, Babak Morteza
ZARIN RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY*
ZEIDI, Hossein
ZHUHAI ZHENRONG COMPANY
ZIRACCHIAN ZADEH, Mahmoud*

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BLOCKED PROPERTY	PROPERTY OF	TYPE	IMO NUMBER
EP-CFD	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFE	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFH	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFI	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFJ	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFK	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFL	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFM	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFO	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFP	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFQ	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-CFR	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IAA	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IAB	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IAC	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IAD	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IAG	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IAH	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IAI	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IAM	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBA	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBB	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBC	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBD	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBG	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBH	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBI	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBJ	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBK	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBL	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBM	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBN	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBP	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBQ	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBS	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBT	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBV	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IBZ	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-ICD	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-ICE	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-ICF	IRAN AIR		Aircraft
EP-IDA	IRAN AIR		Aircraft

x Denotes blocked property of individuals and entities identified as GOI by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. U.S. persons and foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person will continue to be prohibited from transactions with these individuals and entities, pursuant to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.

EP-IDD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IDF	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IDG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEB	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEC	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IED	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEF	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRK	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRN	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRR	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRS	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRT	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-MDD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-MDE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BXI	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BXL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BXM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CGS	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CGT	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHW	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHX	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHY	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHZ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CJQ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BHJ	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-BXN	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CIX	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CIY	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CJA	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CJK	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
RIONA	HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO	Vessel	9349588
MIRZA KOCHEK KHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7027899
ASSA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7632814
AMITEES	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7632826
HORMUZ 2	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7904580
PARMIDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8105284
BARSAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8107581
PANTEA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8108559
IRAN AKHAVAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8113009

SARINA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8203608
SABRINA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8215742
ATTRIBUTE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309593
ALIAS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309608
AQUARIAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309610
ADVENTIST	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309622
AGEAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309634
ANGEL	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309646
AGILE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309658
AJAX	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309672
ACROBAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309684
SHADFAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309696
AMPLIFY	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309701
IRAN HORMUZ 21	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8314263
IRAN HORMUZ 22	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8314275
IRAN HORMUZ 23	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8319782
IRAN SHALAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8319940
IRAN YOUSHAH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8319952
AEROLITE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320121
ADRIAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320133
NAGHMEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320145
RONAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320157
ACCURATE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320169
TABANDEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320171
GULAFSHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320183
ALAMEDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320195
IRAN PARAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8322064
IRAN CHARAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8322076
IRAN HORMUZ 25	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8422072
IRAN HORMUZ 26	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8422084
DORITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8605234
IRAN SHALAMCHEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8820925
AAJ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8984484
IRAN HORMUZ 12	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9005596
IRAN KONG	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9007582
VISTA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9010711
VIANA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9010723
IRAN HORMUZ 14	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9020778
HAMD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9036052
SOBHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9036935
SATTAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9040479
ABBA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051624
BEHDAD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051636
PARSHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051648
VALERIAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051650
NEGEEN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9071519
ATTAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9074092
PARIN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9076478

TEEN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9101649
GOWHAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9103087
IRAN DALEER	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9118551
PATRIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9137210
NARDIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9137246
KADOS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9137258
ZOMOROUD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9138044
BRELYAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9138056
NILDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165786
JOVITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165798
MANOLA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165803
GLADIOLUS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165815
ELYANA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165827
NEGAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165839
SAVIZ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167253
GLOXINIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167265
NESHAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167277
BEHSHAD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167289
JAIRAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167291
IRAN SHAHED	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9184691
GOLSAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193185
ZARSAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193197
ARVIN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193202
ARTAVAND	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193214
TERESA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209324
GABRIELA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209336
SARITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209348
SILVER CRAFT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209350
MAHNAME	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9213387
TERMEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9213399
MAHSAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9226944
HAMADAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9226956
TARADIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9245304
PARMIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9245316
ZAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9260160
ZIVAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9260172
VALILI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270646
SHAMIM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270658
IRAN SHAHR-E-KORD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270684
IRAN KASHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270696
SININ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9274941
PARMIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283007
AZARGOUN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283019
SALIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283021
GOLBON	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283033
PARDIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9284142
TANDIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9284154
SHERE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305192

UPPERCOURT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305207
TONGHAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305219
VOBSTER	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305221
GOLAFRUZ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9323833
ADALIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9328900
SHABGOUN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9346524
AGATA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9346536
BENITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9346548
MARISOL	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349576
ORIANA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349590
MERCEDES	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349667
RAMONA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349679
GILDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9367982
SANIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9367994
SARIR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9368003
SOMIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9368015
GLORY	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9369710
ARIES	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9369722
ABTIN 1	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9379636
ARSHAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9386500
PARSHAD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387786
HAADI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387798
RAAZI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387803
SAEI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387815
ARTMAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405930
BASKAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405942
BAHJAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405954
HAAMI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405966
SHAADI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405978
SHAYAN 1	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9420356
TABAN 1	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9420368
YARAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9420370
AMIN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9422366
AVANG	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465746
KIAZAND	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465758
BATIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465760
WARTA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465849
SALIM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465851
ARDAVAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465863
NAMI	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	8419178
GAS CAMELLIA	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	8803381
TESS	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	8913564
KATERINA 1	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	9031959
MARIA	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	9110626
SUN OCEAN	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	9408358
YOUNES ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8212465
YOUSEF ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8316106
YAGHOUB ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8316168

TOLOU ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8318178
VALFAJR2 ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8400103
BADR ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8407345
BANEH ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8508462
SARDASHT ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8517231
MARIVAN ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8517243
BRIGHT ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9005235
CARIBO ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9011246
AURA ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9013749
BICAS ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9077850
MAHARLIKA ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079066
NAPOLI ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079078
NYOS ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079080
NAINITAL ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079092
NATIVE LAND ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079107
ATLANTIC ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9107655
SPARROW ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9171450
SWALLOW ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9171462
SUPERIOR ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9172038
SPOTLESS ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9172040
SABRINA ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9172052
DESTINY ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9177155
HUMANITY ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9180281
ORIENTAL ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9183934
SHONA ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187629
ABELIA ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187631
ALERT ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187643
SUNDIAL ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187655
SILVER CLOUD ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187667
HUWAYZEH ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212888
HORIZON ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212890
HAPPINESS ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212905
MARINA ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212917
HALISTIC ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212929
DELVAR ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218454
DAYLAM ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218466
DAMAVAND ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218478
DENA ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218480
DARAB ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218492
IRAN FAZEL ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9283746
FIANGA ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9283760
IRAN FAHIM ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9286140
IRAN FALAGH ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9286152
DECESIVE ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9356593
SANCHI ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9356608
MAJESTIC ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357183
SUCCESS ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357353
SUNEAST ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357365

SPLENDOUR ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357377
COURAGE ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357389
HONESTY ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357391
AMBER ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357406
DAL LAKE ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357717
JUSTICE ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357729
HYDRA ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9362059
DOVE ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9362061
ZEUS ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9362073
IMICO NEKA 455 ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9404546
IMICO NEKA 456 ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9404558
IMICO NEKA 457 ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9404560
SUNSHINE ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569205
DOJIRAN ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569619
ATLANTIS ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569621
FORTUN ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569633
SALALEH ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569645
SMOOTH ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569657
SKYLINE ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569669
INFINITY ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569671
DEMOS ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569683
YANGZHOU DAYANG DY905 ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9575424
SUNRISE ×	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9615092
ANTHEM	SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP	Vessel	8310669
JAFFNA	SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP	Vessel	8609515
OLYSA	SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP	Vessel	9001605

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ATTACHMENT 4

ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun
ADVANCE ELECTRICAL AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES SL
ALUMINAT
ANDISHEH ZOLAL
ARIA NIKAN MARINE INDUSTRY
BUJAR, Farhad
DAYENI, Mahmoud Mohammadi
EYVAZ TECHNIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY
FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen
FARATECH
FARAYAND TECHNIQUE
FULMEN GROUP
IMANIRAD, Arman
IMANIRAD, Mohammad Javad
IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY
IRAN POOYA
JAHAN TECH ROOYAN PARS
JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS
KAHVARIN, Iradj Mohammadi
KALAYE ELECTRIC COMPANY
KHAKI, Parviz
MANDEGAR BASPAR KIMIYA COMPANY
MARO SANAT COMPANY
MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP
NEKA NOVIN
PARTO SANAT CO.
PAYA PARTOV CO.
PENTANE CHEMISTRY INDUSTRIES
PETRO GREEN
PISHRO SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY
POUYA CONTROL
PUNTI, Pere
RAHIMYAR, Amir Hossein
SIMATIC DEVELOPMENT CO.
TAGHTIRAN KASHAN COMPANY
TANIDEH, Hossein
TARH O PALAYESH
THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH
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YASA PART
ZOLAL IRAN COMPANY

80/104

JCPOA Annex III - Civil Nuclear Cooperation

A. General

1. Iran and E3/EU+3 decided to co-operate [WHY IS THIS HYPHENATED ????] [IS IT TO HAVE SPECIAL MEANING ??? – IT IS NOT DEFINED IN THIS DOCUMENT !!!!], among others, including through IAEA technical cooperation, where appropriate, and without prejudice to the existing bilateral agreements, in different areas of civil nuclear co-operation to be developed within the framework of this JCPOA, as detailed in this Annex. In this context, the Joint Commission will also support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects,

[THE IAEA WILL TEACH THEM HOW TO RUN IT MORE EFFECTIVELY SO WHEN THE 10 YEARS OR SOONER COMES IRAN CAN PRODUCE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL FASTER AND IN GREATER QUANTITIES !!!!]

[14 LBS. OF PLUTONIUM ANNIHILATED NAGASAKI !!!!] as appropriate.

[SEE PAGE 36/104 Preliminary Characteristics: Core Parameters - 239Pu at EoC (g) ~ 850 [1.87 LBS OR 13.4% OF THE NAGASAKI BOMB !!!!] [NO DOCUMENTATION ON HOW TO MANAGE AND CONTROL THE PLUTONIUM. WILL IT BE ENRICHED IN IRAN OR IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ????]

2. All civil nuclear cooperation projects under this JCPOA will be mutually determined by the participating states and will be consistent with the JCPOA and the national laws and regulations of the participating parties.

3. The civil nuclear and scientific cooperation projects envisioned between Iran and the E3/EU+3 as part of this JCPOA may be undertaken in a variety of formats, with a variety of potential participants. A given project undertaken by the E3/EU+3 will not necessarily include participation by all E3/EU+3 parties:

[WILL IRAN REALLY LET THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATE IN THE IRANIAN PROGRAMS ????]

[IT IS ALREADY DOCUMENTED IN THIS DEAL THAT THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WILL WORK WITH IRAN !!!!]

3.1. bilateral or multilateral cooperation arrangements with Iran. Such arrangements would be mutually determined by the participating states.

[THE PARTIES WILL DECIDE ON THE DEAL !!!!] [AND THE DEAL CAN BE SECRET !!!!]

[IRAN AND RUSSIA WORKING IN SECRET TOGETHER FOR THE WORLD'S BENEFIT !!!!]

[FIRST IRANIAN AND RUSSIAN BENEFIT – ELIMINATE THEIR GREAT SATAN ENEMY !!!!]

3.2. projects under the auspices [ENDORSEMENT] of the IAEA, either through IAEA technical co-operation projects including through Project and Supply Agreements.

[THIS ENTIRE DEAL IS WRITTEN TO GIVE IRAN EVERYTHING !!!!]

[THE IAEA WILL NOT WANT IT TO FAIL SO THEY WILL ENDORSE EVERYTHING – FOR EVERYTHING WILL BE WRITTEN AS CIVIL – BUT IMPLEMENTED BY THE PARTIES (IRAN & RUSSIA) AS MILITARY !!!!]

[WILL THE U.S. CONGRESS PLAY THIS ON PARTY LINES ????]

[OR WILL THE U.S. CONGRESS STAND UP TO PROTECT WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ????]

3.3. through International Science and Technology Centres. [ALLOW IRAN THE EXPORTER OR WORLD TERRORISM ACCESS TO THE BEST OF THE BEST OF THE WORLD ON NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT !!!!]

Specifically, E3/EU+3 parties will undertake, to develop nuclear co-operation with Iran, in particular within the following areas:

B. Reactors, Fuels and Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes

[OPTIMIZED PROCESS GIVE THE GREATEST ADVANTAGES AND IN 10 YEARS OR LESS IRAN WILL MAXIMIZE THE PROCESSES FOR WEAPONS GRADE NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCTION !!!!]

[GIVE THEM EVERYTHING AND REQUIRE NOTHING REAL IN RETURN !!!!]

4. Modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, technologies and facilities

E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate [NOT TO INCLUDE THE UNITED STATES !!!!] [KEEP EVERYTHING SECRET FROM THE UNITED STATES !!!!], will facilitate Iran's acquisition of light-water research and power reactors, for research, development and testing, [TESTING THE LIMITS FOR MAXIMUM FUTURE PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL !!!!] [IRAN WILL ALREADY BE PRODUCING THE SEEDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIAL - SEE PAGE 36/104 Preliminary Characteristics: Core Parameters - 239Pu at EoC (g) ~ 850 [1.87 LBS OR 13.4% OF THE NAGASAKI BOMB !!!!] [NO DOCUMENTATION ON HOW TO MANAGE AND CONTROL THE PLUTONIUM. WILL IT BE ENRICHED IN IRAN OR IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ????]] and for the supply of electricity and desalination, with arrangements for the assured supply of nuclear fuel and the removal of spent fuel as provided in relevant contracts, for each reactor provided. This may include the following areas for co-operation: [WHY IS THIS HYPHENATED ????]

4.1. Construction as well as effective and safe operation of new light water power reactors and associated equipment, according to Generation III+ requirements, including small and medium sized nuclear reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate.

4.2. Construction of state of the art light water moderated multipurpose research reactors [TESTING THE LIMITS FOR MAXIMUM FUTURE (WITHIN 10 YEARS) PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL !!!!] capable of testing fuel pins, assembly prototypes and structural materials with associated related facilities, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate.

4.3. Supply of state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems for the above research and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;

[LEADS THEM DOWN THE PATH TO MAXIMIZE FUTURE (WITHIN 10 YEARS) PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL !!!!]!!!!]

[THIS DEAL GIVES EVERYTHING TO IRAN !!!!]

[REQUIRES NOTHING REAL IN RETURN !!!!]

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!]

4.4. Supply of nuclear simulation and calculation codes and software solutions with regard to the above areas, including joint development, as appropriate;

[IT IS SO EASY TO PIRATE CODES AND SOFTWARE TO A SECRET UNDISCLOSED LOCATION TO THAT IRAN OR IRAN & RUSSIA CAN RUN SIMULATIONS FOR MAXIMUM PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL !!!!] [WHEN IRAN RAISES HELL ON EARTH IN THE WESTERN WORLD IT WILL BE TOO LATE !!!!]

4.5. Supply of first and second loop main equipment as well as core of the above research and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;

4.6. On-the-job training on fuel management scenarios and reshuffling for the above research and power nuclear reactors;

[RUSSIA WILL BE HAPPY TO TEACH THEM HOW TO BLOW UP THE WEST BETTER – FASTER – MORE EFFECTIVELY !!!!]

4.7. Joint technical review of Iran's current nuclear reactors, upon the request by Iran, in order to upgrade current equipment and systems, including concerning nuclear safety;

[RUSSIA WILL HELP THEM BEHIND THE SCENES AND IRAN WILL NEVER HAVE TO REQUEST ANYTHING FROM THE WEST EXCEPT STATE-OF-ART TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION !!!!]

5. Arak Modernisation Project [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

5.1. As described in Section B of Annex I, an international partnership composed of E3/EU+3 parties and Iran, which may subsequently be enlarged to include mutually determined third countries will be established, to support and facilitate the redesign and rebuilding of the IR-40 reactor at Arak into a modernised, not exceeding 20MWth, heavy-water moderated and cooled research reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to Annex I).

5.2. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project. A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to support and facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities as described in Annex I. The Working Group could be enlarged to include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, especially in the key areas such as redesign, design review and certification, reactor core manufacturing, fuel design, fabrication and supply, safety and security, spent fuel treatment or disposition, as well as concerning the supply of materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems, and subsequently contracts would be concluded. The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.

5.3. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and operation.

5.4. Iran will continue to assume the primary responsibility for financing the modernisation project. Additional funding arrangements for the project, including for IAEA projects supporting the Arak modernisation project, will be

determined based on the official document and contracts to be subsequently concluded.

6. Nuclear Fuel [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

6.1. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will support assistance to Iran, including through the IAEA, as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel fabricated by Iran.

6.2. E3/EU+3 parties will seek to cooperate regarding the supply of modern fuels, including, as appropriate, joint design and fabrication, the relevant licenses and fabrication technologies and equipment and related infrastructure, for current and future nuclear research and power reactors, including technical assistance on purification processes, forming and metallurgical activities for different types of nuclear fuel clads and cladding for the modernised Arak heavy water research reactor.

C. Research and Development (R&D) Practices [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

7. To implement other aspects of this JCPOA and in support of a broader opening of scientific engagements between the E3/EU+3 and Iran, the E3/EU+3 and Iran will seek cooperation and scientific exchange in the field of nuclear science and technology:

[NOTHING IT THE DEAL REQUIRES IRAN TO PROVIDE STATE-OF-ART DISCOVERIES BACK TO OTHER PARTIES !!!!]

7.1. Accelerator-based nuclear physics and nuclear astrophysics research, and stable isotope production in international collaboration at the nuclear, physics, and technology centre at the Fordow facility. Iran will request from the E3/EU+3 and other interested parties [RUSSIA] specific proposals for cooperative international nuclear, physics, and technology projects and will host an international workshop to review these proposals. The goal is to realise international collaborative projects within a few years. The transitioning to stable isotope production of two cascades will be conducted in a joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon.

7.2. Plasma physics and nuclear fusion;

[HOW BIG AND BAD WOULD A FUSION BOMB BE ????] [WOULD IT YEILD 10,000 TIMES THAT OF A NAGASAKI BOMB ????]

7.3. Research reactor applications at the TRR, modernized Arak reactor, or at other future research reactors in Iran, [WEAPONS GRADE REACTORS AFTER 10 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!] such as:

7.3.1. Training

7.3.2. Radio-isotope production and utilization

7.3.3. Nuclear desalination

7.3.4. Neutron transmutation doping

7.3.5. Neutron activation analysis

7.3.6. Neutron capture therapy

7.3.7. Neutron imaging and materials characterization studies using neutron beams

7.4. E3/EU+3 parties and Iran could also explore co-operation in the following additional areas:

- 7.4.1. Design, manufacture and/or assembly of in-core measuring instrumentation and technologies;
- 7.4.2. Nuclear instrumentation and control, systems and electronics design, manufacture and/or assembly;
- 7.4.3. Fusion technology and plasma physics and related infrastructure and facilitating contribution of Iran to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Project and/or similar projects, including relevant IAEA technical cooperation projects;

[THERMONUCLEAR – COMBINES FISSION AND HYDROGEN TO CREATE THE MOST EXPLOSIVE WEAPON CURRENTLY KNOW TO MANKIND !!!!]

- 7.4.4. Neutrino astronomy;
- 7.4.5. Design and manufacturing, and supply, of different types of accelerators and supply of related equipment including through relevant IAEA technical cooperation projects;
- 7.4.6. Data acquisition and processing software and interface equipment;

D. Nuclear Safety, Safeguards and Security [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

8. Nuclear safety [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran to establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, engage in workshops and training events in Iran to support interactions between Iranian nuclear regulatory authorities and those from the E3/EU+3 and elsewhere to, among other things, share lessons learned on establishing and maintaining regulatory independence and effectiveness, and training on implementing nuclear safety culture and best practices; facilitate exchanges and visits to nuclear regulatory authorities and nuclear power plants outside of Iran focusing on best practices for safe operation; and enhance and strengthen domestic emergency preparedness and severe accident management capability.

Provide support and assistance to enable Iran to join relevant conventions on nuclear safety and security, e.g. through workshops or seminars furthering accession to such commitments. Such workshops or seminars could also take place under the auspices of the IAEA.

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, will co-operate with Iran in the following areas of nuclear safety, as well as in other areas to be mutually agreed:

- 8.1. Conclusion of bilateral/multilateral agreements with related organisations and research centres;
- 8.2. Supply of valid codes, instruments and equipment related to nuclear safety;
- 8.3. Facilitate exchange of knowledge and experience in the area of nuclear safety;
- 8.4. Enhance and strengthen domestic emergency preparedness and severe accident management capability;
- 8.5. Arrange on-the-job training and apprenticeship courses for reactor and facility operators, regulatory authority personnel and related supportive organizations in the area of nuclear safety inside and outside of Iran;

8.6. Establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, which shall be equipped with necessary tools, techniques and equipment, in order to support and facilitate technical and professional training and exchange of lessons-learned for reactor and facility operators, regulatory authority personnel and related supportive organizations;

9. Nuclear Safeguards [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and transparency measures in Iran. Co-operation in the following areas can be envisaged:

9.1. Cooperation in the form of on-the-job trainings and workshops to strengthen nuclear material accounting and control process, human resource development, and quality assurance/quality control processes;

9.2. E3/EU+3 parties, and other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran for the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and transparency measures in Iran.

9.3. This cooperation could take the form of training and workshops to strengthen Iran's safeguards regulatory authority, nuclear material accounting and control processes, human resource development, and quality assurance/quality control processes.

10. Nuclear Security [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the implementation of nuclear security guidelines and best practices. Co-operation in the following areas can be envisaged:

10.1. Co-operation in the form of training courses and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear facilities and systems as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems;

10.2. Co-operation through training and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to protect against, and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems.

E. Nuclear Medicine and Radioisotopes, Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

11. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran to improve the utilization of nuclear medicine in Iran in order to enhance Iran's expertise in diagnostic imaging and radiotherapy, increase the availability of medical radioisotopes for diagnosis and treatment of Iranian citizens, and facilitate Iran's participation in the broader international scientific and nuclear medicine community. Such cooperation may include:

11.1. Upgrades to the infrastructure associated with existing cyclotron facilities, including for medical radioisotopes production.

- 11.2. Facilitating Iranian acquisition of a new cyclotron, and associated radio-pharmacy equipment, for medical radioisotopes production.
- 11.3. Acquisition of state-of-the-art diagnostic imaging and radiotherapy equipment for existing or new nuclear medicine centers, including co-operation between hospitals for the treatment of individual patients.
- 11.4. Cooperation on occupational and patient dosimetry procedures.
- 11.5. Improved target utilization to increase radioisotope production.
- 11.6. Acquisition of radioisotope sources for brachytherapy, and radiotherapy instrument calibration, and other medical and industrial applications.
- 11.7. Supply of state-of-the-art radio-medicine center and necessary laboratories.

F. Waste Management and Facility Decommissioning [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

- 12. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in the safe, effective, and efficient management and disposition of nuclear and radiological wastes derived from Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities and nuclear medicine, radioisotope production and/or consumption activities.
- 13. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in areas of safe, effective, and environmentally friendly best practices for facility decontamination and decommissioning, including co-operation on long term storage facilities for the repository of low and medium level waste.
- 14. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to facilitate exchanges and visits to relevant sites and locations outside of Iran related to effective waste management and best practices.
- 15. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will facilitate the supply of appropriate equipment and systems for waste management and depository facilities in Iran.

G. Other projects

- 16. Other projects may be implemented between the relevant E3/EU+3 parties [THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT BY IRAN !!!!] and Iran, as mutually determined by the participants in the JCPOA, including in the following areas:
 - 16.1. Construction of nuclear desalination and associated infrastructure in Iran;
 - 16.2. Development of laser technology for medical applications (e.g. for eye surgery);

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

1. Establishment, Composition, and Coordinator

1.1. The Joint Commission is established to carry out the functions assigned to it in the JCPOA, including its Annexes.

1.2. The Joint Commission is comprised of representatives of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), together, the JCPOA participants.

1.3. The Joint Commission may establish Working Groups in particular areas, as appropriate.

1.4. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ('High Representative'), or his/her designated representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission.

2. Functions

2.1. The Joint Commission will perform the following functions:

2.1.1. Review and approve the final design for the modernized heavy water research reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories prior to the commencement of construction, and review and approve the fuel design for the modernized heavy water research reactor as provided for in Section B of Annex I;

2.1.2. Review and approve, upon request by Iran, development, acquisition, construction or operation of hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 21 of Annex I; [SEE ALL PREVIOUS COMMENTS RELATING TO THESE TOPICS !!!!]

2.1.3. Review and approve plans submitted by Iran to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel. [WHAT PLANS WILL IRAN KEEP SECRET AND NOT SUBMIT FOR APPROVAL ??? IRAN WILL WORK SECRETLY WITH RUSSIA !!!!] as provided for in paragraph 26 of Annex I;

2.1.4. Review and approve, upon request by Iran, projects on new types of centrifuges to proceed to a prototype stage for mechanical testing, as provided for in paragraph 43 of Annex I; [WHAT PLANS WILL IRAN KEEP SECRET AND NOT SUBMIT FOR APPROVAL ??? IRAN WILL WORK SECRETLY WITH RUSSIA !!!!]

2.1.5. Receive information in advance about the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 44 of Annex I;

[WHAT PROJECTS WILL IRAN KEEP SECRET AND NOT SUBMIT FOR APPROVAL ???]

[THERE IS NO 7/24 CONTINUOUS MONITORING !!!!]

[SO HOW MUCH CAN IRAN REALLY DO IN SECRET IN-BETWEEN INSPECTIONS ???]

2.1.6. Receive information [VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS !!!!] about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 46.1 of Annex I;

2.1.7. Assess and then approve, upon request by Iran, that fuel assemblies manufactured in Iran and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF₆, based on the objective technical criteria, with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran, as provided in paragraph 59 of Annex I;

[WHAT WORK WILL IRAN KEEP SECRET AND NOT SUBMIT FOR APPROVAL ???]

[THERE IS NO 7/24 CONTINUOUS MONITORING !!!!]

[SO HOW MUCH CAN IRAN REALLY DO IN SECRET IN-BETWEEN INSPECTIONS ???]

2.1.8. Support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran, as provided for in paragraph 59 of Annex I;

2.1.9. Review and approve in advance, upon request by Iran, engagement by Iran, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment and enrichment related activities, including related research and development, as provided for in paragraph 73 in Annex I;

[WHAT PROJECTS WILL IRAN KEEP SECRET AND NOT SUBMIT FOR APPROVAL ????]

[THERE IS NO 7/24 CONTINUOUS MONITORING !!!!]

[SO HOW MUCH CAN IRAN REALLY DO IN SECRET IN-BETWEEN INSPECTIONS ????]

2.1.10. Provide consultation, and advise on the necessary means in the context of access as specified in paragraph 78 of Annex I;

2.1.11. Review and approve in advance, upon request by Iran, the design, development, fabrication, acquisition, or use for non-nuclear purposes of multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device and explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, as provided for in paragraphs 82.2 and 82.3 of Annex I;

[SO EVERYTHING IRAN IS NOT SUPPOSE TO HAVE AND DO UNDER THIS SO-CALLED PEACEFUL DEAL IRAN CAN ASK FOR ????]

[IRAN WILL ASK FOR IT OR WILL KEEP IT IN SECRET UNDISCLOSED OPERATION FOR 10 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]

[THEN IRAN WILL UNLEASH HELL ON EARTH IN THE WESTERN WORLD WITH ALL OF IRAN'S SECRET UNDISCLOSED NUCLEAR WEAPONS !!!!]

2.1.12. Review and consult to address issues arising from the implementation of sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA and its Annex II;

2.1.13. Review and decide on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with, Iran, in accordance with Section 6 of this Annex and the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA;

2.1.14. Review, with a view to resolving, any issue that a JCPOA participant believes constitutes nonperformance by another JCPOA participant of its commitments under the JCPOA, according to the process outlined in the JCPOA;

2.1.15. Adopt or modify, as necessary, procedures to govern its activities;

2.1.16. Consult and provide guidance on other implementation matters that may arise under the JCPOA.

3. Procedures

3.1. The Joint Commission will meet on a quarterly basis and at any time upon request of a JCPOA participant to the Coordinator. The Coordinator will convene a meeting of the Joint Commission to be held no later than one week following receipt of such a request, except for consultations in accordance with Section Q of Annex I and any other matter that the Coordinator and/or a JCPOA participant deem urgent, in which case the meeting will be convened as soon as possible and not later than three calendar days from receipt of the request.

3.2. Meetings of the Joint Commission will be held in New York, Vienna, or Geneva as appropriate. The host country should facilitate entry formalities for those attending such meetings.

[PERFECT LOCATIONS TO UNLEASH HELL ON EARTH ????]

3.3. The Joint Commission may decide by consensus to invite observers to attend its meetings.

3.4. Except as provided in Section 6 of this Annex which will be subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN, [SECRET !!!!] the work of the Joint Commission is

confidential and may be shared only among JCPOA participants and observers as appropriate, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.

4. Decisions

4.1. Except as stated otherwise in this Annex, decisions by the Joint Commission are to be made by consensus.

4.2. Each JCPOA participant will have one vote. Decisions of the Joint Commission are to be taken by the Representative or the Deputy Representative or other such alternate as the JCPOA participant may designate.

4.3. The vote of each JCPOA participant will be made known to all other JCPOA participants if any JCPOA participant requests a recorded vote.

4.4. Matters before the Joint Commission pursuant to Section Q of Annex I are to be decided by consensus or by affirmative vote of five JCPOA participants. There is no quorum requirement.

4.5. The Coordinator will not take part in decision-making on nuclear-related transfers and activities as set out in Section 6 of this Annex.

5. Other

5.1. Each JCPOA participant will be responsible for its own costs of participating in the Joint Commission, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.

5.2. JCPOA participants may request that the Coordinator circulates a notification to the other JCPOA participants at any time. Upon such a request, the Coordinator will circulate such notification without delay to all JCPOA participants.

6. Procurement Working Group [EVERYTHING IN THIS SECTION IS SECRET-SEE SECTION 3.4 ON PAGE 88/104 !!!]

6.1. With the purpose of establishing a procurement channel, the Joint Commission will, except as otherwise provided by the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, **review and decide on proposals** by states seeking to engage in:

6.1.1. the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or **using their flag vessels or aircraft** to, or for the **use in or benefit of, Iran**, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and, if the end-use will be for Iran's nuclear programme set out in this JCPOA or other non-nuclear civilian end-use, all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the relevant State determines that they could contribute to activities inconsistent with the JCPOA; and,

6.1.2. the provision to **Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering** or other services related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above;

6.1.3. acquisition by Iran of an interest in a commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technologies as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and such investments in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them.

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

6.3. Each E3+3 State and Iran will participate in the Procurement Working Group. The High Representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group.

6.4. Except as otherwise provided by the Joint Commission or the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:

6.4.1. Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA. The Procurement Working Group will have up to 30 working days to consider and decide on the proposal.

6.4.2. "Necessary supporting information" for purposes of Section 6.4.1 means: (a) a description of the item; (b) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the exporting entity; (c) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the importing entity; (d) a statement of the proposed end-use and end use location, along with an end-use certification signed by the AEOI or the appropriate authority of Iran attesting the stated end-use; (e) export license number if available; (f) contract date, if available; and (g) details on transportation, if available; provided that if any of the export license number, contract date, or details on transportation are not available as of the time of submittal of the proposal, such information will be provided as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item.

[TOO MUCH "IF AVAILABLE" LANGUAGE – JUST ALLOWS FOR EXPEDITING DELIVERY TO IRAN AND SHORTENING THE 10 YEARS TO SOONER !!!]

6.4.3. Each participant in the Procurement Working Group will have to communicate to the Coordinator, within 20 working days, whether it approves or rejects the proposal. The timeline for consideration may be extended for an additional period of 10 working days at the request of a participant of the Procurement Working Group.

6.4.4. The proposal will be recommended for approval as soon as the Coordinator receives formal approvals from all the Procurement Working Group Participants or if, at the end of the 30 working day period, the Coordinator has received no disapprovals from any of the Procurement Working Group Participants. If at the end of the 30 working day period, the proposal has

not been recommended for approval, the proposal may, at the request of at least two Working Group Participants within 5 working days, be referred to the Joint Commission, which would decide on approval of the proposal by consensus within 10 working days. Otherwise the proposal will be recommended for disapproval. The disapproving JCPOA participant(s) should provide relevant information regarding the disapproval to the Joint Commission as appropriate, taking into account the need to protect confidential information.

6.4.5. The Coordinator will communicate the recommendation of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council no later than 35 working days, or in case of referral to the Joint Commission no later than 45 working days from the date the Coordinator transmitted the proposal and all necessary supporting information to the Procurement Working Group.

6.4.6. Except as decided otherwise **by consensus**, **[WHAT DEFINES CONSENSUS ????**] **[GENERAL AGREEMENT !!!!]**

[SO A 100% AGREEMENT IS NOT REQUIRED ????]

[SO MUCH FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAVING ANY CONTROL UNDER THIS DEAL !!!!]

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!]

the Procurement Working Group will **meet every three weeks** for reviewing the proposals. When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in **nuclear activities** authorized by the JCPOA, the **IAEA may be invited** to attend the meeting as an observer.

[IF IAEA IS DOING THE INSPECTIONS SHOULDN'T THE IAEA BE REQUIRED TO BE AT EVERY DISCUSSION INVOLVING NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES ????]

[NO WONDER NO ONE HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN INSPECTIONS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLING COMPLIANCE WITH ANY DEAL !!!!] **[SEE TAB XXX PAGE XX “skepticism about the capability to verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty posed a major obstacle to any agreement. *[There are no gaurentees – THE IRAN Nuclear Deal does nothing – It is all political fluff - NO DEAL is just as good]*”]**

6.5. All JCPOA participants will act in accordance with the procurement channel and will only engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1 following approval by the Joint Commission and the United Nations Security Council. **Iran will not use, acquire, or seek to procure** the items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology referred to in Section 6.1 of this Annex for nuclear activities which are inconsistent with this JCPOA.

[WHAT WILL BE IRAN'S SECRET PLANS WITH RUSSIA TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY 10 YEARS OR SOONER ????]

6.6. Any JCPOA participant may refer a procurement-related activity to the Joint Commission under the dispute settlement mechanism if it is concerned that such activity is inconsistent with this JCPOA.

6.7. **Iran will provide to the IAEA** access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (**or the most recent version of these documents** as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.

[IF IAEA IS DOING THE INSPECTIONS SHOULDN'T THE IAEA BE REQUIRED TO BE AT EVERY DISCUSSION OF THE Procurement Working Group INVOLVING NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES ????]

6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state **[RUSSIA]** to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.

6.9. The Procurement Working Group will respond to requests for guidance on procurement activities from third parties, as communicated by the Coordinator. The Procurement Working Group will endeavor to respond to

such requests for guidance within 9 working days [NOT MUCH TIME] from the date the Coordinator submits it to the Procurement Working Group.

6.10. The Joint Commission will report to the United Nations Security Council at least every 6 months on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues.

7. Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting

7.1. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibilities for reviewing and consulting on issues related to the implementation of sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA assisted by a working group on the implementation of sanctions lifting.

7.2. The Joint Commission participants will participate in this working group. The High Representative will serve as coordinator of this working group.

7.3. If at any time following the implementation day Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure including related designations of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the working group.

7.4. The participants of the working group will review and consult, with a view to resolving the issue within 30 working days.

7.5. If after involvement of the working group, the issue remains unresolved, any participant of the JCPOA may refer it to the Joint Commission.

JCPOA Annex V - Implementation Plan¹

1. This Annex describes the sequence of the actions specified in Annexes I and II to this JCPOA.

A. Finalisation Day

2. Upon conclusion of the negotiations of this JCPOA, the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and Iran will endorse this JCPOA.

3. Promptly after the conclusion of the negotiations of this JCPOA, the proposed UN Security Council resolution referred to in Section 18 of this Annex will be submitted to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay. [Subjugation of the U.S. Congress – by the Obama Executive Branch through the UN Security Council !!!!]

4. The EU will promptly endorse the UN Security Council resolution referred to above through Council Conclusions.

5. Iran and the IAEA will start developing necessary arrangements to implement all transparency measures provided for in this JCPOA so that such arrangements are completed, in place, and ready for implementation on Implementation Day.

B. Adoption Day

6. Adoption Day will occur 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council through the resolution referred to above, or at an earlier date by mutual consent of all JCPOA participants, at which point this JCPOA comes into effect.

7. Beginning on Adoption Day, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations, including legal and administrative preparations, for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.

8. Iran will officially inform the IAEA that, effective on Implementation Day, Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol, pending its ratification by the Majlis (Parliament), and will fully implement the modified code 3.1. [So IRAN's Parliament gets to control and participate, but not our Legislative Branch] [Subjugation of the U.S. Congress – by the Obama Executive Branch through the UN Security Council !!!!] [Democrats and Republicans should be outraged by the actions of the Obama and his Executive Branch !!!!]

9. Iran will implement paragraph 66 from Section M on “Past and Present Issues of Concern” of Annex I.

10. The EU and its Member States will adopt an EU Regulation, taking effect as of Implementation Day, terminating all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial EU sanctions as specified in Section 16.1 of this Annex, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of agreed nuclear-related measures.

11. The United States, acting pursuant to Presidential authorities [Subjugation of the U.S. Congress – by the Obama Executive Branch through the UN Security Council !!!!] [Democrats and Republicans should be outraged by the actions of the Obama and his Executive Branch !!!!], will issue waivers, to take effect upon Implementation Day, ceasing the application of the statutory nuclear-related sanctions as specified in Sections 17.1 to 17.2 of this Annex. The President [Subjugation of the U.S. Congress – by the Obama Executive Branch through the UN Security Council !!!!] [Democrats and Republicans should be outraged by the actions of the Obama and his Executive Branch !!!!] will also take action to direct that all appropriate

¹ This Annex is only for the purpose of determining the sequence of implementation of the commitments described in this JCPOA and annexes thereto and does not restrict or expand the scope of these commitments.

additional measures be taken to implement the cessation of application of sanctions as specified in Sections 17.1 to 17.4 of this Annex, including the **termination of Executive orders as specified in Section 17.4, and the licensing of activities as specified in Section 17.5.**

12. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will begin discussions on an official document to be concluded in advance of Implementation Day which will express strong **[No gaurentees – NO DEAL is better than this DEAL !!!!]** commitments of the E3/EU+3 participants to the Arak Heavy Water Reactor modernisation project and define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.

13. The EU, its Member States and the United States will begin consultation as appropriate with Iran regarding relevant guidelines and publicly accessible statements **[What will be going on in secret ?????] [If the World is ever going to be safe from NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST there can be no SECRETS !!!!]** on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures to be lifted under this JCPOA.

C. Implementation Day

14. Implementation Day will occur upon the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in paragraph 15 below, and, simultaneously, the E3/EU+3 taking the actions described in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, and with the actions described in paragraph 18 below taking place at the UN level in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.

15. Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I:

- 15.1. Paragraphs 3 and 10 from Section B on “Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor”;
- 15.2. Paragraphs 14 and 15 from Section C on “Heavy Water Production Plant”;
- 15.3. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 29.1 and 29.2 from Section F on “Enrichment Capacity”;
- 15.4. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 from Section G on “Centrifuges Research and Development”;
- 15.5. Paragraphs 45, 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 from Section H on “Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant”;
- 15.6. Paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 from Section I on “Other Aspects of Enrichment”;
- 15.7. Paragraphs 57 and 58 from Section J on “Uranium Stocks and Fuels”;
- 15.8. Paragraph 62 from Section K on “Centrifuge Manufacturing”;
- 15.9. Complete the modalities and facilities-specific arrangements to allow the IAEA to implement all transparency measures provided for in Annex I;
- 15.10. Paragraphs 64 and 65 from Section L on “Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1”;
- 15.11. Paragraphs 80.1 and 80.2 from Section R on “Centrifuge Component Manufacturing Transparency”; and
- 15.12. Within one year from Implementation Day, Iran will have completed the measures specified in paragraphs 47.2 and 48.2 of Section H on “Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant”.

16. The European Union will:

16.1. Terminate the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspend the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.1.1-1.1.3; 1.1.5-1.1.8; 1.2.1-1.2.5; 1.3.1, 1.3.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 16 and 17 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP) and 1.3.3; 1.4.1 and 1.4.2; 1.10.1.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 39, 43, 43a of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012) of Annex II. EU Member States will terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required.

16.2. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.6.1-1.7.2 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.

16.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II of this JCPOA from Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012. Suspend the provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Section 1.9.1 of Annex II in relation to individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II.

16.4. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 of Annex II to implement the relevant provisions of the UN Security Council resolution referred to above.

17. The United States will: **[READ THE FOOTNOTES !!!!]**

17.1. **Cease** the application of the sanctions set forth in Sections 4.1-4.5 and 4.7 of Annex II, with the exception of Section 211(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA);

[DICTATORIAL ORDERS OR DEMANDS IS NOT HOW OUR GOVERNMENT IS TO WORK !!!!]

[HAS THIS BECOME THE NEW WORLD ORDER WHERE THE UN RULES OVER THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ????

[IS THIS MORE OF OBAMA'S SUBJUGATION OF CONGRESS ???? **SEE PAGE 2/104 ITEM 2.** *Calls upon* all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and **by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments** **[Does a vote by the U.S. Congress that rejects this agreement not violate this clause ????** **Why would Secretary Kerry ever agree to this ????** **[Has Obama and his Administration decided that his Executive Branch is above the Legislative Branch process of our Federal Government and can do whatever they want ????** **[What is Imam Obama's real goal ????** **[Divide and conquer U.S. ????** **[This cannot be about Democrats and Republicans – it must be about U.S. – The United States of America. Obama has done nothing but attempt to divide and conquer U.S. !!!! Will this Congress allow him to continue ????** **]** under the JCPOA;]

17.2. **Cease** the application of the sanctions set forth in Section 4.6 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II;

[SEE COMMENTS UNDER 17.1] [SEE COMMENTS IN SECTION 4 OF ANNEX II !!!!]

17.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List (FSE List), and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List as set forth in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II;

[WILL THE UN AND THIS DEAL ORDER US WHO WE HAVE TO DO BUSINESS WITH ????

[HAVE THESE INDIVIDUALS BEEN VETTED BY THE CIA ????

[MORE OF OBAMA'S SUBJUGATION OF HOW THE GOVERNMENT FO THE WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS TO WORK !!!!]

17.4. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645 and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628 as set forth in Section 4 of Annex II; and

[THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE AUTHORITY IN EXECUTIVE ORDERS – AN IMAM OBAMA PRESIDENT DOES MORE FOR HIS FAITHFUL MUSLIMS THAN HE DOES FOR WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!!]

[THIS IS NOT HOW OUR GOVERNMENT IS TO WORK !!!!]

17.5. License activities as set forth in Section 5 of Annex II.

[SEE COMMENTS IN 17.3 ABOVE !!!!] [SEE COMMENTS IN SECTION 5 ANNEX II !!!!]

18. UN Security Council

18.1. In accordance with the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the provisions imposed in UN Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) will be terminated **subject to re-imposition** in the event of **significant non-performance by Iran** of JCPOA commitments, and specific

[WHAT DEFINES “significant nonperformance by IRAN” ????

[IRAN WILL PRESS THE LIMITS AND THEN BACK-OFF FOR 10 YEARS OR LESS AND THEN THEY WILL UNLEASH HELL ON THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]

²The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply are those directed towards non-U.S. persons, as described in Section 4 of Annex II.

restrictions, including restrictions regarding the transfer of proliferation sensitive goods will apply.³ **[READ THE FOOTNOTE !!!!]**

[WHY WAS THIS FOOTNOTE “³ The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.” REQUIRED ????

[IMAM OBAMA HAS PROVEN TIME AND AGAIN THAT HIS WORDS CAN'T BE TRUSTED AND THAT HE DOES MORE PROTECT HIS BROTHERS OF ISLAM THAN HE DOES WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!!]

[IMAM OBAMA AND HIS ADMINISTRATION AND THEIR WORDS BOTH VERBALLY AND WRITTEN ON THIS DEAL CAN'T BE TRUSTED !!!!]

18.2. The E3/EU+3 will **take appropriate measures** to implement the new UNSC resolution.

[WHAT DOES “TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES” MEAN ????

D. Transition Day

19. Transition Day will occur 8 years from Adoption Day or upon a report from the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the UN Security Council stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.

20. The European Union will:

20.1. Terminate the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspend the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.1.4, 1.3.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 15 and 18 of Council Decision and Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation); 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 (in so far as it concerns Ballistic Missiles restrictions); 1.6.1-1.9.1 of Annex II.

20.2. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 2 to Annex II from Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012.

20.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II from Annexes I and II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP.

20.4. Terminate all provisions in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP suspended on Implementation Day.

21. The United States will:

21.1. **Seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate,** or modify to effectuate the termination of, the statutory sanctions set forth in Sections 4.1-4.5, 4.7 and 4.9 of Annex II;

[DICTATORIAL ORDERS OR DEMANDS IS NOT HOW OUR GOVERNMENT IS TO WORK !!!!]

[HAS THIS BECOME THE NEW WORLD ORDER WHERE THE UN RULES OVER THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ????

[IS THIS MORE OF OBAMA'S SUBJUGATION OF CONGRESS ???? SEE PAGE 2/104 ITEM 2. Calls upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments **[Does a vote by the U.S. Congress that rejects this agreement not violate this clause ???? Why would Secretary Kerry ever agree to this ????** **[Has Obama and his Administration decided that his Executive Branch is above the Legislative Branch process of our Federal Government and can do whatever they want ????** **[What is Imam Obama's real goal ????** **[Divide and conquer U.S. ????** **[This cannot be about Democrats and Republicans – it must be about U.S. – The United States of America. Obama has done nothing but attempt to divide and conquer U.S. !!!! Will this Congress allow him to continue ????** **under the JCPOA;]**

21.2. Seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the statutory sanctions described in Section 4.6 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to Annex II; and

[SEE COMMENTS UNDER 21.1]

21.3. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 4 to Annex II from the SDN List and/or the FSE List as set forth in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II.

[WILL THE UN AND THIS DEAL ORDER US WHO WE HAVE TO DO BUSINESS WITH ????

[HAVE THESE INDIVIDUALS BEEN VETTED BY THE CIA ????

[MORE OF OBAMA'S SUBJUGATION OF HOW THE GOVERNMENT FO THE WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS TO WORK !!!!]

22. Iran will:

22.1. Seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.

E. UNSCR Termination Day

23. UNSCR (UN Security Council resolution) Termination Day will occur in accordance with the terms of the UN Security Council resolution endorsing

³ The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.

the JCPOA, which is 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated.

[IT ALL ENDS AT 10 YEARS OR SOONER AND NOTHING OF THE 15, 20, OR 25 YEARS REALLY MATTERS !!!!]

[IRAN WILL BE ABLE TO DO WHATEVER IT WANTS !!!!]

24. On UNSCR Termination Day, the provisions and measures imposed in that resolution would terminate and the UN Security Council would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue.

[IT ALL ENDS AT 10 YEARS OR SOONER AND NOTHING OF THE 15, 20, OR 25 YEARS REALLY MATTERS !!!!]

[IRAN WILL BE ABLE TO DO WHATEVER IT WANTS !!!!]

25. **The European Union will:**

25.1. Terminate all remaining provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP.

F. Other

26. The terminations described in this Annex V are without prejudice to other JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates.

[A HOLLOW STATEMENT THAT MEANS NOTHING BECAUSE IF IRAN CHEATS THERE IS NOTHING TO BE DONE BUT WAR !!!!]

[AND IF IRAN CHEATS BY DELIVERING BOMBS BY AIR, SEA, AND LAND IT WILL BE TOO LATE !!!!]

[IT ALL ENDS AT 10 YEARS OR SOONER AND NOTHING OF THE 15, 20, OR 25 YEARS REALLY MATTERS !!!!]

[IRAN WILL BE ABLE TO DO WHATEVER IT WANTS !!!!]

Annex B: Statement

Statement

China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union have concluded [IF IT HASN'T PASSED CONGRESS THIS IS JUST MORE IMAM OBAMA SUBJUGATION OF WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!!] with Iran a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. [IS 8, 10, 15, 20, 25 YEARS REALLY A LONG TERM SOLUTION ????] [CIVILIZATION/HUMANS HAVE BEEN SEEKING CONQUEST FOR 10S OF THOUSANDS OF YEARS – HOW DOES ANYONE REALLY BELIEVE THIS IS A “long term and proper solution” ????] To improve transparency and create an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the JCPOA, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union have set forth below certain provisions. Their participation in the JCPOA is contingent upon the United Nations Security Council adopting a new resolution that would, acting under Article 41 of the UN Charter: terminate resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015); require States to comply

[SUBJUGATION OF PROCESSES WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!]

[IS THIS MORE OF OBAMA'S SUBJUGATION OF CONGRESS ???? SEE PAGE 2/104 ITEM 2. Calls upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments [Does a vote by the U.S. Congress that rejects this agreement not violate this clause ???? Why would Secretary Kerry ever agree to this ????] [Has Obama and his Administration decided that his Executive Branch is above the Legislative Branch process of our Federal Government and can do whatever they want ????] [What is Imam Obama's real goal ????] [Divide and conquer U.S. ????] [This cannot be about Democrats and Republicans – it must be about U.S. – The United States of America. Obama has done nothing but attempt to divide and conquer U.S. !!!! Will this Congress allow him to continue ????] under the JCPOA;]

with the provisions in this statement for their respective durations [IS IT 8, 10, 15, 20, OR 25 YEARS ???] [IRAN CAN DO WHATEVER IT WANTS 10 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]; and facilitate, in cooperation with the Joint Commission established in the JCPOA, implementation of the JCPOA as provided in paragraphs 2 and 6(a) below.

As provided by a resolution so deciding, the following provisions would apply on the date on which the IAEA Director General submits a report verifying that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA:

1. The term “all States” as used in this document, and as incorporated in the resolution, means “all States without exception.”

2. All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;

[THE DEAL CAN BE VIOLATED BY APPROVAL OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL] [WHAT IS THE DEAL THEN ????] [NO DEAL IS AS GOOD AS THIS DEAL !!!!]

[YOU CAN BET THAT IRAN AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ARE ALREADY WORKING ON THESE DEALS !!!!]

(b) the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above; and

[THE DEAL CAN BE VIOLATED BY APPROVAL OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL] [WHAT IS THE DEAL THEN ????] [NO DEAL IS AS GOOD AS THIS DEAL !!!!]

[YOU CAN BET THAT IRAN AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ARE ALREADY WORKING ON THESE DEALS !!!!]

(c) acquisition by Iran of an interest in a commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining or production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1,

[WHAT DOES THIS DOCUMENT SAY ???] [CAN RUSSIA PROVIDE THEM WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT ????]

[RUSSIA'S ECONOMY IS IN TROUBLE – AN IRANIAN BOOST OF MONEY WILL DO WHAT FOR RUSSIA] [THE IRANIAN GOAL OF WIPING OUT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL WILL DO WHAT FOR RUSSIA ????]

and such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them,

except that approval in advance by the Security Council shall not be required **[UNSC REMOVES ITSELF AFTER 10 YEARS OR SOONER]** for the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of equipment covered by B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 when such equipment is for light water reactors, low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors, as well as items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part 2 only when for exclusive use in light water reactors.

For any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that are approved by the Security Council pursuant to subparagraph (a) above, or are supplied, sold, or transferred subject to the exception stated above, States are to ensure that: (a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the referenced INFCIRC have been met; (b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; (c) they notify the Security Council within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and d) in the case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the referenced INFCIRCs, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer.

[DOES ANYONE REALLY BELIEVE THAT IRAN AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WILL COMPLY ????]

And except also that approval in advance by the Security Council **is not required** for the supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and the provision of any related technical assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, that is directly related to the necessary modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, the export of Iran's enriched uranium in excess of 300 kilograms in return for natural uranium, and the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design and, subsequently, on the agreed final design of such reactor, provided that Member States ensure that: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; (b) they notify the Security Council and Joint Commission ten days in advance of such activities; (c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the referenced INFCIRC have been met; (d) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and

[IF THE IAEA IS REALLY DOING "CONTINUOUS MONITORING" (UNDEFINED WHAT THIS TERM MEANS IN THIS DEAL) WHY IS THIS VERIFICATION REQUIRED ????]

(e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the referenced INFCIRCs, they also notify the IAEA within **ten days** of the supply, sale or transfers.

[IRAN AND RUSSIA WILL COOK THE BOOKS ON QUANTITIES AND THE IAEA AND NO ONE ELSE WILL REALLY KNOW WHAT'S WHAT, WHEN, AND WHERE !!!!]

This paragraph shall apply until the date **ten years** after JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, **except if the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion before that date,**

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND THE DEAL ENDS 10 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]

then the **requirement to obtain approval in advance by the Security Council shall be suspended immediately** and, beginning on the date of this suspension, the exceptions provided for in this paragraph shall continue to apply and all States may participate in and permit the activities set forth in this paragraph if they notify the Security Council and the Joint Commission at least ten working days in advance of each such activity on a case-by-case basis.

3. **Iran is called upon not to undertake** any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, **until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day** or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, **whichever is earlier.**

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND THE DEAL ENDS 8 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]

[THERE IS NOTHING THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TIMELINE IN THIS DEAL !!!!]

[THIS DEAL ALLOWS FOR IRAN TO BECOME A NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWER SUPPORTED AND STRENGTHEN BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION !!!!]

[NO DEAL IS BETTER THAN THIS DEAL !!!!]

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below *provided* that the Security Council decides in advance **[WHAT HAPPENS AFTER 8 YEARS OR SOONER ???]** on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of **any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems**;

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND IRAN WILL HAVE A BOMB 8 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]

and

(b) the provision to Iran of any technology or technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, or Iran's acquisition of an interest in any commercial activity in another State, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in **subparagraph a**

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND IRAN WILL HAVE A BOMB 8 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]

of this paragraph or related to the activities described in paragraph 3.

provided that in the event of an approval by the Security Council: (a) the contract for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate **end-user guarantees**; and (b) **Iran commit not to use such items for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems**.

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND IRAN WILL HAVE A BOMB 8 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]

[BUT IRAN CAN USE COMMERCIAL PLANES, TRAINS, BUSES, CARS, AND SHIPS AS DELIVERY SYSTEMS !!!!]

This paragraph shall apply until the date **eight years** after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is **earlier**.

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND IRAN WILL HAVE A NUCLEAR BOMB 8 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]

5. All States may participate in and permit, *provided* that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, **of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel**.

[IF THIS DEAL IS REALLY ABOUT PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR POWER WHAT THE HELL IS THIS DOING IN HERE ???]

including spare parts, and the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of **technical training**, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, **manufacture**, maintenance, or **use of arms and related materiel** described in this subparagraph.

[IF THIS DEAL IS REALLY ABOUT PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR POWER WHAT THE HELL IS THIS DOING IN HERE ???]

This paragraph shall apply until the **date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day** or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, **whichever is earlier**.

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND IRAN WILL HAVE A MASSIVE WAR MACHINE 5 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]

6. **All States are to:**

(a) Take the necessary measures to ensure that any activities described in paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 occur on their territories, or involving their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or involving their flag vessels or aircraft, only pursuant to the relevant terms of those

paragraphs, and also to prevent and prohibit any activities inconsistent with these provisions, until the date **ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day** or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, **whichever is earlier**;

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND IS IT 10, 8, OR 5 YEARS OR SOONER ????]

[INCONSISTENCIES CREATE DISCREPANCIES IN UNDERSTANDING !!!!]

[DISCREPANCIES CREATE CONFLICTS IN UNDERSTANDING !!!!]

[CONFLICTS CREATE DISPUTES IN UNDERSTANDING !!!!]

[DISPUTES IN UNDERSTANDING GIVE IRAN AN OUT NOT TO COMPLY !!!!]

(b) Take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the UN Security Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel **from Iran** by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran, **until the date five years** after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, **whichever is earlier**;

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND IRAN WILL HAVE A MASSIVE WAR MACHINE 5 YEARS OR SOONER AND IRAN CAN START EXPORTING ITS MASSIVE WAR MACHINE FOR TERROR AROUND THE WORLD 5 YEARS OR SOONER!!!!]

(c) **For eight years** after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier, **continue to freeze** the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of the JCPOA, and freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the **individuals and entities that were specified** on the list established and maintained by the Committee pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) as of the date of adoption of the new resolution, **with the exception of those individuals and entities specified in Attachment hereto**, or that may be **de-listed by the Security Council**.

[THE UNSC DECIDES AND IF CONGRESS OR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OBJECT THEN IRAN CAN RUN FORM THE DEAL AND DO WHAT THEY WANT !!!!]

[IMAM OBAMA IS SETTING UP THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO BE BLAMED FOR THE FAILURE OF THE DEAL !!!! AND IMAM OBAMA HAS SUBJUGATED CONGRESS SO THAT IT HAPPENS SOONER THAN LATER AND HIS ISLAMIC BROTHERS IN ARMS FOR THE DESTRUCITON OF AMERICA CAN OCCUR !!!!]

[IMAM OBAMA THE NO. 1 DOMESTIC ENEMY OF WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !!!!]

and freeze those of additional individuals and entities that may be designated by the Security Council as: having engaged in, directly associated with or provided support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities undertaken contrary to Iran's commitments in the JCPOA or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified in this statement; having assisted designated individuals or entities in evading or acting inconsistently with the **JCPOA or the new resolution**; having acted on behalf or at the direction of designated individuals or entities; or having been owned or controlled by designated individuals or entities, including through illicit means.

[READ – SEE – UNDERSTAND IRAN WILL HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON 8 YEARS OR SOONER !!!!]

(d) **For eight years** from the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, **whichever is earlier**, ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of designated individuals or entities. These requirements shall not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:

i. To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with

national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Security Council of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Security Council within five working days of such notification;

[THE NAIVEITE OF THE WESTERN WORLD – BE NICE TO IRAN AND IRAN WILL BE NICE TO THE REST OF THE WORLD !!!!!]

[THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAN WILL NOT BE NICE TO ANYONE THAT IS NOT UNDER IRAN'S ISLAMIC CONTROL OR WHO DOES NOT AGREE WITH IRAN'S ISLAMIC LAW !!!!!]

ii. To be necessary for **extraordinary expenses**,

[MORE UNDEFINED TERMS !!!!!] [MONEYS FOR A MAJOR (EXTRAORDINARY) NATURAL DISASTER ARE OFTEN LOST AND MISSUSED FOR OTHER BENEFITS THAN WHAT THEY WERE INTENDED FOR !!!!!]

provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council and has been approved by the Security Council;

iii. To be necessary for the **civil nuclear cooperation projects** described in Annex III of the JCPOA, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council and has been approved by the Security Council;

iv. To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), is not for the benefit of a person or entity subject to the measures in this paragraph, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council; or

[MORE AVENUES FOR IRAN TO DO WHAT THEY WANT WITH THE MONEY THAT COMES IN FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD !!!!!]

v. To be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in paragraph 2, or to any other activity required for the implementation of the JCPOA, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council and has been approved by the Security Council.

In addition, this provision shall not prevent a designated individual or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such individual or entity, provided that the relevant **States have determined**

[AND WHAT WILL THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION DECIDE WITH ALL OF THE RUSSIAN CONTRACTS ????]

[RUSSIA WILL CLAIM EVERYTHING COMPLYS !!!!!]

[IMAM OBAMA HAS PISSED PUTIN OFF TO THE POINT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ONCE AGAIN RUSSIA'S PRIMARY TARGET !!!!!]

that the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in this statement; the payment is not directly or indirectly received by an individual or entity subject to the measures in this paragraph; and after notification by the relevant States to the Security Council of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working days prior to such authorization.

In addition, **States may permit** the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to this paragraph of interest or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts were frozen, provided that such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these measures and are frozen;

(e) For **five years** from the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, **whichever is earlier**, take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or **transit** through their territories **of individuals** described in paragraphs 6(c) above, although underlining that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory. The measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the Security Council determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, **including religious obligations**, **[AND WHO WILL DETERMINE THE PERSONS RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS ???]** **[MECCA WILL BECOME THE MEETING AND MELTING POT FOR EXPORTED TERRORISM TO THE WESTERN WORLD !!!!]** **[LOOK OUT SAUDI ARABIA – IRAN WILL BE COMING FOR YOU !!!!]** or where the **Security Council concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives** of the new resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA statute is engaged;

(f) Take the required actions, in accordance with the resolution and guidance provided by the Security Council, with respect to items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement, and cooperate in such efforts.

[OPEN ENDED STATEMENT THAT ALLOWS FOR EVERYTHING REQUIRED FOR AN IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPON TO BE ACQUIRED TO OCCUR !!!!]

7. **All States are called upon to facilitate full implementation of the JCPOA** by inspecting, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, **in their territory**, including seaports and airports, **if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds** to believe that the cargo contains

[NO INSPECTIONS AT-WILL ARE ALLOWED !!!! SEE 3.4.3 PAGE 41/104 AND CONTINUED ON PAGE 42/104 !!!!]

items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement; and are called upon also to cooperate in inspections on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, **if there is information that provides reasonable grounds**

[NO INSPECTIONS AT-WILL ARE ALLOWED !!!! SEE 3.4.3 PAGE 41/104 AND CONTINUED ON PAGE 42/104 !!!!]

to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement.

China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, **the United States** and the European Union note their understanding that, upon adoption of a resolution endorsing the JCPOA, the **Security Council would make the practical arrangements to undertake directly**

[HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO RESPOND TO THESE REQUIREMENTS ???]

[JUST ALLOWS FOR DELAYS SO IRAN CAN HIDE WHAT THEY ARE REALLY DOING !!!!]

the tasks specified in this statement, **including to monitor and take action to support the implementation** by Member States of these provisions, review proposals described in paragraph 2 of this statement, answer inquiries from Member States, **provide guidance, and examine information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution**. Furthermore, these states propose that the Security Council ask the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of these provisions every six months. The duration of the provisions in this statement may be reviewed by the Joint Commission at the request of any participant at its biannual ministerial-level meetings, at which time the Joint Commission could make recommendations by consensus to the Security Council.

ATTACHMENT

1. AGHA-JANI, Dawood
2. ALAI, Amir Moayyed
3. ASGARPOUR, Behman
4. ASHIANI, Mohammad Fedai
5. ASHTIANI, Abbas Rezaee
6. ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANISATION OF IRAN (AEOI)
7. BAKHTIAR, Haleh
8. BEHZAD, Morteza
9. ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTRE (NFRPC) AND ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE (ENTC)
10. FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.:
11. HOSSEINI, Seyyed Hussein
12. IRANO HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
13. IRISL BENELUX NV
14. JABBER IBN HAYAN
15. KARAJ NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE
16. KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
17. LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
18. MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
19. MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
20. MOHAJERANI, Hamid-Reza
21. MOHAMMADI, Jafar
22. MONAJEMI, Ehsan
23. NOBARI, Houshang
24. NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
25. NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
26. PARS TRASH COMPANY
27. PISHGAM (PIONEER) ENERGY INDUSTRIES
28. QANNADI, Mohammad
29. RAHIMI, Amir
30. RAHIQI, Javad
31. RASHIDI, Abbas
32. SABET, M. Javad Karimi
33. SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
34. SOLEYMANI, Ghasem
35. SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (SSL)
36. TAMAS COMPANY

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